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Abstract 
  
This thesis examines the ramifications of Britain’s negotiations to join the European 
Community (EC) on Anglo-American relations, 1969-1974. It adds to the historical debate by 
showing that strong Anglo-American political, economic, and defence relations continued under 
Heath and Nixon. The prevailing view in this area is that the British Prime Minister Heath 
sought to re-orientate foreign policy away from the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship 
towards the EC. Moreover, it is believed that the Nixon presidency developed a sceptical view 
of an enlarged, competitive EC. Thus, the Heath-Nixon period is viewed as a low point in the 
post-1945 alliance because of the EC enlargement. However, while gaining entry into the EC 
was the top priority for the UK government, Heath and Whitehall sought to preserve close 
Anglo-American cooperation. Moreover, Nixon considered Western European integration and 
Anglo-American relations to be important components of the Atlantic Alliance and his Cold 
War strategy. Tensions did grow: over the substance of China and Middle Eastern policy, the 
unilateral dismantling of the Bretton Woods system, and the ‘Year of Europe’. But these 
episodes also showed the strength of the Anglo-American partnership. In the economic sphere 
the EC enlargement negotiations planted the UK into the middle of US-EC trade conflict over 
unfair trading practices. Furthermore, the UK’s entry into the EC altered the status of sterling, 
resulting in a delicate change to Anglo-American economic relations. Yet close cooperation 
continued in trade and monetary affairs, independent from the enlarged EC. In the field of 
defence policy, Anglo-American ‘special’ relations actually strengthened under Heath and 
Nixon with the Polaris missile system upgrade and the continuation of sharing military facilities 
and intelligence. The 1970s witnessed a subtle policy-making process and adjustment in 
diplomatic relations, less coherent and straightforward than previously presented. Using 
recently released government documents, this thesis contributes to developing our 
understanding of 1970s Anglo-American relations and European integration.       
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Introduction 
 
 Prime Minister Edward Heath, hoping to increase the importance of Western European 
cooperation in British foreign policy, opened up membership negotiations with the European 
Community (EC) in July 1970, but this potentially challenged Britain’s post-war relations with 
the US and the Commonwealth. While the US supported an integrated Western Europe with 
British participation since 1947 and the Marshall Plan, Britain decided not join in the early 
European integration projects of the 1950s, as a greater priority was placed on maintaining a 
global strategy. However, the 1960s saw a gradual shift in British foreign policy towards 
European integration with two unsuccessful applications to join the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
1
 A third opportunity arose in December 1969 following the EC conference 
at The Hague, where the member countries declared their support for the enlargement and 
strengthening of the integration project. This led to Heath reviving the second application, 
taking Britain into the EC on 1 January 1973. While the UK focussed on joining the EC, the US 
President Richard Nixon, entering office in January 1969, sought to improve relations with the 
Soviet Union, normalise relations with China, and end the Vietnam War, therefore devoting less 
time to the Anglo-American alliance and the EC. This raises an immediate question: what 
impact did the EC enlargement negotiations and UK membership of the EC have on Anglo-
American relations during the Heath-Nixon period? It is this problem which is the starting point 
of this study. 
 This thesis adds to the historical debate on Anglo-American relations and European 
integration in two central ways. Firstly, it shows the continuing importance of the Anglo-
American political, economic, and defence alliance under Heath and Nixon, independently from 
the EC context. Britain’s application to join the EC, and subsequent membership, created new 
dimensions to the Anglo-American relationship, which adjusted through a more subtle way than 
previous presented. Although an alteration took place, particularly apparent in the economic 
field, it did not mark a fundamental re-orientation of Anglo-American relations, nor US and UK 
foreign policy. The partnership remained one of the Heath government’s top priorities despite 
the strong desire to join the EC, while the Nixon administration considered both Anglo-
American relations and the EC as important for the Atlantic Alliance and their Cold War 
strategy. The financial, monetary, and trade connections between London and New York 
remained, as did major nuclear and political cooperation. Therefore the UK operated in between 
                                                 
1
  The European Economic Community (EEC) or ‘Common Market’, created by the Treaties  
of Rome (25 March 1957), included Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the  
Netherlands, and West Germany. The term European Community (EC) entered into use from  
July 1967 when the three existing communities merged - the EEC, the European Coal and  
Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). The  
term EC will be used throughout this study. Britain made its first application to join the EC  
under Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961 and its second application under Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson in 1967. Edward Heath revived the second application in July 1970.       
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the European and US zones, partly influenced by both. The Anglo-American relationship 
continues to be a relevant in international relations and for historians.     
Secondly, this study also makes a contribution to the historical debate by investigating 
specific issues related to the UK’s negotiations to join the EC and its connection to the Anglo-
American relationship in a more nuanced way the previously treated. (a) Politically, on the 
‘Trojan horse’ issue – the perception that the UK would create an Atlantic EC, promoting US 
influence – the Heath government thought that this would be the key stumbling block to gaining 
French approval for their application. The UK therefore adopted a policy of balancing relations 
with the US and France, in order to gain EC membership while retaining close Anglo-American 
relations. This policy influenced the Heath government’s pursuit of Anglo-French nuclear 
collaboration and the early adoption of the EC agricultural system. The Nixon administration 
understood this, and intentionally pursued a ‘hand-off’ position, so as to not jeopardize the 
UK’s application. Close political cooperation continued in Cold War strategy and British 
membership of the EC did not represent a fundamental change in the alliance, even if EC issues 
became more prominent.      
(b) Economically, the UK introduced agricultural levies as the first step in the transition 
towards the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy. This placed the UK into the middle of the EC-
US trading wars, which started to dominate the Anglo-American trade relationship even before 
the UK achieved membership. Likewise, on the UK’s attempt to associate the Commonwealth 
with the EC and preserve the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, this created both a US-UK and 
US-EC trade dispute. Finally, the UK made a commitment to run-down the sterling balances 
during the negotiations phrase. This soon replaced the ‘Trojan horse’ problem, from the 
perspective of the UK government, as the most important factor in gaining French support for 
UK membership of the EC. The changing status of the international role of sterling naturally 
altered Anglo-American monetary relations during the reform of the Bretton Woods system and 
the EC movement towards Economic and Monetary Union, analysed here together to increase 
our understanding of Anglo-American monetary relations and the EC enlargement. 
(c) In the defence field, despite the UK’s move towards EC membership, the Heath 
government retained a limited political presence in Singapore/Malaysia, as a partial reversal of 
the Wilson government’s decision to withdraw its position from East of Suez. This indicated the 
continuing importance of a world role, the Atlantic Alliance, and the Anglo-American 
relationship to the UK government, rather than just focussing on a regional, European security 
role. This was supported by the continuing cooperation in the sharing of military facilities 
across the globe, from Europe, to the Indian Ocean, and throughout the Caribbean. Finally, the 
Heath government pursued Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, in order to prove the UK’s 
desire for the European integration movement. This did not take off because of the fundamental 
difference between the nature of the UK and French nuclear forces – the French pursued an 
independent stance, while the UK sought inter-dependence with the US. In fact, the Heath 
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government’s decision to upgrade the Polaris missile system actually increased Anglo-
American nuclear collaboration, more so than under Macmillan. This thesis increases our 
knowledge of the Anglo-American aspects of the UK’s negotiations to enter the EC, as well as 
the state of the Anglo-American relationship. 
 
Historiography 
  
During the 1970s and 1980s historians had access to the government papers for the 
Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, a fascinating period when the Anglo-
American alliance played a central role in the international system. In the 1990s, the primary 
documents on the 1960s were made available. New histories focussed on the US-UK power 
imbalance, Britain’s decision to withdraw from East of Suez, and the Vietnam War. In the 
2000s, historical research based on internal government papers for the early 1970s is possible 
and is rapidly growing. Histories of Britain and European integration go from large to small in 
both the use of primary government information and the quantity of academic attention 
received. History produced and primary sources applied to Harold Macmillan’s EEC bid for 
entry 1961-1963 are extensive; they decrease in quantity for the Harold Wilson EEC bid of 
1967; and contract to a minor figure for the EC entry process under Edward Heath, 1970-1973. 
The many different perspectives on Anglo-American relations and the European integration 
movement have helped to create a more complete picture of the era. 
Histories prior to 2000 on the Heath-Nixon relationship have depended on three types 
of sources: contemporary accounts, memoirs/autobiographies, and public sources. In 
contemporary accounts, an incomplete collection of evidence causes difficulties in determining 
the relevance, reliability and representation of information, thus intensifying the problems all 
historians encounter.
2
 While memoirs, autobiographies, and diaries offer unique and personal 
information not apparent in government documents, this genre has contributed towards creating 
a limited view of the Heath-Nixon period, particularly through a heavy reliance on Henry 
Kissinger’s memoirs.3 The main public sources on the Heath-Nixon governments particularly 
used were parliamentary and congressional debates, and in the US the Public Papers of the 
Presidents. The number of published documents is small (compared to sources collected in 
archives) and the scope is limited by the editor of the published series. Legislation, reports, 
conferences, and speeches outline policies and public rhetoric, but do not include internal 
                                                 
2
  For three contemporary accounts: Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How  
Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), 11-18. Simon Young, 
Terms of Entry: Britain’s Negotiations with the European Community 1970-1972 (London: 
Heinemann, 1973). Con O’Neill, Britain’s Entry into the European Community: Report on the 
Negotiations of 1970-1972 (London: Frank Cass, 2000). Sir Con O’Neill led the British Official 
Delegation at the EC negotiations. He completed his report in July 1972, available to the public 
since 2000.  
3
  Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979). Henry  
Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982). 
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debates. Therefore, the histories constructed before the release of vital government papers have 
resulted in recurring assumptions, which are especially open for re-examination, although this 
study is also revising conventional views independently from the new sources.  
 This thesis touches on a range of historiographical debates, covering a triangle of 
relations between the UK, the US, and the EC, mainly covered in four areas of literature: firstly, 
studies on the Anglo-American relationship; secondly, studies looking into Britain and 
European integration; thirdly, histories of the Heath government; fourthly, histories of the 
Nixon administration. While history books are independent of each other and concepts and 
approaches cross-over between different schools of thought, trends may be discerned.   
 
Anglo-American Relations 
 
The nature of the Anglo-American relationship is a theme running through the 
historiography. ‘Functionalist’ interpretations focussed on shared or conflicting interests in the 
relationship. Cultural historians thought language, historical heritage and values created a bond 
between the US and the UK. A further focus of debate is the term ‘special’. Functionalists 
defined ‘special’ by focussing on the degree of policy influence each government had on the 
other, with particular reference to nuclear and intelligence sharing. Cultural historians looked at 
sentimental and societal factors making the relationship ‘special’. The dominant position argued 
is that a ‘special’ relationship between the US and UK has existed at various points during and 
since the Second World War. A smaller number of studies attempted to deconstruct the myth of 
a ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship.4  
A prevailing opinion of historians in the 1980s and 1990s is that post 1970 Anglo-
American relations were ‘Europeanised’. This raises the issue of what is actually meant by the 
term ‘Europeanisation’. One aspect is that it is argued that under both Heath and Nixon a 
reappraisal of foreign policy occurred. The failure of non-European options for the UK resulted 
in a firm commitment to the EC. On the American side, a sceptical view of a supranational 
                                                 
4
  John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schafer, eds., America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and  
Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance (London: Routledge, 2009). Alex Danchev, ‘On 
Specialness’, International Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 4, 1996, 737-750.  John Baylis, “Anglo-
American Relationship and Alliance Theory”, International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1985, 368-
379. David Reynolds, ‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order 
Since the Second World War”, International Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 1, 1985, 1-20. Raymond 
Dawson and Richard Rosecrance, “Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance”, World 
Politics, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1966, 21-51. Richard Aldrich, “British Intelligence and the Anglo-
American ‘Special Relationship’ during the Cold War”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 
24, 1998, 331-351. Kathleen Burk, Old War, New World: The Story of Britain and America 
(London: Little, Brown, 2007).  Antoine Capet and Aissatou Sy-Wonyu, eds., The ‘Special 
Relationship’: La Relation Spéciale (Rouen: University of Rouen, 2003).  
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Europe developed, and therefore the relationship became dominated by US-European issues.
5
 
David Watt took the view that “since the 1970s Anglo-American relations...have ceased to be 
very important or interesting. To be either, they have to be viewed in the context of American-
European relations”.6 This interpretation is also supported in more recent studies.7 But does 
‘Europeanisation’ constitute a fundamental transformation in the relationship, or just a subtle 
change? Anglo-American cooperation continues today in many fields, independently from EC 
issues, and therefore the alliance continues to be important in international relations and for 
historians, outside of the EC context. Moreover, issues raised by Britain’s accession to the EC 
were carefully handled within the Anglo-American relationship, which could suggest the 
‘Europeanisation’ of the alliance. On the other hand, it may actually reveal a determined effort 
to preserve the bilateral alliance in conjunction with British EC membership, thus leaving a 
degree of separation between Anglo-American relations, US-EC relations, and UK-EC 
relations.  
  Meanwhile, many historians viewed Heath as having little regard for the special 
relationship. Alan Dobson claimed that under Heath “Europe had decisively replaced the US as 
the main overseas focus of the United Kingdom”.8 Richie Ovendale argued that Nixon wanted 
friendship with Heath, but Heath remained aloof because of Europe; moreover, “Heath was 
probably the first British Prime Minister in thirty years without any commitment to the Anglo-
American special relationship”.9 Christopher Bartlett agreed, arguing that Heath did not want to 
be “seen as America’s Trojan horse in the EEC”, and therefore Heath no longer wanted special 
relations with the US.
10
  
Some historians have also argued that diverging Anglo-American economic and 
political interests as a result of British decline and membership of the EC caused significant 
tensions and fundamentally altered the relationship. David Reynolds thought that “the 
                                                 
5
  Robert Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations since World War II  
(Boston, Massachusetts: Twayne Publishers, 1990), 101. Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American  
Relations in the Twentieth Century, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 133. C.J. Bartlett, 
‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945 
(London: Longman, 1992), 130. John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American 
Relations From the Cold War to Iraq, 2
nd
 Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006). This book gives 
an extended treatment to the issue of Anglo-American relations and European integration (see 
216-241).    
6
  David Watt, “Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship”, in The ‘Special Relationship’:  
Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, eds., Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986), 13. Also see Ernest May and Gregory Treverton, “Defence Relationships: 
American Perspectives”, in The ‘Special Relationship’, eds., Louis and Bull, 162. Alistair Horne, 
“The Macmillan Years and Afterwards”, in The ‘Special Relationship’, eds. Louis and Bull, 101.   
7
  Niklas Rossbach, Heath, Nixon and the Rebirth of the Special Relationship: Britain, the US and  
the EC, 1969-74 (London: Palgrave: 2009). 
8
  Alan Dobson, “The Special Relationship and European Integration”, Diplomacy and Statecraft,  
Vol.2, No.1, 1991, 79. Also see Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth 
Century: Of friendship, conflict, and the rise and decline of the superpowers (London: 
Routledge, 1995), 141. 
9
   Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations, 133.  
10
     Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’, 130. 
- 14 - 
 
underlying reason was not personality but power”, thus diminishing the influence of Heath and 
Nixon on the conditions of early 1970s Anglo-American relations.
11
     
 Many of these studies, with a 1980s and 1990s contemporary orientation, lacked 
extensive archival research on the Heath-Nixon period, with only small sections covering 1970-
1974, and relying too heavily on the Kissinger memoirs and newspapers. However, since the 
2000s with the release of new documents, the historical debate has moved forward. John 
Dumbrell noted that “the notion of a sharp Anglo-American transition in the Heath years can be 
overstated”, thus signalling the beginning of a change in interpretation of Anglo-American 
relations under Heath and Nixon.
12
 Since around 2009 to 2010, during the writing of this thesis, 
many recent studies have started to reappraise this period, suggesting that the Heath-Nixon 
relationship was not as bad as previously thought. This also shows the continuing scholarly 
interest in Anglo-American relations.
13
  
 
Britain and European Integration 
 
The historiography of Britain and European integration is vast, and much can be learned 
about the evolution of British European policy since 1945, coving many angles, by just studying 
the historiographical dissection.
14
 Some historians saw Britain’s position on the EC in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and entry into the EC from 1973 as a traditional foreign policy of seeking to 
maintain and increase British influence in world affairs.
15
 Historians contradicting this 
perspective argued that Britain’s embrace of European integration marked a fundamental re-
orientation of British foreign policy in the twentieth century.
16
 The wide range of literature can 
be boxed into three groups, or trends, although this is not uniform and many studies add a 
different aspect to the debate. 
The orthodox school argued that successive British governments missed or lost the 
opportunity to catch the European ‘bus’ or ‘boat’ up until Britain’s accession to the EC in 1973, 
                                                 
11
  Reynolds, ‘A ‘Special Relationship’?”, 13. For a similar view see David Dimbleby and David  
Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth 
Century (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), 266. 
12
  Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, 89. 
13
  Alex Spelling, “Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1974: A Reappraisal”,  
Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2009 638-658. Andrea Benvenuti, “The Heath 
Government and British Defence Policy in Southeast Asia at the End of Empire (1970-71)”, 
Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, 53-73. Thomas Robb, “Antelope, 
Poseidon or a Hybrid: The Upgrading of the British Nuclear Deterrent 1970-1974”, Journal of 
Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6, 2010 797-817. Catherine Hynes and Sandra Scanlon, eds., 
Reform and Renewal: Transatlantic Relations during the 1960s and 1970s (Newcastle: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009).  
14
  Oliver Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945: Historiographic Perspectives on Integration  
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 10-11.  
15
  Paul Sharp, “The Place of the European Community in the Foreign Policy of British  
Governments 1961-1971”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1982,  
155. 
16
  John Young, Britain and European Unity 1945-1999, 2
nd
 Edition (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press,  
2000), 184. 
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as displayed in the works of Miriam Camps.
17
 This judged Britain’s cautious approach to 
European unity a mistake or missed opportunity, and was thus a politically subjective view. 
Some historians have commented on the influence of the ‘Europeanists’ on this school of 
thought – a network of pro-European opinion makers in the UK, US, and Europe, which 
assumed that the European integration movement was a natural, superior process to the British 
preference. This distorts the argument and deflects attention from the perception and intentions 
of policy makers.
18
  
Related to this is the ‘awkward partner’ perspective, as seen in the works of Stephen 
George, which suggested that the UK government attached unwarranted importance to the 
Anglo-American relationship above the European factor. Interestingly, George believed that 
Heath also took an awkward position in the EC, stemming from a traditional foreign policy, 
similar to that of Macmillan and Wilson. This differed from many Anglo-American historians 
who thought of Heath as fundamentally pro-European.
19
 Revisionist historians heavily criticised 
George’s work for the lack of comparison between British policy and the government policies 
of other European countries, to determine the relative awkwardness of Britain.
20
 Once again, 
this interpretation implied that Britain departed from the ‘natural’ path of European integration.    
The revisionist school emerged in the 1980s, challenging the orthodox viewpoint with 
the use of new archival evidence. This ‘new perspective’ sought to ‘understand’ policy rather 
than ‘explaining’ the failure of Britain to join in the early European project.21 Jan Melissen and 
Bert Zeeman argued that “Britain did not miss the European bus; it just declined to board one 
that was going in the wrong direction”.22 Wolfram Kaiser argued that Whitehall officials 
                                                 
17
  Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (Princeton: Princeton  
University Press, 1964), 507. Thirty years later, Camps believed that the documents released  
from the NAUK (Kew) offered few surprises and supported her original thesis of missed 
chances. See Miriam Camps, “Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times?”, in From 
Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945, eds., Brian Brivati and Harriet 
Jones (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 134-143. 
18
  Pascaline Winand, “American ‘Europeanists’, Monnet’s Action Committee and British  
Membership”, in Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-1963: The 
Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations, ed., 
George Wilkes (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 164-190. Oliver Daddow, “Introduction: The 
Historiography of Wilson’s Attempt to Take Britain into the EEC”, in Harold Wilson and 
European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC, ed., Oliver Daddow 
(London: Frank Cass: 2003), 1-36.  
19
  Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3
rd
 edition (Oxford:  
Oxford University Press, 1998), 12-16 & 39-40 & 70. Stephen George, eds., Britain and the  
European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).  
Stephen George, “The Awkward Partner: An Overview”, in From Reconstruction to Integration, 
eds., Brivati and Jones, 179-190. For similar interpretation see Sean Greenwood, Britain and 
European Cooperation since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 94-102. David Gowland  and 
Arthur Turner, Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-1998 (New York: 
Longman, 2000), 4.    
20
  Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, Abusing Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945- 
1963 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), xxxi. Young, Britain and European Unity, 186-187.  
21
  Daddow, Britain and Europe Since 1945, 114-156. 
22
  Jan Melissen and Bert Zeeman, “Britain and Western Europe 1945-1951: Opportunities Lost?”,  
International Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 1, 1987, 93.   
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recognised Britain’s long term interests in Europe but that there was “a time-lag in the 
Europeanisation of Britain’s trade and political interests”.23 John Young also noted the gradual 
rise of a “sophisticated European policy” circle in British foreign affairs. Furthermore, Young 
viewed “Heath Europeanism” as causing distance in the Anglo-American relationship.24 
Christopher Lord argued that Heath took Britain into the EC with two conflicting European 
policies – on one side economic and security policy started to depend on membership of the EC, 
but on the other hand British policy makers did not want to relinquish British sovereignty.
25
 
Another theme in revisionist studies is to view the second application under Wilson as a 
“successful failure”. While the application may have been a short term defeat, it helped pave the 
way for Heath’s success in gaining entry into the EC.26 This area needs more research, from 
1967 to 1973, to determine the exact influence of Wilson’s failure on Heath’s success.   
Some historians have taken a more international approach. Piers Ludlow, using the 
archives of European countries and the institutions of the EC, showed the community reaction 
to Britain’s first application and negotiations to join the EC, thus offering a new perspective.27 
These revisionist histories offered a better understanding of British policy decisions on 
European integration and the EC enlargement negotiations than in the orthodox works.  
A third category has also developed, referred to as the post-revisionist school, in which 
writers have presented British policy making as a subtle and incoherent process. With an 
abundance of new primary evidence, post-revisionists have noted the rapidly shifting opinions 
of government officials, covering the entire period of Britain’s applications to join the EC.28 
While many of these studies cited on Britain and European integration did not deal with the 
Heath government in detail or at all, they are relevant to this thesis for understanding the 
different approaches in re-interpreting British European integration history. 
 
 The Heath Government 
 
Influenced by a free market and Thatcherite climate, many studies in the 1980s 
criticised the ‘failures’ of the Heath government. Martin Holmes argued that Heath abandoned 
                                                 
23
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25
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28
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key political and economic policy objectives, such as the promotion of the free market, leaving 
a legacy of failure.
29
 Holmes said that Heath was an unconditional supporter of EC membership, 
and therefore the negotiations would never fail i.e. that Heath would accept any terms of entry. 
This interpretation seems to ignore the views of the EC members and the tough negotiating 
position taken by Heath on Commonwealth association (discussed in this thesis) and other 
issues. Dennis Kavanagh also presented the Heath government as a failure.
30
 
The 1990s revisionist histories portrayed Heath in a more positive light.
31
 According to 
John Campbell’s biography, Heath wanted EC membership to provide a strong economic base 
in which Britain could rediscover a world role, but “he was never a European idealist”.32 
Moreover, Campbell said that Heath wanted to “…realign the country’s sense of identity 
irrevocably towards Europe”. This involved the ending of the special relationship with the US, 
which Campbell viewed as a radically different policy from his predecessors and successors. 
While he noted the cold and formal relations between Nixon and Heath, he thought that “there 
was no rift”.33 Campbell hailed the success of the Heath application as “an historic 
achievement” in light of “the dismal saga of missed opportunities since 1945”.34 These 
revisionist studies mainly relied on interviews and autobiographies of key policy-makers, 
newspaper articles, parliamentary papers, and secondary reading. A more recent political 
biography by Philip Ziegler made extensive use of the new papers released at the National 
Archives, but he took a similar view to Campbell on European integration and the Anglo-
American relationship.
35
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The Nixon Administration 
 
The number of histories written on the Nixon administration since January 1969 is vast, 
and increasing with the continual release of official papers.
36
 Many groups, with different 
interests and assumptions, have interpreted Nixon. He has been portrayed as a populist and 
opportunist, both as a conservative and liberal, and used as a case study of paranoia and 
conspiracy. There have been conventional biographies, in terms of a chronological structure and 
approach, as well as ‘psychobiography’ or ‘psychohistory’ which used psychoanalysis to 
explore Nixon’s motives.37 Other books have focussed on specific areas, mainly Watergate, 
foreign policy, and domestic policy. Some historians looked at Nixon within the wider context 
of American society.
38
 Furthermore, Nixon has frequently appeared in cultural works, a 
powerful influence on public opinion, such as in films, novels, poems, operas, plays, and 
popular music.
39
 This has created many representations of Nixon.
40
 
Orthodox histories prioritised Nixon’s career as follows: Watergate, foreign policy, 
domestic policy. On Watergate, Nixon is viewed as initiating a cover-up and guilty of breaking 
the law. These historians considered foreign policy to be Nixon’s top priority. While given 
credit for opening China and pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, historians criticised Nixon 
for not reducing the United States commitment to South Vietnam sooner, and for the country’s 
involvement in Cambodia and Laos. This school of interpretation thought that Kissinger took 
control of foreign policy after the 1972 election, when Nixon became preoccupied with the 
Watergate investigations. Complicated social and economic changes, domestic affairs, Anglo-
American relations, and Nixon’s European policies were all dealt with in quick summaries.41   
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  With the cooling of Watergate era passions and the release of new sources, a revisionist 
interpretation developed.
42
 Historians of the 1990s labelled Nixon an innovator of domestic 
policy and criticised his conduct of foreign affairs. The priorities seen in the conventional 
interpretations were reversed, as domestic policy became the key feature, followed by foreign 
affairs, and then the Watergate break-in. Historians searched for new perspectives, and the 
release of Nixon presidential materials, starting with domestic records, supported the “Nixon as 
Liberal” thesis.43 The title of Joan Hoff’s introduction, ‘Nixon is more than Watergate’, 
represents the shift in interpretation. Hoff argued that “most of his lasting achievements are in 
domestic, rather than foreign, affairs”.44 Throughout the 2000s, histories on Nixon foreign 
policy have expanded beyond superpower relations, China, and Vietnam.
45
   
Many books have looked at the relationship between Nixon and his National Security 
Adviser, Henry Kissinger. Early studies on the Nixon administration tended to view Nixon and 
Kissinger as a solid partnership in the formation of foreign policy, although with some personal 
differences. The heavy dependence on the Kissinger memoirs encouraged this viewpoint.
46
 The 
release of archival material since the 1990s has allowed historians to trace the origins of policies 
and the differences between Nixon and Kissinger.
47
 
Few historians have specifically dealt with Nixon’s policy on Anglo-American relations 
and Europe compared to the many studies on Nixon’s policies on China, Soviet Union and 
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Vietnam (discussed in a later chapter), because these areas were considered to be low priorities 
in the Nixon administration. But Nixon’s relationship to Britain and Europe has been covered in 
larger studies on Anglo-American relations, the Atlantic Alliance, and European integration, all 
of which have been thoroughly researched areas in diplomatic history.
 48
 The prevailing position 
of historians is that a sceptical view of a supranational Europe developed under the Nixon 
administration, which would only view European integration in the Atlantic context. The key 
tensions between America and Europe were diverging economic and political interests. It is also 
claimed that Nixon sought to establish closer ties with Britain, which would undermine 
European integration.
49
  
 As most Nixon studies have focussed on the Vietnam War, China, the Soviet Union, 
Watergate, and, more recently, on domestic policy, there is more work to be done on the Nixon 
administration’s policy and conduct of the Anglo-American relationship, as well as on European 
policy. This study on the Heath-Nixon period will contribute towards increasing our 
understanding of Anglo-American relations and European integration.   
 
Sources 
 
This thesis is primarily based on US and UK government papers. In Britain under the 
thirty year rule for the opening of government archival papers, a large proportion of the official 
papers on the Heath government were released by 2004/2005, held at the National Archives in 
Kew, London.
50
 But some of the papers discussed here on Anglo-American nuclear relations 
were only released in 2010. Most of the evidence comes from files held in the Prime Minister’s 
office, the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), and the Treasury. These are the institutions which played an important formal 
role in creating foreign policy under Heath, as discussed in chapter 1. The views of other 
ministers and officials across Whitehall are accounted for through their participation in the 
cabinet committees or through their direct communication to the prime minister or the FCO.     
 In the US, of the approximately 46 million pages of the Nixon presidential materials, 
about 10 million are available. Stored at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba 
Linda, California (NPL) since 2009, this thesis makes extensive use of the National Security 
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Council (NSC) files, which Nixon relied heavily on in the formation of foreign policy, as well 
as general White House files and the telephone conversation transcripts, all part of the Nixon 
Presidential Materials (NPM).
51
 The papers of the State Department, Department of Agriculture, 
and the Treasury Department, stored at the National Archives and Records Administration at 
College Park, Maryland (NARA II) are also referenced. Also used are the Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS) series for the Nixon/Ford administration, published by the State 
Department.  
 Public opinion polls, newspapers, political pamphlets, parliamentary and congressional 
records, autobiographies/memoirs, and government discussions with pressure groups are 
important sources consulted. However, the central focus is on the Heath and Nixon archival 
materials.  
 
Method and Structure 
 
An investigation into the internal government debates, policy-making process, domestic 
influences on foreign policy, and bilateral relations in the US and the UK will show how the 
Heath and Nixon governments perceived and implemented policy. The motives behind policy 
and its application under Heath and Nixon have complex, multiple dimensions. A framework to 
examine sources and policy formation is how the US and UK governments perceived (a) the 
European integration movement, (b) British entry into the EC, and (c) the Anglo-American 
relationship. Finally, where did those three fit into their overall foreign policy priorities? This 
will help to measures the influence of the EC enlargement on Anglo-American relations.  
In terms of foreign and domestic policy perceptions, this study is restricted to looking at 
the views of US and UK policy makers, mainly as represented in government documents. This 
includes both officials and politicians. Likewise, the views of the EC and nation states presented 
in this study are as perceived by the member of the US and UK political machines or through 
direct bilateral and multilateral negotiations with those countries and institutions, and therefore 
only what they wanted to reveal to the US and the UK. An understanding of the views of the EC 
and other countries will require another investigation by historians, outside of this thesis.    
While cultural factors are important, and the Anglo-American relationship is multi-
faceted, this thesis takes a functional approach, looking at the level of political communication 
and cooperation between the Heath and Nixon governments, and the bureaucracies during this 
period. Moreover, this study is not particularly focussed on the term ‘special’ and whether 
relations were actually ‘special’ (in comparison to other alliances), although it may be referred 
to, especially with regards to its usage by Heath, Nixon, and other policy and opinion makers. 
Nixon often referred to the relationship as ‘special’ while Heath used the term ‘natural’, which 
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needs to be analysed. A focus on the functional – the day-to-day habit of working together, 
between politicians and officials – tends to reduce the role of personal relations, although this is 
another level of the relationship which is important to consider.       
 It also needs to be noted here that this study concentrates on the major aspects of the EC 
enlargement which the US and UK policy makers perceived to be issues in Anglo-American 
relations, such as agricultural and Commonwealth trade, the role of sterling, and the ‘Trojan 
horse’ issue. It also considers Anglo-American relations on the key preoccupations of the US 
administration – superpower relations and arms control negotiations, Chinese rapprochement, 
and the Vietnam War, and well as nuclear and defence cooperation, in order to display the 
degree of ‘Europeanisation’ in Anglo-American relations.  
It therefore follows that this study does not attempt to cover every theme and issue that 
arose in Anglo-American relations, nor in Britain’s application to join the EC, which would 
pretty much extend to every part of the globe and cover many thematic topics, especially in the 
Cold War context. Notably topics not discussed at length are Indo-Pakistan relations, the 
Middle-East (apart from the 1973 Yom Kippur War), Latin America, Africa, Japan, the energy 
crisis, Ireland, and the other EC applicants. These are issue that would benefit from greater 
research, which in itself displays the wide spectrum of the Anglo-American partnership.   
This study is organised thematically. It is divided between various political, economic, 
and defence issues, and between foreign policy, bilateral and multilateral relations, and 
domestic influences on foreign policy. This helps to deal fully with the details of each theme 
over 1970-1974. However, all of these themes are naturally inter-connected and so there is 
cross-referencing throughout the study. 
The organisation of the argument to be developed in the succeeding chapters is as 
follows. The subject of chapter 1 is policy making structures and elites. Important to this study 
of diplomatic and political history are the players and institutions involved in the formation of 
policy, and the relationship between the international environment and internal domestic factors. 
Looking at the nature of the domestic system and the balance of government power in Britain 
and the US reveals the constraints that Nixon and Heath operated under. Nixon and Heath 
functioned under different constitutional arrangements which created different patterns of 
behaviour. A further factor to consider is that Prime Ministers and Presidents will organise 
government in their own ways and manipulate the system to suit their styles. This chapter is 
particularly concerned with the party system and elections, the executive office, 
legislative/executive balance of power, as well as the pressure group system and the role played 
by the media and public opinion.  
Chapter 2 looks at the internal debates in the US and UK governments and the 
development of foreign policy, which show the strategies that each country took into the 
bilateral relations with each other. It analyses the key influences on Nixon’s Cold War strategy, 
such as nuclear arms parity, the Sino-Soviet split, and US economic problems, followed by a 
- 23 - 
 
looks at the administration’s position on détente, rapprochement with China, the Vietnam War, 
the Atlantic Alliance, and European integration. The chapter then investigates UK foreign 
policy by looking at long term economic changes in Britain, Heath’s concept of European 
integration, and the development of the Heath government’s policy on the EC and the US. It 
then looks at Heath’s Cold War strategy. But short term relations were not governed in full by 
grand strategies. They only provided blueprints. Policies and actions also developed based on 
the progress of events and negotiations, discussed in the following chapters in the areas of 
politics, economics, and defence.       
 Chapter 3 analyses Anglo-American political relations and the EC enlargement. It 
firstly measures the early relationship during Britain’s negotiations to join the EC (1970-1971), 
with particular reference to the ‘Trojan horse’ problem and Anglo-French relations. It then 
considers Anglo-American political relations after Britain’s accession to the EC (1973-1974). 
This chapter is illustrated with three specific episodes: the opening of China, the ‘Year of 
Europe’, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.     
   Chapters 4 and 5 analyse Anglo-American economic relations under Nixon and Heath. 
Economic issues are a major focus of this thesis because of their importance in the enlargement 
negotiations. Chapter 4 deals with the trade aspects. Firstly, it briefly describes general trade 
issues affecting the US, the UK, and the EC. This is followed by an analysis of Anglo-American 
relations with regards to US trade policy, the Mills Bill and Congressional protectionism, the 
UK’s introduction of agricultural levies, and the Commonwealth association with the EC. 
 Chapter 5 is about Anglo-American monetary relations. This starts by outlining the 
functioning of the Bretton Woods system 1945-1971. It then looks at the EC movement toward 
European Economic and Monetary Union and explains how this has an impact on the EC 
negotiations, Anglo-American relations, and on the role of sterling. It then looks at Nixon’s 
New Economic Policy and the subsequent monetary crisis on the reform of the Bretton Woods 
system. This then led to the flotation of sterling and the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement. 
Trade and monetary issues are closely related and therefore a connection exists between these 
two chapters. 
 Chapter 6 describes the level of Anglo-American defence cooperation under Heath and 
Nixon. It will investigate the sharing of military facilities, such as Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean. Connected to this, the chapter will examine the Heath government’s decision to 
implement a partial reversal of Wilson’s withdrawal from Singapore/Malaysia (‘East of Suez’), 
and its connection to the Anglo-American relationship. Finally, it analyses the UK investigation 
into Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, while at the same time embarking on an upgrade of 
their nuclear system with US assistance. 
 Britain’s relationship to European integration and the Anglo-American relationship 
remain important areas of interest to historians as reflected in the continually growing literature. 
This subject has contemporary relevance, particularly to policy making elites. The UK dilemma 
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today is similar to the one faced by policy makers in the 1970s – either close ties to the US, to 
the EC, or a balanced relationship. For US policy makers, an expanded EU still raises questions 
on the level of cooperation and conflict in political, economic, and security affairs. This 
research is important in developing our understanding of the Anglo-American relationship, 
1970-1974.    
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Chapter 1:  
Policy Making Structures and Elites 
   
This chapter considers the key domestic factors influencing Anglo-American relations 
and Britain’s entry in the EC under Nixon and Heath. Its central argument is that in both the US 
and the UK the domestic scene played an important role in the conduct of international 
relations. In the US in the early 1970s the Congress sought to reassert its role in the making of 
foreign policy and provide greater supervision over the management of domestic projects by the 
executive. Nixon faced tough pressure from the Congress in the areas war, diplomacy and 
budget making, as well as over the Watergate scandal, which played a part in the policy making 
process. Nixon also continued the post-war centralisation of foreign policy in the White House, 
by reforming and consolidating the role of the National Security Council (NSC). In the UK, 
Heath continued the expansion of prime ministerial government, as well as attempting to break 
down departmentalism, and preparing Whitehall for working within a European political 
structure. Like Nixon, Heath’s style was to keep foreign policy formation close to 10 Downing 
Street, the FCO, and the MOD, as well as with experienced officials in those departments and 
his own private and political secretaries.  
This chapter starts by looking at how to measure political power, followed by a look at 
the pressure group system, and the influence of the media and public opinion. The chapter then 
considers the political conditions of 1970-74 in the UK and US, through the (a) party system 
and elections, (b) the executive office, and (c) the legislative/executive balance of power.          
___________________ 
 
Measuring Political Power and Policy Making 
 
The criteria used throughout this thesis for measuring political power and the domestic 
influences on foreign policy are (a) the formal constitutional powers of government bodies, (b) 
the actual political power of institutions developed through the political and cultural history of 
the country, and (c) the political conditions of 1970-1974 under the governments of Nixon and 
Heath. An investigation of these three criteria contributes towards understanding the role played 
by parties and individuals, public and media opinion, ministers and civil servants, government 
institutions, pressure groups and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The types of 
government system running in the UK and the US determined how power is separated and 
distributed in the political system, and how the executive and legislature were selected and 
terminated, which therefore had an impact on the behaviour of Heath and Nixon.  
Yet, the role played by each of these political factors is also dependent on the method of 
policy making used by the executive. Some foreign policy issues, usually low-level, were 
handled in the political bureaucracy, either in the executive office or Whitehall and Federal 
government departments. On some high level foreign policy issues, Nixon and Heath chose to 
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dominate the decision making, thus increasing the importance of personality. This was reflected 
to a degree in the selection of their cabinets and advisors, appointing people with the same 
foreign policy outlook to contribute towards shaping policies in a group structure, but within the 
guidelines of the Prime Minster and President.  
At the other end of the spectrum Heath and Nixon chose to, or were forced to, conduct 
foreign policy with various components of the domestic political scene – taking into account the 
views of other parties, pressure groups, the media, and public opinion. This particularly applied 
to the question of EC enlargement which involved economic and trade issues, a complicated 
area in foreign relations, affecting many domestic and international interest groups, from unions 
to big and small businesses in the US and UK. Furthermore, it is connected to constitutional 
change and established foreign policy traditions, therefore challenging elite perceptions of 
international affairs and government systems.
1
 
 
Media, Pressure Groups, and Public Opinion 
 
Media organisations, pressure groups, and public opinion in the US and UK influenced 
the nature of government and the domestic political scene. Newspapers, radio, and television 
outlets were by the 1970s the key sources of political information for most people. Thus the 
views of journalists and newspaper proprietors could influence public opinion, while the 
political parties used the media as a communication tool. Both Heath and Nixon had full time 
and influential press advisors and ran sophisticated national television election campaigns.
2
 
Moreover, both Whitehall and Washington tracked political media coverage, which showed its 
importance.
3
  
But in the 1970s printed press field, the style and nature of journalism in the US and 
UK differed, which influenced the political environment.  While Britain had at least nine 
national titles competing on the newsstands, the US mainly had a series of newspapers that were 
powerful on a state / city level with different audiences. In the US factual news stories and 
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opinion pieces were more clearly separated, where as UK news coverage often took a political 
side. Moreover, in the UK, domestic issues in foreign countries often received wider coverage 
in the UK press than in the US media. Opinion polls showed that the US public were not very 
interested in foreign affairs.
4
 The Nixon-Heath era also saw a rise in investigative journalism, 
such as with the Washington Post investigation into the Watergate break-in, which contributed 
towards an expansion of news-led agendas, which increased the importance of the media on 
politics.         
Pressure groups function at the heart of both the UK and US political process and 
played an important role in domestic and international policy making during the Nixon and 
Heath years.
5
 Of the many pressure groups in existence, a limited number of core insider groups 
had the greatest opportunities to influence the executive and law makers. In the UK the key 
groups in 1970 were the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI).
6
 In a similar way, the US had umbrella organisations that were major players in 
the Washington lobby scene in the 1970s, that sought federal help during a period of economic 
turbulence. Representing business interests were the US Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufactures, while the American Federation of Labour and the 
Congress of Industrial Organisations, which merged in 1955, represented organised labour 
unions. Farming groups also exerted huge influence on policy. All these unions were worried 
about the effects of EC integration on agricultural prices and competition from 1970-1974.  
However, some differences in the US and UK systems had an impact on pressure group 
activity. The separation of powers in the US meant that pressure groups needed to seek 
influence in both the White House and on Capitol Hill, whereas in the UK it was more 
important to work with the executive. Policy in Whitehall also focussed around departments and 
hence pressure groups often bypassed constituency MPs. Legislation in the US frequently went 
from one house of Congress to the other, via committees, conferences and the White House in a 
bargaining process, which provided room to amend legislation. But in the UK a White Paper or 
Bill was seen as a statement of the government’s intentions and thus its publication limited the 
opportunities for modification. Due to considerable organisational efficiency and clearly defined 
memberships, pressure groups influenced the domestic political scene.                  
In the liberal-democratic electoral systems of the UK and US public opinion usually 
played a prominent role in policy making. Policy makers often sought to avoid unpopular 
policies, and thus the election cycle is an important factor. In the diplomatic field, references to 
public opinion often meant public opinion according to the opinion polls, and these polls were 
frequently tracked and discussed under Heath and Nixon. Specific problems arise from 
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analysing opinion polls, such the clash between long term trends and short term fluctuations, the 
wording of questions, the representativeness of people questioned, the historical and social 
context of the polls, and the methods of measurements. Nevertheless, the law makers frequently 
used the polls in the policy making process as navigational and therefore they are an important 
factor in diplomatic and political history.
7
 
 The conventional view on the relationship between foreign affairs and the opinion polls 
is that public opinion tends to follow government policy.
8
 However, the change in US domestic 
opinion on the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1973 challenged this assumption, discussed below.  
Moreover, in Britain, entry into the EC was regarded as belonging in both the foreign and 
domestic fields, as well as involving constitutional change. Therefore the British public 
displayed a high level of interest in the EC negotiations. Another factor to consider in relation to 
public opinion and pressure groups are social movements, a means by which people sought 
change. During the Heath-Nixon era the anti-war movement in the US influenced opinion and 
altered Vietnam policy.     
 
(a) US-UK Party System and Elections 
 
US Party Distribution 1969-1975 
 
A significant shift from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party in presidential 
elections took place in 1968 and 1972. This provided Nixon with the claim to hold the 
democratic mandate to implement his foreign and domestic agendas from the executive office. 
However, Nixon, the first president to enter office with a hostile Congress since Zachary Taylor 
in 1849, faced a divided government throughout his two terms. As table 1 below shows, the 
Democrats controlled the Congress from Nixon’s inauguration in 1969 through to his 
resignation in 1974. Many historians have pointed to the Nixon election victories of 1968 and 
1972 as “the end of the New Deal Democratic hegemony and the beginning of a new era in 
American politics”.9 While the victories were significant in handing the Republicans control of 
the presidency, it only made a slight difference to the actual number of elected Republicans. The 
Democrats still dominated the legislative process. This had an impact on the nature of the Nixon 
presidency. He implemented measures to centralise foreign and domestic policy making, as a 
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method of working around the Congress. Thus, Nixon’s attempts to marginalise the Congress 
created a period of high institutional conflict. 
 
Table 1: Party Division in the US Congress 1969-1975
10
 
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F 
 Total Democrats  Republicans Others Majority 
91
st
 Congress 1969-
1971 
House 435 243 192 0 
Dem 
+51 
Senate 100 57 43 0 
Dem 
+14 
92
nd
 Congress 1971-
1973 
House 435 255 180 0 
Dem 
+75 
Senate 100 54 44 2 
Dem 
+8 
93
rd
 Congress 1973-
1975 
House 435 242 192 1 
Dem 
+49 
Senate 100 56 42 2 
Dem 
+12 
 
The Nixon campaign teams of 1968 and 1972 approached the elections with a 
significant strategy to reverse the minority status of the Republicans in elected offices. This plan 
helped to broaden the appeal of the party into new geographical areas and is an important 
indicator of where Nixon sought support, which influenced policy making. It has been referred 
to as the “southern strategy”, but it focussed on the whole of the US, especially the “heartland” 
and Pacific regions. Identified and partly designed by Nixon’s election strategist Kevin Phillips, 
it aimed to take advantage of a trend of disillusionment amongst traditional white ethnic groups 
with the New Deal-Great Society policies of the Democrats. In 1967 Phillips wrote a paper The 
Emerging Republican Majority which the Republicans used in the 1968 and 1972 presidential 
campaigns.  
Firstly, on the “southern” aspect of the strategy, Nixon sought to realign the traditional 
Democratic southern states with the Republicans. The groundwork for the Republicans 
increased strength in the southern region had already begun in the 1950s before Phillips’ 
influential paper – the results of this were reflected in the 1964 presidential election, when the 
Republican candidate Barry Goldwater won five southern states. The strategy focussed on the 
influence of ethnic factors on voting behaviour, such as civil rights policies, and Phillips 
concluded that the “new popular majority is white and conservative” and that large numbers of 
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them were located in the south.
11
 Many media outlets perceived a controversial racial element to 
the strategy.12  
Secondly, Phillips particularly drew attention to the post-1945 migration of the 
traditional Democratic white ethnic groups from the south to the heartland, suburbs, and Pacific 
regions. The “heartland” geographically referred to every state without a coastline, from the 
Appalachians to the Rocky Mountains. These 25 states provided the vast majority of members 
of the electoral colleges needed to elect a president, and were thus politically significant.13 
Nixon sometimes ambiguously dubbed this the great “silent majority” and middle-America. A 
growing number of people from white ethnic groups in the heartland and Pacific region 
perceived that the enlargement of federal activities in the 1940s and the social changes of the 
1960s imposed on them from the Democratic federal government were a threat to their 
traditional way of life. The region included large areas of farm land, and people who had strong 
ties to religion and agricultural country life. Therefore the Nixon campaign called for less 
federal interference in state affairs, agricultural investment, and rural redevelopment as a way to 
realign the traditional Democrats with the Republicans.
14
   
The opinion polls throughout 1968 narrowly fluctuated between the two main parties, 
reflecting the tight race in the presidential primaries.
15
 Nixon always remained the Republican 
front-runner in the race. But he faced strong competition from the left of the party - George 
Romney, Governor of Michigan, and Nelson Rockefeller, the Governor of New York. Ronald 
Reagan entered the race as a “favourite-son” candidate in California, taking all its votes. 
Rockefeller had hoped that Reagan would split the right wing of the party; this did not 
materialise. Although Romney, Rockefeller, and Reagan ran strong campaigns at certain times, 
they failed to sustain support throughout the process and always remained behind Nixon in the 
Republican polls. Nixon thus won the nomination on the first ballot at the National Convention 
in Florida in August 1968.
16
 The Democrats had a series of candidates with a credible chance of 
winning the party’s presidential nomination. This uncertainty and the changing circumstances in 
the presidential race showed up in the polls.
17
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In the 1968 presidential election the Republicans achieved a limited breakthrough in the 
south which created the groundwork for the more significant party domination of the region in 
subsequent presidential elections. Moreover, the party increased its popular appeal throughout 
the US, winning states in all regions. Nixon defeated the Democrat candidate Hubert Humphrey 
and the American Independent Party (AIP) candidate George Wallace. The popular vote saw 
Nixon just edge above Humphrey by 43.4% to 42.7%. However, the electoral college margin, 
the key figure in the election, showed a vast Republican win – Nixon won 301 to Humphrey’s 
191 and Wallace’s 46. Nixon won 32 states, Humphrey 13, and Wallace 5. Nixon’s success in 
the 1968 election depended largely on his appeal to rural America. This group, the “silent 
majority” throughout the heartland, broadly supported Nixon’s Vietnam policy, which later 
provided him with leeway in dealing with the anti-war movement and the Congress. 
Furthermore, they had strong ties to the main farming lobbies in Washington and the US 
Department of Agriculture, and thus a factor in the formulation of policies.
18
 
Nixon’s 1972 presidential election landslide saw significant gains in the south, which 
set a trend for the future Republicans. Nixon won the popular vote by 61% to 38% over the 
Democrat Party candidate George McGovern (Senator from South Dakota). Nixon dominated 
every area of the country, taking 49 states with 520 electoral college votes, losing only 
Massachusetts and the District of Columbia. McGovern made a strong run in university towns 
which can be accounted for by the enfranchisement of 18 to 21 year olds for the 1972 election. 
This helped increase the turnout from 73.2 to 77.7 million, many of whom were students. They 
were particularly opposed to Nixon’s expansion of the Vietnam War to the areas of Cambodia 
and Laos.
19
 Once again, Nixon carried the election with the support of rural and middle-
America, the heartland, the Pacific, and the white south.         
 Despite the scale of Nixon’s 1972 victory, the balance of power between the parties in 
the constitutional system remained roughly the same as 1968. From 1932 the Democrats 
dominated White House power, with the exception of the Eisenhower administration (1953-
1961). Nixon’s landslide showed a remarkable turnaround took place in the party control of the 
presidency. Thus, the Nixon Republicans claimed to have a democratic mandate, which they 
used to vigorously pursue their agenda from the White House. However, neither the victory in 
1968 nor the landslide of 1972 altered the Democrat Party’s control of Congress. This resulted 
in institutional conflict over policy making, having an impact on the nature of the Nixon 
administration.   
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UK Party Distribution 1970-1974  
 
The Conservative Party won the 1970 general election with a small, but workable, 
majority of thirty in the House of Commons. This provided Heath with the public mandate to 
pursue his policies and the numerical ability to control the agenda in the Parliament. However, 
with only a thirty-seat majority, the far-right wing of the Conservative Party posed a threat to 
Heath just as much as the opposition parties in the House; a small backbench rebellion from the 
Conservatives could undo Heath’s legislation. Moreover, Heath’s majority had fallen to 17 by 
the time of the dissolution of parliament in February 1974. This had a large influence on the 
nature of government, by limiting Heath’s ability to dominate the Commons, especially on 
issues which were important to the right-wing, such as entry into the EC, race relations, and 
economic policy. 
 The opinion polls played a prominent role in the 1970 general election. Firstly, they 
influenced the timing of the election, and, secondly, most of the polls predicted that Labour 
would win. Hence, historians and contemporary commentators focussed on Heath’s “surprise” 
victory. Denis MacShane summarised the orthodox interpretation, arguing that “the win was 
very much his own achievement” because the opinion polls and the media “saw Heath as a 
loser”.20 Heath ran a strong campaign, which commentators viewed as the major reason for the 
“upset” which brought the Conservatives to power.21 However, this argument does not account 
for the long-term trend in support for the Conservatives building up to the 1970 election and the 
swing against the governing party.
 22
  
The Labour government faced major economic problems from 1966 to 1969, which 
damaged Harold Wilson’s premiership. Britain had a large balance of payments deficit - £800 
million in 1964 - which harmed the value of the currency, pegged at a rate of $2.80 under the 
Bretton Woods system. Severe speculation against sterling took place after Wilson’s second 
general election victory in April 1966, which led Labour to implement unpopular deflationary 
policies. Public investment and overseas expenditures were cut and taxes increased. Labour also 
froze wages between July 1966 and January 1967.
23
 However, speculation against sterling 
continued and so the Wilson government devalued the pound, from $2.80 to $2.40 on 18 
November 1967, roughly 14% lower. The economy started to improve from the autumn of 1969 
into 1970, but the recovery came too late for Wilson to win a third consecutive general election 
in June 1970. 
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The devaluation harmed his leadership and caused sustained harm to the reputation of 
his government. As opinion polls indicated, 45% of people described the devaluation as a defeat 
for Britain and 85% of people feared a rise in the cost of living.
24
 In the immediate aftermath of 
the 1970 election defeat Wilson put forward an accurate explanation for the result, arguing that 
“the improvement in our economic position, as in other ways, had not erased all the scars from 
the tough things we had to do”.25  The economic problems and the tough measures implemented 
to deal with the crisis created a reputation of economic mismanagement, despite an economic 
recovery in late 1969. The underlying reason for the Conservative election victory in 1970 was 
the continual economic crisis from 1966 onwards. 
The Conservatives in opposition also managed to create a distinctive set of policies and 
present themselves as a viable alternative to the government. At first the policy initiatives made 
little impact on the general public. However, over a few years and after the Selsdon Park 
Conference in 1969, the party succeeded in presenting an alternative vision to the press and 
public, which started to attract positive support, not just negative votes against Labour. 
Heath, elected as leader of the Conservatives in August 1965, set in motion a major 
review of policy in an attempt to provide the contemporary public with a picture of how the 
Conservatives would run Britain.  Heath always had to tread carefully between the centre 
ground, to achieve electoral success, and the right wing, in order to keep the party united, as 
well as present a clear alternative to Wilson’s centre left policies. The party promoted distinct 
right-wing economic policies, arguing for less government interference in industry, 
privatisation, tax reform, and greater competition. It also contained interventionist policies, such 
as on welfare and income, and thus balancing the centre and extreme right-wing factions of the 
party.
26
 While this preparation helped to create a picture of a future Tory government, which in 
the long term helped Heath to win the election, they initially only made a small impact outside 
of party circles.   
In the run-up to the general election, at the end of January 1970, the Conservative 
shadow cabinet met at the Selsdon Park Hotel in Croydon to discuss policy, which created 
increased public attention to the party’s programme. A large historical debate sprang out of this 
conference over the possible direction of Conservative policy. After the conference Wilson went 
on the offensive, creating the “Selsdon Man” image for Heath - portraying the conference as a 
move to the right and a break from the post-war consensus of Keynesian economics and support 
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for nationalised industries.
27
 Some historians and right-wing Conservatives in the 1980s also 
saw the tone of the conference as representing proto-Thatcherism, and criticised Heath for 
failing to implement the new economic policies.
28
 However, the actual transcripts of the 
conference and the 1970 election manifesto show that while the party adopted new free-market 
policies, it also held onto Heath’s ‘One Nation’ Conservatism – supporting interventionist 
policies to promote social cohesion and welfare.
29
 Nevertheless, the conference and Wilson’s 
“Selsdon Man” gimmick created an image for the Tories which gave them a breakthrough in the 
public arena. This, combined with the steady erosion of support for Labour and the long term 
development of Conservative policy during 1966-1970, played a part in building a viable 
alternative to Labour.          
  The opinions polls and by-election and local election results showed both a swing 
towards the Conservatives and long term disapproval of the Labour government. The by-
election results for the 1966-1970 Parliament are particularly revealing, with an eleven-seat gain 
for the Conservatives compared to a fifteen-seat loss for Labour. In 1967 the Conservatives took 
four seats from Labour, three of which showed the Conservative share of the vote increase from 
the previous election. Furthermore, for the first time since 1934 Labour lost control of the 
Greater London Council on 13 April 1967. In 1968 the average swing increased by over 20%, 
with the Tories gaining five seats from Labour. These results indicated the beginning of a 
change in public opinion.
30
 A further string of results also displayed the reduced popularity of 
Labour. On 9 March 1967 the Conservatives won Glasgow Pollok from Labour, in which 
Labour lost 21% of the vote compared to the last election. On the same day Labour held onto 
Rhondda West, but lost an astonishing 27% of its majority. Five by-elections staged on 31
 
October 1969 reinforced the trend. The Conservatives largely maintained their vote from the 
1966 election, and therefore the result showed the collapse of Labour’s support. 31   
Beginning from mid to late 1967, the three major polls, Gallup Poll, National Opinion 
Poll (NOP), and the Opinion Research Centre (ORC), all showed the Conservatives leading 
Labour by 2-5% in voting intentions. This trend continued until February 1968 at which point 
all three polls showed that the Conservatives led the Labour Party by between 20-25%. The 
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Conservatives maintained an advantage in the opinion polls until May 1970.
32
 This indicated a 
long term trend in favour of the Conservatives and a move away from the Labour government. 
 Labour staged a short term recovery in the opinion polls from May to June 1970, which 
encouraged Wilson to call an election on 18 May 1970; as Wilson noted: “the public opinion 
polls, for what they were worth, were moving steadily in our favour”.33 On the final day election 
forecast, five of six polls showed a marginal Labour lead, and media outlets predicted that the 
Wilson government would retain power.
34
 However, as seen in table 2 below, the Conservatives 
won the 18 June election. 
 
Table 2: British General Election Statistics, 18 June 1970
35
 
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E Column F 
 Total Conservative Party 
Labour  
Party 
Liberal Party Others 
Electorate 39,342,013 _ _ _ _ 
Turnout 72% _ _ _ _ 
Votes Cast 28,344,798 13,145,123 12,178,295 2,117,033 196,019 
% of turnout _ 46.4% 43% 7.5% 0.7% 
Parliamentary seats 630 330 287 6 7 
 
 
What explains the short term irregularity in the polls, from May to June 1970 in favour 
of Labour? The linkage between polls and current events is difficult to determine because of the 
simplified polls of the period. Apart from the technical deficiencies (for example the margin of 
error), the polls focussed on voting intentions and excluded opinions on political, economic, and 
social issues and breakdown of results by background. A factor in the short term bounce for 
Labour may have been the improvement in the economy in 1970, which had suffered since the 
1967 devaluation. A strong correlation developed between economic and political indicators. As 
the current account balance of payments worsened, and thus the general UK economy suffered 
and the government received more negative coverage in the press, so the Conservative 
percentage lead over Labour in the polls increased.
36
 Although the outcome of the election 
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surprised contemporary analysts, the long term trend in the polls showed an unpopular Labour 
government and a swing towards the Conservatives from 1967-1970. 
 
(b) The Executive Office in the US and UK 
 
Nixon’s Cabinet and White House Centralisation 1969-1974 
 
Nixon implemented reforms to centralise foreign and domestic policy making in the 
White House. This trend had already begun in the post-war period of the imperial presidency, 
but the party divisions in the Congress created the need for the Nixon administration to work 
around the anti-Republican bloc. Both these factors created strong legislative-executive tension 
throughout the Nixon years. The new system meant that Nixon’s political offices in the White 
House played a central role in policy formation and the conduct of international relations. This 
caused friction within the Nixon Administration, between his White House national security 
advisers and the secretaries of the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD).   
The most powerful figures in the Nixon administration were not members of the 
cabinet. These White House aides were not confirmed by the Senate nor obliged to stand before 
Congressional Committees for policy scrutiny. Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor 
(NSA) throughout the Nixon presidency, exerted more influence over foreign policy than the 
Secretary of State William Rogers (1969-1973) and the Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird 
(1969-1973). In 1973 Kissinger took over the State Department, approved by the Senate, and 
therefore subject to Congressional Committee interrogation. But he continued in his role as the 
NSA and continued to isolate the State Department. In the domestic field, H.R. Haldeman 
(White House Chief of Staff 1969-1973) and John Ehrlichman (Assistant to the President for 
Domestic Affairs 1969-1973) also exercised a high level of control in the administration.    
 The most significant institutional change of the Nixon presidency, the restructuring of 
the National Security Council (NSC), placed that body, and the NSA, at the heart of most 
decision making. This provided Nixon with tighter control over policy formation across the 
board, reducing the role played by federal government departments and the Congress. Nixon’s 
restructuring resembled the Eisenhower NSC; it emphasised policy choices and long term 
planning, and it produced a strong institutional organisation with adequate funds and resources. 
The NSC thus received a revival in comparison to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 
which had opted for a system of consensus amongst many advisors in an informal, personal 
process.
37
 The two key goals of the reformed NSC under Nixon were to retain power at the top 
and to construct clear policy options.  
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 During the presidential transition period, from November 1968 to January 1969, 
Nixon’s advisers worked on reforming the NSC, an indication of the key role foreign policy 
would play in the administration.
38
 The two main issues addressed were (1) who would control 
the agenda, through the flow of policy papers and chairmanship of the committees and (2) how 
to build an efficient and non-bureaucratic system. The review decided that the old committee 
system, based around the State Department, should be scrapped. In its place would be a network 
of inter-agency committees chaired by the NSA, reporting back to the president, and hence 
cutting out State Department control. These new committees, at the core of the system, would 
produce policy studies, to be called National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM), which 
would provide a range of policy options, representing the different departmental and agency 
views. After consultation with Kissinger and the Cabinet level NSC, Nixon would issue a 
National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) – a directive of presidential policy issued to 
all relevant government departments. Through this new system, the NSA and the president 
could control the foreign policy agenda from the White House. Nixon privately approved the 
Kissinger scheme.
39
       
 Both the State Department and the DOD opposed the new NSC system, which 
threatened their power bases. Kissinger warned Nixon that “The State Department has now 
begun to object to the NSC procedures which you approved”.40 The Under Secretary of State 
Elliot Richardson outlined the views of State, arguing that they should control the committee 
structure because of their experience, and that the changes would limit their ability to control 
foreign policy.
41
 Laird objected, on behalf of the DOD, that “all intelligence inputs would be 
channelled through a single source” – i.e. Kissinger and the NSC staff.42 But Laird’s criticisms 
were Kissinger’s objectives.  Kissinger countered the arguments of State, telling Nixon that 
State officials were “inadequate to the task of planning” with “parochial interests” and that their 
past work displayed the department’s “consistent failure” in planning and that they “obfuscated 
rather than clarified alternatives”.43 Nixon overruled the objections from State and the DOD and 
planned for the implementation of a new system of centralised control.
44
  When Rogers and the 
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State Department protested against the proposed changes to the NSC during the transition 
period in January 1969, Kissinger warned Nixon that “it would not be helpful to begin the 
Administration with a bureaucratic disagreement”.45 However, members of the administration 
were already disagreeing, and this tension would remain throughout the Nixon period.   
The split between the NSC and State soon received wide coverage in the press and in 
reports from foreign diplomats stationed in Washington, which undermined Rogers and 
increased the bureaucratic tensions in the administration. Early on, during the transition period, 
sections of the US media thought that State would be influential in forming policy. On 11 
December 1968 Nixon introduced his cabinet to the public through a live television broadcast in 
Washington D.C., viewed by 42 million people.
46
 Time Magazine saw the move as an 
“indication of Nixon’s intention to invest the Cabinet with more prestige and responsibility”.47 
The New York Times also saw early indications of a less centralised system. The paper reported 
in November 1968 that Nixon “plans stronger role for Cabinet”.48 However, a conflict in policy 
making between State and the NSC soon became widely discussed. The New York Times wrote 
on their front page in January 1969 that “Nixon plans to convert the long dormant National 
Security Council into the central decision-making instrument of his Administration”.49 Then less 
than a month into the new administration, Nixon faced questions at his second press conference, 
on 6 February 1969, with one journalist asking if the Secretary of State reported to the NSC.50 
Diplomats also noted the bureaucratic divisions. In the build-up to the first formal 
meeting between the Nixon administration and the Heath government in July 1970, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, John Freeman, reported to the FCO that “while Mr. Rogers will 
certainly continue to be listened to in the White House, there are many fields of foreign 
policy…in which his influence is unlikely to prevail over that of the White House Staff”.51 By 
1971 the new British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, devoted an entire report to the 
growing rift in foreign policy making, warning the FCO that “we shall have to be more careful 
than ever...when we have dealings with the White House”.52 The speculation from government 
officials and the press created complications in diplomatic relations, as officials tried to figure 
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out whom in the US administration to consult with in the different policy areas. This also added 
to the internal political disagreements in the administration.  
 Although the NSC played a key role, policy making in the formal institutions and 
systems was often a subtle and incoherent process, in contrast to the clear, straightforward 
history presented in both the orthodox and revisionist schools of Nixon historiography.
53
 With 
an abundance of new primary evidence it can be noted that Nixon and Kissinger did not rigidly 
follow a grand plan or blueprint when forming policy. In the first two years of the 
administration, from 1969-1970, most agencies and government departments had the 
opportunity to formulate opinions in the various NSC committees and policy reviews. But 
eventually, Nixon and Kissinger spent less time operating in the NSC, instead opting for 
personal discussions, although still taking into account the NSC studies. From 1973, Nixon, 
occupied with the Watergate scandal, left Kissinger to deal with many foreign policy issues 
outside of the formal NSC structure.          
Nixon also sought to improve the White House system for policy formation and 
implementation of domestic projects. The most significant reform created the Domestic 
Council, under the direction of John Ehrlichman, and converted the Budget Bureau into the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), headed by George Shultz. The Domestic Council 
focussed on policy formation, which Nixon called “a domestic counterpart to the National 
Security Council”.54 These two organisations, working closely together, were key domestic 
policy and implementation forums. 
  
Heath’s Cabinet and Whitehall 1970-1974 
  
Heath took steps in government to structurally reorganise Whitehall, in an attempt to 
strengthen the policy making machine and increase the power of the Prime Minister’s Office. 
However, the British cabinet officially remained the most powerful institution, and thus 
Whitehall departments maintained a strong presence in policy making. Heath established the 
Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) and remodelled departments, in an attempt to create long 
term strategic policy making across Whitehall and prevent the domination of departmental 
interests. Several historical studies into the role of the CPRS and Heath’s centralising reforms 
were inconclusive on the exact nature and influence of the changes because of the lack of public 
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information.
55
 The released government papers show structural flaws in Heath’s bureaucratic 
reforms, thus explaining their lack of influence on policy making.  
The UK had influential decision makers outside of the cabinet, and not elected. For 
example, Sir Burke Trend built up huge influence throughout Whitehall in the 1960s and early 
1970s.
56
 Trend became the Cabinet Secretary in 1963, serving with four Prime Ministers: 
Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home, Harold Wilson and Heath. With Heath, Trend advised 
on all issues, and played a key role in organising, preparing and participating in high-level 
meetings with the Nixon administration, playing a key advisory role 1970- 1973.
57
 Heath’s 
Principal Private Secretary Robert Armstrong also exerted influence.
58
 Heath’s private office 
team, although significantly smaller than what Nixon had at the White House, still played a 
crucial advisory function behind the scenes.
59
             
The cabinet’s period of greatest influence in the Heath government came between 1970 
and 1972. But with the onset of short term crises, such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in August 1971, Heath frequently turned to an inner circle of advisers. He left the 
prominent Euro-sceptics on the back-benches and filled the cabinet with pro-European MPs.
 60 
  
Some historians, contemporary commentators, and politicians thought that the Heath 
cabinet lacked heavyweights.
61
 Heath had thought of the Chancellor of Exchequer Ian Macleod 
as the government’s ‘biggest hitter”, but he died on 20 July 1970, which added to the perception 
of a weak cabinet.
 62
 However, the cabinet did include some important senior Tories, who were 
also members of Heath’s inner circle, and they played a prominent role, 1970-1974. Alec 
Douglas-Home, appointed to the key position of Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, had first held that position under the Macmillan government, and then 
became Prime Minister in 1963. Throughout the Heath period Douglas-Home continued to 
maintain close relations with the US while also seeking membership of the EC.
 63
 Lord 
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Carrington, who had also been in the Macmillan government, took charge of the MOD. He had 
supported Britain’s application to join the EEC, which he continued to do so under Wilson and 
Heath.
64
 The other vital member of the Heath cabinet, Geoffrey Rippon, the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster (CDL), also featured in Heath’s inner circle. He had the task of negotiating 
Britain’s entry into the EC at the ministerial level. Like Heath, Rippon’s support for European 
cooperation can be traced as far back as 1956, when he supported the creating of the EEC.
65
 
Therefore the cabinet contained some influential members, who contributed towards decision 
making 1970-1974. 
Heath geared Whitehall’s machinery towards the EC membership negotiations. While 
meetings of the cabinet were reserved for substantive debate and decisions, the detailed 
consideration of particular issues were usually dealt with by Cabinet Committees. On 26 June 
1970 Heath re-established and re-structured the ‘Ministerial Committee on the Approach to 
Europe’, chaired by Douglas-Home, which did a substantial amount of work in preparing for the 
negotiations, most of which actually took place under Wilson.
66
 Also important was the Defence 
and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP), a cross-Whitehall ministerial committee chaired by 
Heath, which played a part in developing policy throughout this period.
67
 
In September 1971 Heath created a new “inter-departmental unit” to develop European 
policy, located in the Cabinet Office and which reported to the prime minister, which caused a 
degree of institutional conflict and confusion. Following the resolution of the main obstacles in 
the EC negotiations, Heath sought to redirect European policy making away from the 
negotiation phrase to working as a member of the EC. Heath sent a directive to the cabinet on 6 
August 1971 on the new “approach to Europe”, which said that: “in all major problems of 
policy, whether political, economic or strategic in character, we have to learn to think 
European”.68 Heath ruled out the creation of a “European Department” to achieve the new 
approach to British European policy because the directive needed to be applied to the whole of 
Whitehall.
69
  
Furthermore, the ministerial responsibilities for Europe, as a member of EC, needed to 
be arranged. Thus Heath moved the CDL out of the FCO into the Cabinet Office, where 
Geoffrey Rippon, playing a more central, non-departmental role, would supervise a new 
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European unit; he would “report direct to the Prime Minister” during the negotiations.70 Then as 
a member state of the EC, the British representative on the Council of Ministers would be the 
FCO Secretary, while the CDL would be responsible for co-ordinating the views of Whitehall 
departments.
71
 Essentially, the move divided the EC ministerial responsibilities, which 
increased the influence of the prime minister over the FCO in the European field and caused 
some confusion over spheres of influence.
72
 The FCO opposed the move. Douglas-Home wrote 
to Heath, arguing that being a member of the EC would require continual diplomatic 
negotiations between the EC countries and other countries, and hence a European minister 
should be based in the FCO.73 Moreover, the move “could have divisive effects on policy”.74 
But they were overruled by Heath, in order to avoid having a narrow focus in EC affairs.
75
  
Heath reviewed the situation in July 1973, six months after joining the EC. The new 
Cabinet Secretary, John Hunt, reported that tensions continued to exist between the FCO and 
the new CDL John Davies at the Council of Ministers, where the “arrangements have not 
worked...the regular appearance of two ministers has not helped our image....there has been no 
feeling of reliability”.76 The arrangements were maintained and thus friction over the control of 
European policy continued.    
 The other key policy making reform of the Heath years, the creation of the CPRS, failed 
to have a significant impact on the nature of policy making in Whitehall. Nicknamed the 
“Think-Tank”, the government introduced the CPRS in the White Paper “The Reorganisation of 
Central Government” on 15 October 1970. 77 The move formed a part of Heath’s “new style of 
Government” which focussed on long term changes and systematic policy making.78 The 
objectives of the CPRS contained some resemblance to the NSC in the US executive office. The 
idea of a “central capability”, developed in opposition by Heath and the Parliamentary Secretary 
David Howell, gained the support of Burke Trend and William Armstrong, on the basis that the 
CPRS would be in the Cabinet Office, responsible to the cabinet and not a framework for a 
Prime Minister’s Department, which would have reduced the influence of the Civil Service 
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Department and Cabinet Secretariat. This resulted in a watered down version of a “central 
capability”, and thus created a more informal, multidisciplinary policy unit.79  
Eventually established on 1 February 1971, the CPRS, situated in the Cabinet Office, 
actually reported directly to Heath and represented a small step towards prime ministerial 
government. The No. 10 staff remained about the same size as under the Wilson government, 
but the CPRS acted as Heath’s private policy unit, and thus, in effect, an expansion of his 
resources. The directorship of the CPRS went to Victor Rothschild.
80
 The CPRS comprised only 
20 members (not including administrative staff), half of which were civil servants and the other 
half outsiders, mainly from business and academia.  
Although Heath thought of it as “a new departure in Government”81 and “one of the best 
innovations of my years at No. 10”82, the CPRS lacked the statutory authority and cabinet 
representation to stand alone and compete against well established departments, like the 
Treasury and the Department of Trade and Industry, who complained that the CPRS interfered 
in their business.
83
 The structure and resources of the think-tank made it dependent on 
information and cooperation from other Whitehall departments, and thus contributed towards its 
failure to change the nature of policy making in Whitehall, which still centred on departmental 
policy making.       
 
(c) Executive-Legislative Relationship:  
The Balance of Power in the US and UK  
 
US Executive-Legislative Balance of Power 1969-1975 
  
Nixon took office in 1969 at a peak of presidential power, but he encountered a re-
assertive Congress. This ‘reassertion’ increased the short term legislative battles between the 
White House and Congress. It put immediate pressure on Nixon, although only in the long term, 
in certain areas, has it proved effective in balancing executive-legislative power. The actual 
relative power between the executive and legislative has shifted from the Congress to the White 
House. In 1885 Woodrow Wilson noted and criticised the overwhelming power of the Congress 
in his book Congressional Government.
84
 But by the early 1970s the system had been 
transformed and a strong “imperial” presidency dominated over the constitution system. Some 
                                                 
79
  Tessa Blackstone & William Plowden, Inside the Think Tank: Advising the Cabinet 1971-1983  
(London: William Heinemann, 1988), 10. Also Heath, The Course, 316.  
80
  Letter; William Armstrong to Heath; “The Central Capability”; 17 December 1970; PREM  
15/406; NAUK. Lord Rothschild, Meditations of a Broomstick (London: Collins, 1977), 89. 
81
  Memo; “The Central Capability: Note by the Prime Minister”; 12 August 1970; PREM 15/406;  
NAUK. 
82
  Heath, The Course, 316. 
83
  Letter; Anthony Part (Permanent Secretary of the DTI) to Trend; 1 March 1971; CAB 164/998;  
NAUK.  
84
  Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics (New York:  
Dover, 2006), 7-17.  
- 44 - 
 
historians, such as Arthur Schlesinger, have criticised the 1970s ‘reassertion’ as weak and 
ineffective.
85
  On the “most publicised shackle of all”, the War Powers Act (discussed below), 
Schlesinger thought that it “turned out to be a toy handcuff”.86 Robert Dallek supported that 
view in his recent study, saying that “The act did less to inhibit the presidency than to 
demonstrate that Nixon had lost his capacity to govern”.87 On the other side of the debate, 
Nixon, and subsequent presidents, claimed that the Congressional ‘reassertion’ amounted to a 
substantial and harmful reduction of executive power.
88
 Kissinger argued that it undermined the 
US threat of force against the Soviet Union.
89
 It is argued here that the Congress did not 
“shackle” the presidency and the comprehensive reforms were not meaningless. But in most 
cases the Congress acted too late to have an impact on Nixon. The three areas of contention 
were over war making powers, oversight powers, and budget powers, all of which are important 
factors to consider in this diplomatic history.   
Another important factor to note in this area is the Watergate scandal. It started with a 
burglary at the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate office building in 
Washington, D.C. on 17 June 1972, when five people were arrested, all connected to Nixon’s 
Committee to Re-elect the President. This led to a political scandal from March 1973 after 
White House officials were implicated in the case, leading to impeachment proceedings, 
prosecutions, and Nixon’s eventual resignation on 8 August 1974. Along with the conspiracy 
and criminal charges, Congress was also aggrieved by presidential abuses of power. In the 
orthodox Nixon histories, Watergate tended to overshadow all else. In the 1990s the argument 
shifted, with Nixon revisionists like Joan Hoff arguing that “Nixon is more than Watergate”.90 
In both cases they tended to overlook the broader balance of power in the system.   
Public opinion on the Watergate scandal added more weight to the reassertion from 
1973-1974. The polls indicated that the public turned against Nixon after the administration was 
linked to Watergate in March 1973, and with mid-term elections approaching in 1974, members 
of Congress were focussed on constituency concerns and public opinion. During Nixon’s first 
term (January 1969-January 1973) his average job approval rating was 55.8%, reaching a peak 
of 67% in November 1969 (after his “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam” on 3 
November 1969) and January 1973 (when the administration ended the Vietnam War). But just 
four months later, by April 1973, Watergate had halved his approval rating, tumbling to 30%. 
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His second term average job approval rating (January 1973-August 1974) fell to 34.4%, the 
lowest ever for a post-war second term president. By August 1974, his ratings had slumped to 
just 24%, the second lowest in post-war history, which put pressure on Nixon to resign and for 
the Congress to respond.
91
 Watergate spurred on the Democratic-controlled Congress, backed 
by public opinion, to take action against presidential abuses, and therefore Watergate had an 
influence on the Congressional reassertion from 1973-1974. However, the confrontation over 
policy making had actually begun before the 1972 break-in.    
The war making powers took central stage in the Congressional-Executive legislative 
disputes under Nixon. The Constitution states that the president shall be the Commander in 
Chief of the US military forces. But it also states that Congress has the power to declare war and 
has the ‘power of the purse’; this was the greatest influence that the Congress had over the 
direction of foreign policy. However, presidents in the post-war period went to war without 
Congressional approval, such as President Truman in Korea (1950-1953), and the Vietnam War 
in the 1960s under Kennedy and Johnson. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a powerful 
committee charged with overseeing foreign policy legislation, called on the Senate to reassert its 
role in war and foreign policy making on 16 April 1969.92 This reflected a widespread belief 
amongst Senators that the executive had sidelined the Congress in the area of war. The 
Congress and the Nixon White House particularly clashed over the deployment of US military 
forces in Indochina.  
The anti-war movement and mass public opinion on the home front played a part in this 
debate, which added domestic pressure on the Nixon administration. It developed early on in the 
conflict, picking up momentum from late 1964, and building a large base on college campuses.
93
 
Two events particularly put pressure on Nixon. The first, the Moratorium to End the War in 
Vietnam (15 October 1969 and 15 November 1969), attracted a few million protesters, 
significantly larger than the demonstrations in the mid-1960s and with a broader base than the 
usual campus protest.
94
 The second, the Kent State demonstration on 4 May 1970, formed a part 
of the surge of campus protest against the expansion of the war into Cambodia. The Ohio State 
National Guard killed four students. This in turn caused more demonstrations against the Kent 
State “Massacre”. This all created the image of an administration under siege.95  
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The movement spread into the cultural field, with hundreds of folk and popular protest 
(or “topical”) songs released, documentary films made, and books written against the war, for 
example Norman Mailer’s portrayal of the 1967 “March on the Pentagon” in his 1968 novel The 
Armies of the Night.
96
 Within three weeks of the Kent State shooting the super-group Crosby, 
Stills, Nash & Young had recorded the song “Ohio”, composed by Neil Young, reaching the top 
end of the US charts, which attacked the president: “Tin soldiers and Nixon’s coming; Four 
dead in Ohio”.97 But it is rarely mentioned that many more “patriotic songs” appeared than 
“protest songs” which supported the war effort, particularly in the country music genre.98  
However, despite all the well attended anti-war demonstrations, throughout most of the 
conflict the protest movement was actually a minority and mass public opinion supported 
presidential policy.
99
 
Nevertheless, public and elite opinion did change on the Vietnam War.
100
 The majority 
of the protest movement at the beginning were morally opposed to the war. But mass public 
opinion eventually started to support withdrawal under Nixon because of the military failures.
101
 
Secondly, by the 1968 presidential election race, important opinion makers from Nixon to 
Robert Kennedy had called for an end to the war, and thus it was no longer unpatriotic or 
controversial to support the anti-war movement or withdrawal from Vietnam.
102
 Therefore, 
public opinion influenced policy makers and the elite influenced public opinion. The anti-war 
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movement and public opinion limited the amount of time that Nixon had to pursue his Vietnam 
policy.
103
        
Congress had an important influence on Nixon’s Indochina policy through a series of 
Congressional bills and amendments between 1970 and 1973, which sought to restrict US 
military operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. This applied consistent pressure on the 
Nixon administration.
104
 Nixon’s incursion into Cambodia from April to June 1970 triggered the 
proposals.
105
 The anti-war bloc in Congress cleared its first restriction, the Cooper-Church 
Amendment, with the president’s signature on 5 January 1971.  It prohibited the use of funds 
appropriated by any act “to finance the introduction of United States ground troops into 
Cambodia”.106 It thus prevented Nixon from re-sending troops into Cambodia - Nixon had 
already withdrawn all US troops by 30 June 1970. However, the act did not mention air 
bombing and shipping activities which continued. It also did not mention other areas of 
Indochina, such as Laos and Vietnam. But it represented the first major legislative restraint on 
Nixon’s actions in Indochina and it became a symbolic act of Congressional war power.   
Following the signing of a peace agreement in January 1973, Congress built on the 
Cooper-Church amendment, passing four funding restrictions, in order to prevent any renewed 
conflict.
107
 All of them were attached to appropriation bills, which extended the prohibition of 
using any Congressional funds for “combat in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, 
South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia” by 15 August 1973. Bombing stopped on that date, and 
therefore Congress succeeded in influencing policy. Nixon viewed the bombing cut-off as a 
“reckless act”, telling Senator Leader Mike Mansfield that now the North Vietnamese “are free 
to launch a military offensive in other areas of Indochina”.108 This further illustrates the direct 
impact of Congressional action on Nixon’s Vietnam strategy.  
But how did Nixon manage to hold off the Congress and the anti-war movement for so 
long on the Vietnam issue? Between 1970 and 1973, twelve other attempts to restrict Nixon’s 
Vietnam policy failed to pass through the Congress because of disagreements between members 
of Congress and the threat of a presidential veto. Many of the Democratic Party members of 
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Congress were elected in states that went Republican in the presidential election, and were thus 
cautious about calling for an immediate withdrawal or setting a time-table as many of these bills 
and amendments attempted. Nixon also had the “great silent majority” in the heartland which 
elected him in 1968 and 1972, and who apparently supported his ‘Vietnamisation’ policy. The 
“silent majority” may not have actually existed, but Nixon skilfully used the concept of it in 
holding off the anti-war movement (in the streets and Congress).  
The debate in Congress over US force levels also spilled into the European arena, where 
the US made a large contribution to the defence of Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). In turn, the Congressional threat of a US withdrawal from Europe 
became a major issue in US-European and Anglo-American relations (see chapter 2).
109
 After 
1973 the Congress also managed to institutionally curb the president’s power to go to war, 
through the War Power Act, after a three year battle with Nixon. The act created an important 
symbol of Congressional war power in the immediate term. However, Congress enacted the Bill 
too late to influence Nixon’s policy in war zones.110     
The next area of executive-legislative contention involved Congressional oversight of 
the president’s role in making international treaties, national emergencies, and intelligence 
gathering. On the issue of international treaties, diplomacy needed be conducted “by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate”.111 Thus, treaties had to be reported to the Congress. 
However, from 1969 to 1970, the Congress investigated contemporary examples of secret 
agreements and discovered several which committed US financial resources and opened the 
possibility for US military intervention.
112
  Nixon also conducted secret diplomacy under 
“executive privilege” – a prerogative allowing the president to withhold information from the 
Congress, which he invoked a record 27 times.
113
 The actions of Nixon and his predecessors 
stirred Congressional disapproval, leading to the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act, which sought 
oversight in the area. But the bill had weak enforcement instruments.
114
 The Congress also 
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reasserted its control of oversight on national emergency laws, but this came too late to have a 
direct effect on the Nixon administration.
115
             
The oversight of intelligence institutions, another area of confrontation between the 
Congress and White House, increased the domestic pressure that Nixon faced. Congress 
complained about Nixon’s abuse of intelligence for political purposes, the lack of information 
on intelligence operations and its influence on policy making, from institutions like the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA).
116
 But Congress did not succeed in strengthening Congressional 
oversight of intelligence while Nixon occupied the White House, with the first reforms only 
passed in 1974.
117
          
Budget powers were the final major area of contention between Congress and the White 
House during the Nixon years. The Constitution states that the Congress has the power of the 
purse.
118
  However, most presidents have used the budgeting procedure “impoundment” – this 
allowed the executive to not spend money appropriated by Congress.
119
 The main purpose of 
impoundment was to make savings due to changing events (for example in war) or for 
managerial efficiency. Prior to 1969, impoundments were uncontroversial because they did not 
challenge Congressional spending priorities and the quantities were small. Under Nixon, 
impoundment reached unprecedented monetary levels, as well as being connected to over 100 
different programs, in Nixon’s attempt to take greater control of the domestic agenda.  
Through the OMB infrastructure, discussed above, Nixon impounded approximately 
$79.4 billion that Congress had appropriated for domestic programs between 1969 and 1974.
120
 
Of this total Nixon deferred approximately $70.1 billion between 1969 and 1972 to a 
subsequent budget year and this was not hugely contentious, although it received Congressional 
criticism because of the large amount of money involved. However, $9.3 billion between 1973 
and 1974 involved the complete termination of a domestic program approved by the Congress. 
In 1972 Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Act which appropriated $6 billion towards 
environmental protection. Nixon, who thought $6 billion was too high a cost, vetoed the Bill, 
which Congress overturned. So Nixon impounded the $6 billion in 1973 – effectively a second 
veto - which Congress saw as a direct attack on their budget powers, thus leading to 
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Congressional action to restrict policy impoundments.
121
 In 1974 the Congress introduced the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which reasserted and strengthened their 
role in federal budget making.
122
 The Act came into force in 1976, and so once again, too late to 
restrict Nixon, but it added to the institutional friction of the period.  
The extension of executive power since World War Two and the sidelining of Congress 
by Nixon in the areas of war, diplomacy, intelligence and budget making played a key role in 
motivating the Congressional reassertion. The Watergate scandal and negative public opinion 
also pushed Congress into action against the White House. But other forces were important in 
motivating the Congress, such as the need to fulfil electoral mandates, through gaining more 
control over legislation. The Congress has also sought to become more efficient and 
professional in dealing with legislation, special interest groups, and constituent relations.
123
 The 
revival of Congressional participation in policy making took time to develop and so Nixon 
successfully marginalised the legislature in the major policy areas.  
 
UK Executive-Legislative Balance of Power 1970-1974 
 
The 1970-1974 Parliament witnessed a minor shift in the executive-legislative balance 
of power in favour of the House of Commons, which created increased domestic pressure on the 
Heath government. From the period 1945-1970, the typical Westminster model featured strong 
party loyalty and cohesion. The governing party rarely lost a vote in the House of Commons 
from 1945-1970, and less than 10% of divisions saw one or more members voting against their 
official party line. But under Heath, this rose to 20%.
124
 Although party cohesion remained the 
central feature of the parliamentary system after 1970, the Heath government had to deal with a 
greater amount of dissent from backbench fringes than other post-1945 prime ministers. As 
discussed above, Heath’s small majority increased the influence of Conservative backbenchers, 
who had the potential to vote down key areas of government policy. As the Heath government 
sought to maintain the confidence of the House of Commons, the domestic party political game 
played a role in the negotiations for entry into the EC and bilateral Anglo-American relations 
connected to the European issue.                    
Entry into the EC became the central area of executive-legislative confrontation. Other 
party conflicts in the House of Commons over industrial and economic policy, Northern Ireland, 
and race relations all contributed towards a typically confrontational Parliament. The three main 
arguments put forward by historians and political scientists to explain the increase in general 
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party dissent after 1970 are (1) the poor leadership and communication skills of Heath, (2) the 
abandonment of the ‘parliamentary rule’ whereby governments must resign if they lose a vote in 
the House of Commons, and (3) the entry into the House of Commons of a new generation of 
MPs from the 1966 and 1970 general elections, who were apparently more independent and 
likely to rebel.
125
 However, one needs to investigate every episode of dissent to determine the 
factors involved rather than generalise. On the European issue, and the associated foreign policy 
areas of the Commonwealth and Anglo-American relations, all these theories fail to account for 
the strong ideological and policy differences between and within the parties over Britain’s role 
in Europe, regardless of leadership skills, parliamentary procedures, or generational factors. 
Firstly, on the issue of a new generation of MPs - a look at the MPs who cast the 
dissenting votes on EC legislation showed that they were just as likely to be well-established 
members as they were to be from the newly elected members, as well as cross-generational, 
contradicting the idea that a “new breed” of politicians entering the Commons in 1970 
accounted for the party dissent. House of Commons statistics show that the main occupations, 
and education level, of Conservative, Labour, and Liberal MPs in 1970 were almost identical to 
those from 1951.
126
 The educational background, main occupation, ethnicity and gender of 
members in the Conservative Party made little impact on the dissenting votes on the EC Bill.      
Secondly, on parliamentary procedure - when Heath entered government the unwritten 
parliamentary rule held that a cabinet must resign and parliament be dissolved if the government 
did not pass a major piece of legislation through the Commons which the one-party executive 
should control. The parliamentary rule gradually disintegrated, beginning from an amendment 
to Heath’s 1972 Immigration Act to the mass legislative defeats under James Callaghan’s 
minority government in the late 1970s. But the survival of the Heath government depended on 
the passing of the EC Bill through Parliament, a core component of the Conservative legislative 
program. The production of the White Paper in July 1971 elevated the issue to prime 
importance to the Westminster elite and political commentators.
127
 It also increased public 
interest and awareness of the EC negotiations.
128
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Finally, on the issue of Heath’s leadership – this needs to be considered in relation to 
the ideological and policy divide on the EC. On most issues, a one-dimensional divide existed 
between the Labour and Conservative parties, in particular on social-economic grounds. 
However, views on membership of the EC were the major exception, cutting across and within 
the two main parties. In the 1970 election campaign, 45% of Conservative candidates expressed 
reservations or adamantly opposed entry into the EC, compared with 61% of Labour 
candidates.
129
 Even so, the leadership of both parties went into the general election supporting 
the principle of entry into the EC. Both leaders had been involved in previous applications; 
Heath headed the negotiations of the first application, while Wilson applied for membership in 
1967. Within both parties pro and anti European groups developed which contributed to the 
general executive-legislative confrontation and fragmentation in the political parties.  
On the issue of European integration the views of the Liberal Party gained significance. 
The Liberal leadership consistently supported the European unity movement from the 1950 
Schuman plan to the 1957 Treaty of Rome.
130
 When fighting the 1970 election, only 7% of 
Liberal candidates expressed reservations or opposition to the EC, and therefore they were the 
strongest supporters of the EC amongst the parties in the 1970 Parliament.
131
 The divisions 
within the Conservative and Labour parties on European integration handed the Liberals a part 
of the legislative balance of power.  
With all three party leaderships supporting the principle of EC membership, the battle 
took place over the specific terms of entry. The main issues which Britain’s application to join 
the EC raised for the Westminster parties were the UK’s future relationship with the 
Commonwealth and the US, the cost of entry, the transition to EC agricultural arrangements, the 
future role of sterling, and most controversially the effect of entry on Parliamentary sovereignty 
– all fundamental questions of future British foreign and economic policy.132 The government 
published the White Paper The United Kingdom and the European Communities on 7 July 1971 
based on the terms negotiated with the EC up to that point, which in 1972 became the European 
Communities Bill.
133
 The centre of the domestic debate over EC membership focussed on these 
terms of entry.  
A significant number of Heath’s Conservative MPs were either sceptical of voting for 
the EC Bill or totally opposed to membership of the EC on the grounds of principle and policy, 
not politics, thus undermining the argument that Heath’s poor leadership and communication 
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skills led to mass dissent.
134
 Heath did have a large leadership task in utilising and integrating 
the huge intake of 101 new Conservative MPs at the 1970 General Election. But the anti-market 
factions in the party were well known in the build-up to the general election and some Tories 
openly campaigned against membership of the EC before the negotiations had begun. The 
Sunday Times quizzed the new Tory MPs on Europe three days after the general election and 
calculated that two-thirds supported entry into Europe on “good terms”. They counted that 16 
were strongly opposed to entry and about 14 were sceptical.
135
 Moreover, 29 veteran MPs had 
ties to an anti-Common Market league. Heath’s success in the general election brought into the 
House of Commons a significant number of openly Euro-sceptics, thus creating a pool of 
opposition to Heath’s central policy.      
One important question is whether the Conservative opposition to the EC Bill blended 
into a general leadership challenge? Of the prominent anti-Europeans backbenchers Enoch 
Powell received the most attention from the Westminster elite and press. Powell had competed 
against Heath in the 1965 Conservative leadership election, coming in third place. Heath then 
appointed Powell to act as the Shadow Secretary of Defence. But in 1968 Heath sacked Powell 
from the shadow cabinet after the controversial “Rivers of Blood” speech on race relations. 
Powell had followers in the Commons (the “Powellites”) who sympathised with his tough line 
on immigration. But they did not necessarily oppose entry into the EC, although a small number 
did. The dissenting voters on the EC were not centred on Powell; opposition to the EC had 
deeper roots than challenging Heath’s leadership of the party.    
Negative public opinion on EC membership greatly concerned MPs, which added 
another dimension to executive-legislative tension. The major polls, Gallup Poll, NOP, and the 
ORC, which the government tracked, showed strong opposition to membership of the EC from 
1970-1971.
136
 At the opening of the negotiations in July 1970 the Gallup Poll recorded a 55% 
disapproval rate with the government applying for membership, with only 24% approving.
137
  
In early 1971 the Social and Community Planning Research (SCPR), the largest 
independent social research institute in Britain, undertook the first of three detailed studies on 
public attitudes towards the EC, taking into account social and economic background, age, 
region, knowledge levels, and political parties. The results were submitted to the government 
and published in July 1971. Conservative and Labour supporters split into a similar position as 
the parliamentary parties - 54% Labour and 49% Conservative supporters would be 
disappointed with entry, and only 28% Labour and 33% Conservative supporters would be 
                                                 
134
  823 H.C. Deb. 21 October 1971-28 October 1971. 
135
  The FCO took note of this article: Newspaper; “Analysis of the Newcomers: A Reservoir of  
Trouble”, The Sunday Times, 21 June 1970, p.1, col. A; FCO 30/709; NAUK.  
136
  Tracking the opinion polls were dealt with in the FCO European Integration Department, for  
example FCO 26/792; NAUK.  
137
  Gallup Poll, British Attitudes Towards the Common Market 1957-1972 (London: The Gallup  
Poll, 1972), trend questions.   
- 54 - 
 
pleased by entry.
138
 This created a tricky situation for pro-European and uncertain MPs in 
marginal seats who needed to defend their jobs at the next general election. Francis Pym, the 
government’s Chief Whip, charged with the task of ensuring that members of the party voted 
with the leadership, wrote to Rippon about the concerns of MPs: 
 
...the general climate of opinion in the country is so anti-market that many Members...are now 
becoming extremely reluctant...Only yesterday three Members reported to me how depressed 
they are about the state of opinion in their constituencies.
139
 
 
The anti-Europeans took up the cause of public opinion, which put more pressure on the 
government. Powell argued that “the British government did not possess the necessary authority 
to conduct the negotiations and to conclude a treaty” without the “full-hearted consent of the 
British people”.140 Then two months before the White Paper, Gallop released a troubling 
statistic for the government. If a general election were held on the EC issue, only 28% would 
vote Conservative and 48% would vote for Labour.
141
   
However, the publication of the 1971 White Paper and the subsequent media attention 
galvanised supporters of the EC and increased public interest in the EC negotiations, as a poll 
conducted by NOP in July 1971 indicated. The increase in support appeared to come from 
Conservative voters and the elderly.
142
 Francis Pym noted to Heath that “the position in the 
Party has improved steadily since your statement on the White Paper...public opinion is 
swinging our way. This is much the strongest persuader”.143 Although the public opinion 
situation improved for the Heath government, the general anti-market feeling reflected in the 
opinion polls played a role in dividing parliamentary opinion and increased domestic pressure 
on the government.  
Pressure group activity also entered the equation. The CBI, TUC, and the NFU had 
strong links to the Parliamentary parties and government departments, and thus they were 
consulted throughout the process. While CBI backing for British entry into the EC helped the 
government support its arguments on the economic benefits of membership, opposition from the 
labour unions and deep concern from farmers and Commonwealth special interest groups 
increased the strength of the anti-market camp and influenced the parliamentary battle, in 
particularly the voting position of Labour in the Commons.
144
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From the beginning, the TUC had leaned towards opposition to the EC, although the 
General Secretary Victor Feathers told Heath in September 1970 that the TUC “would not come 
out with an outright rejection” because they wanted to wait to see the finalised terms of entry.145 
However, from October 1970, Heath’s preparations on the Industrial Relations Act dominated 
TUC-government relations, which led to less cooperation over EC policy and drew Labour and 
the TUC closer together. After the publication of the EC White Paper, the TUC released the 
report “Britain and the EEC” for the 103rd annual TUC conference in Blackpool (6-10 
September 1971) which officially attacked Heath’s European policy, warning that the terms 
negotiated could “be disastrous for British workers and have seriously damaging consequences 
for employment and living standards”.146 Labour had consistently criticised the progress of the 
negotiations and released pamphlets warning about entering Europe on the wrong terms for 
Britain.
147
 But following the release of the TUC position report, Labour produced their report 
“The United Kingdom and the European Community” for the 1970 October Conference, which 
included their new political slogan “No entry on Tory terms”.148 The TUC, with its membership 
accounting for nearly 45% of the UK employment market in 1970 (around 11 million people), 
and the Labour Party’s united front against Heath’s EC legislation significantly threatened the 
progress of the EC Bill on the domestic scene.
149
      
 In the media world Heath’s European policy benefited from the large support amongst 
major newspapers for the principle of British membership of the EC, despite political colours. 
All the major daily broadsheets, or “quality” press, supported entry. The largest circulating 
broadsheet, the Daily Telegraph (around 1.4 million), both supported entry and the 
Conservatives. The Times and the Guardian had roughly the same circulation, just over the 
300,000 mark. The Times provided positive coverage of the negotiations.
150
 Its 8 July 1971 
leader, the day after the issue of the White Paper, argued that it marked “the start of a new and 
much promising phase in British history”.151 The Guardian supported entry into the EC under 
Heath, but the left-leaning paper criticised the terms of entry, arguing in its leader on the White 
Paper that it is “a disappointing document. It is politically timid, economically complacent, and 
vague”.152 Heath faced tougher coverage from the quality weeklies. The right-wing Spectator 
and the left-wing New Statesman were strongly anti-market, although, the Economist took a 
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fiercely pro-European stance, producing detailed surveys.
153
 The general coverage of the events 
surrounding the EC negotiations from the broadsheets benefited the pro-entry side and Heath, as 
it provided the public with more information and worked as free publicity for the government. 
 Heath also enjoyed support from some of the major tabloid dailies, which were more 
important in reaching the wider population than the broadsheets. In fact, as table 3 below shows, 
the quality papers’ combined circulation only came to just over 2 million, whereas the four 
major tabloids exceeded 2 million copies each. The Daily Mirror, Sun, and the Daily Mail all 
strongly supported entry, while the Daily Express opposed entry on the basis of sovereignty and 
the economic cost. This created the interesting situation where the left-wing Daily Mirror and 
the Sun backed the Conservatives’ legislation, whereas the very right-wing Daily Express 
opposed Heath.
154
 Nevertheless, the tabloids went 3-1 towards the EC Bill, with their views 
reaching over 7 million people, which thus helped spread and promote Heath’s policy. The 
continual coverage of the negotiations from the ITN News at Ten, which drew in between 12 to 
15 million viewers on weekday evenings, also increased public knowledge of the EC, which 
usually benefited the pro-camp.
155
           
 
Table 3: UK National Daily Newspaper Circulations, June 1971156 
 
Column A Column B 
Newspaper Circulation 
Daily Mirror 4,380,000 
Daily Express 3,436,000 
Sun 2,083,000 
Daily Mail 2,007,000 
Daily Telegraph 1,455,000 
The Times 341,000 
Guardian 328,000 
Financial Times 168,000 
 
 
Heath also enjoyed some success in communicating with and convincing the Euro-
sceptics and uncertain MPs to vote for his European legislation, although the campaign to 
convince lacked central coordination. Shortly after the election the Conservative Group for 
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Europe set in motion an assessment of opinion in the party on the European question.
157
 Its 
importance lay in driving the party organisation towards developing a strategy for achieving 
parliamentary consent of the EC treaty.
158
 In drafting the White Paper, serious adjustments were 
made to maximise votes in the parliament. The original drafts were considered too “defensive” 
and “negative”, which would play into the hands of the anti-Europeans.159 The changes applied 
to the White Paper put greater emphasis on the long-term economic and political benefits of 
belonging to the EC. On 13 October 1971, Heath managed to gain overwhelming support for the 
government’s terms of entry at the Conservative Party Annual Conference in Brighton (which 
voted 2,474 to 324 in favour). This bolstered Heath’s position on Europe and as leader of the 
party, even if support from the party ‘faithful’ who attended the conference was easier to attain 
than from sceptical Conservative MPs and the public. These steps helped in Heath’s gaining 
ratification of the EC treaty.
160
      
But the key work came in the form of analysing the parliamentary politics surrounding 
the Treaty of Accession by the Chief Whip Francis Pym. The government made two vital 
political decisions about the first reading of the bill: (1) that the party would be allowed a free 
vote, instead of a three-line whip; and (2) that it would be a vote on the principle of entry into 
the EC. Three weeks before the vote, Pym provided a bleak assessment to Heath. He estimated 
that there were 26 hard-line antis, 6 likely to vote against but with an outside chance of 
abstention, and 13 uncertain MPs. This left only 281 Conservative members in favour, thus 
wiping out Heath’s majority.161 Therefore, the Bill could not be passed without the support of 
pro-European Labour and Liberal cross-voters. The Office of the Chief Whip had canvassed 
cross party opinion and concluded that “they would confine their support to the question of 
principle” and that “if there is a free vote on the Conservative side, then the Labour pro-
marketeers...will vote with the Government”.162 A free vote would also reduce the pressure on 
the government to resign if it lost the division. Furthermore, a three-line whip would make little 
difference to the Conservative anti-marketeers.
163
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The first reading of the Bill demonstrated the strength of the Westminster legislative 
chambers. But it also showed the political skill of Heath in navigating his legislation through 
parliament against strong ideological opposition.  Six days of ‘the “great debate”’ began in 
Parliament on 21 October 1971. The first reading, held on the 28
 
October, was a declaratory 
motion (without legal effect) on the principle of entry based on the provisional terms.
164
 Heath 
carried the vote by 112 (356-244), but 39 Conservative MPs voted against their government’s 
White Paper, and two abstained. The White Paper passed with the support of 69 Labour cross-
voters and 20 abstentions, rebelling against Wilson’s three-line whip ordering Labour MPs to 
vote against the government because of opposition to the economic cost of entry and the lack of 
provisions on future Commonwealth relations.
 165
 It also provided an opportunity for Wilson to 
challenge Heath’s control over the Commons. This substantial cross-party vote might create the 
perception that Britain entered the EC without much domestic confrontation. But the Treaty of 
Accession still needed ratification in 1972, which created further divisions within the parties.  
The second reading of the EC Bill became a vote of confidence in the Heath 
government, which revealed the party political game typically seen at the Westminster 
parliament, as well as showing the continuation of the ‘parliamentary rule’.166 Labour wanted to 
topple the government and many pro-European Labour MPs reversed their vote of principle 
taken in October 1971. Heath also imposed a three-line whip ordering Tories to vote for the 
Bill, in order to maximise Conservative votes. Heath survived by the slim majority of 8 (309-
301), with 15 Conservative MPs voting against him and 4 abstaining. The political sketch-
writers captured the drama of the vote. As the speaker announced the result “the Labour Party 
backbenches erupted in furious uproar”, shouting at Heath “resign!”167 Five Liberal MPs were 
“howled” at by Labour backbenchers, as were 5 abstaining Labour MPs because they had saved 
the government.
168
 Wilson then attacked Heath for breaching his election commitment, 
declaring that “the Prime Minister has not got the full-hearted consent of the British people”, as 
well as the parliament, and his own party.
169
 Then, according to Heath, a crowd of Labour MPs 
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attempted to lift Jeremy Thorpe, the Liberal leader, across the chamber.
170
 The Political Editor 
of The Times, David Wood, described the political mayhem: 
 
When the figures were announced both sides of the House went wild. A group of Labour 
backbenchers below the gangway surrounding the Liberals rose and set siege round Mr Thorpe. 
Other opposition members stood in their places and cheered, waved, and catcalled. Minsterialist 
backbenchers...howled, and brandished papers….the roar from the opposition side continued in 
crescendo. Then Mr Heath rose, pale, tense, but resolute and impassive.
171
 
 
The key point here is that Heath did not take Britain into the EC without domestic 
constraint, nor did he build and shape policy exclusively amongst the elite in the executive 
office and Whitehall. The final cut of the EC Bill, its third reading in Parliament, passed by 301-
284 on 13 July 1972, with the help a small number of Labour and Liberal MPs. In total, ten days 
were spent in Parliament in 1971 discussing the EC Bill, in addition to thirty-nine days of 
debate in 1972, with nearly three million words spoken, occupying over three hundred hours.
172
 
Domestic party politics and parliamentary scrutiny played a role in Britain joining the EC. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Nixon won two key presidential elections in 1968 and 1972 but the Republicans failed 
to gain a stronghold in the Congress. The party divisions created a period of high executive-
legislative confrontation, in which Nixon centralised foreign and domestic policy making at the 
peak of the imperial presidency. This meant that the new White House system of policy 
formation and implementation, through the NSC, Domestic Council, and OMB, played a 
significant role in the US conduct of international relations. The Congress and the White House 
clashed over war making powers, diplomacy, and budget making, but it was on Vietnam and the 
level of US troops stationed abroad (such as in Europe) that were the key flashpoints. While 
Nixon had little time for special interest groups in relation to foreign policy, such as labour 
unions, the Israel lobby, and the peace movement, he could not completely ignore the Congress 
and other institutional limitations. Furthermore, Nixon’s obsession with elections, public 
opinion, and the press meant that the domestic scene would always be considered in foreign 
policy making. But at the same time the electorate on the whole were not interested in foreign 
affairs, and the “silent majority” which voted for Nixon opposed the anti-war movement, and so 
to an extent Nixon ignored domestic pressure on foreign issues.      
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Heath entered power in 1970 with a small majority in the House of Commons which 
strengthened fractional elements in the Parliament. His legislative program focussed on entry 
into the EC, an issue which, although supported by the leadership of all three main parties, 
divided opinion on both sides of the House. Thus Heath encountered a tough domestic battle to 
gain membership of the EC, an issue that touched traditional foreign policy areas – the 
Commonwealth, the Anglo-American relationship and Britain’s world role. The Heath cabinet 
included some influential members, and the body played an important role in Government from 
1970-1972. But tensions existed in the Heath cabinet as well as between Whitehall departments 
over the control of European policy development and the implementation of manifesto 
commitments. Heath tended to conduct decision-making on important issues with an inner circle 
of advisers, which included a few select ministers, and private and political secretaries, and thus 
small steps were made away from British collective government towards prime ministerial 
government, especially after 1972 up to the defeat in the February 1974 election.  
In both the histories of the Nixon and Heath years a gap has developed on the broader 
domestic political and institutional balance of power influencing foreign policy. Studies on 
Britain and European integration tended to view the Heath negotiations to join the EC as an 
inevitable process, pushed through without much domestic limitation, either as a method to 
maintain and increase British influence in the world or as a fundamental re-orientation of British 
foreign policy. The orthodox and revisionist studies on Nixon often connected the Watergate 
scandal to a greater foreign policy role for Kissinger after January 1973, but they failed to fully 
take into account that Nixon faced a strong Democratic Congress and a liberal climate. In both 
the UK and US the balance of power, institutional structures, and individuals had an impact on 
the nature of foreign policy making.  
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Chapter 2: 
US and UK Foreign Policy Priorities (1969-1970) 
 
This chapter explores the internal debates by UK and US ministers and officials into 
Anglo-American relations and European policy and their long term objectives between 1969 
and 1970, and therefore the strategy each county took into their bilateral relations and approach 
to the issues created by the European enlargement negotiations.   
This chapter argues that the two central issues in foreign policy under the Heath 
government were gaining membership of the EC and maintaining a strong Anglo-American 
alliance. But the government thought that Europe, central to Britain promoting their world 
interests, should have short term primacy. The primacy of the EC negotiations has led to a 
consistent theme in the historiography, in which it is argued that Heath re-orientated British 
policy away from the US to the EC, and thus Anglo-American relations in this period are 
viewed as being poor and a low priority.
1
  
This chapter adds to the historical debate by arguing that Heath and Whitehall still 
attached importance to the Anglo-American relationship and protected the bilateral relationship, 
while working to gain entry into the EC. British membership of the EC did not represent an 
immediate fundamental re-orientation of British foreign policy and relations. The alterations 
were more subtle and complex. The issues raised by Britain’s accession to the EC were 
carefully handled with the Anglo-American alliance in mind, which reveals a determined effort 
to preserve the bilateral alliance in conjunction with Heath’s European policy.  
Another key aspect of this chapter which contributes towards historical knowledge is 
the analysis on the development of the Nixon administration’s policy towards the EC 
enlargement. It is argued here that the administration supported the enlargement to include 
Britain and greater European integration, which formed a part of the Atlantic Alliance and 
supported US objectives in the Cold War. But the administration would challenge EC economic 
policies which threatened US interests, which would be dealt with through trade and monetary 
negotiations. Moreover, the administration intentionally adopted a “hand-off” approach to UK 
entry into the EC, so as not to jeopardize their membership application, which reveals a high 
level of Anglo-American understanding.   
In Nixon historiography there is a significant lack of attention to Anglo-American 
relations and the EC enlargement.
2
 Furthermore, the prevailing position is that a sceptical view 
of a supranational Europe developed under the Nixon administration and from elite opinion 
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makers, who argued that US interests diverged from those of Western Europe.
3
 It is the case that 
the administration devoted less time to the Anglo-American relationship and European 
integration, neither of which was a pressing priority. Moreover, members of the US 
administration did challenge US European policy. However, this did not develop into opposition 
to greater EC integration and political cooperation under Nixon. This chapter contributes 
towards a greater, detailed understanding of the Nixon administration’s European policy and 
relations with the UK in the context of overall foreign policy issues. 
______________ 
 
US Foreign Policy Priorities 
 
Key Influences on Nixon’s Cold War Policy 
 
Three important factors influencing Nixon’s Cold War policy on détente, China, the 
Vietnam War, and the Atlantic Alliance were (1) US-Soviet nuclear arms parity, (2) the Sino-
Soviet split, and (3) economic difficulties. As discussed in the first chapter, domestic politics 
also played a key role in shaping foreign policy.  
Nuclear arms parity, the most important factor leading to improved US-Soviet relations 
in the 1970s, represented a major advancement for the Soviet Union from an inferior nuclear 
capacity in the 1950s to a rough balance with US strategic nuclear power by 1970. Hence, for 
the US, parity meant a gradual reduction in nuclear superiority throughout the 1960s. Nixon had 
foreseen this development, noting in his 1967 Foreign Affairs article that the “Soviets may 
reach nuclear parity” within the next decade.4  
Rough arms parity did not mean that Russia and the US had the same weapons and 
equal strength in the same areas, but it meant that each side had the capability to destroy the 
other. According to a 1971 report by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Richard Helms, the US had a general advantage in sea and air power, while Russia had superior 
land nuclear based systems. Moreover, Russia had more missiles (which deliver warheads), 
while the US had more warheads. Nixon concluded that “it’s clear there’s a throw weight 
advantage to the Soviets”.5 Both countries had anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) – a system to 
defend against attacking missiles, in particular long range, nuclear armed intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) – but while Russia had deployed more systems, those of the US were 
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technologically more advanced. The US was also technically superior in the development of 
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) – a sophisticated warhead that 
could carry multiple nuclear weapons on a single missile. 
Nixon initiated an extensive review of US military strategy on the day after his 
inauguration, 21 January 1969, the results of which revealed the impact that rough arms parity 
had on US Cold War policy.
6
 At the NSC in 1971 Nixon explained that the fear of nuclear 
conflict meant that its possibility was remote.
7
 In the early stages of the Cold War, US military 
superiority supported a strategy of “massive retaliation” against Soviet attack. However, the 
huge arms race and massive US and Soviet nuclear arsenals by 1969 meant that each country 
had the capacity to destroy the other, which undermined the threat to use such weapons. This 
led to a switch in US nuclear strategy, to strategic equilibrium, the major foundation of détente 
and US-Soviet arms negotiations.  
However, this also required maintaining parity and credible conventional forces, as 
Nixon told the NSC. Thus Nixon adapted a twin strategy: of negotiating on arms reductions, but 
at the same time maintaining US military strength, essential in progressing with Russia and 
China.8 Arms parity also did not necessarily affect competition in other areas, from ‘Third 
World’ conflicts, to East and Western Europe, and other political and economic spheres of 
influence and alliances.
9
 But rough arms parity and a reduced nuclear threat contributed towards 
the process of arms negotiations and a US policy of détente under Nixon. 
The Sino-Soviet split also played key role in influencing Nixon’s review of US relations 
with China and Russia. In the late 1950s difference emerged in the diplomatic relationship 
between the PRC and the Soviet Union, because of ideology, economic and foreign policy 
competition, and domestic politics.
10
 Armed clashes along their shared border in 1969 
heightened tension and highlighted the issue to US policy makers. The split undermined the idea 
of a monolithic communist world, and thus the US could take advantage in relations with both 
countries.  
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This led to the development of the Kissinger-Nixon concept of ‘linkage’ and ‘triangular 
diplomacy’, another topic frequently covered in Nixon historiography.11 Kissinger and Nixon 
used this idea in two senses: firstly, that the superpower relationship was connected to the 
political and military situation in other countries and regions, and secondly, as a diplomatic 
technique used in negotiations, using one objective as leverage on another.
12
 Studies on Nixon 
usually focussed on the ‘linkages’ to the Vietnam War and other ‘Third World’ conflicts, but 
the ‘linkages’ to Europe must also be considered. 
In July 1969 the NSC looked into the “broad implications of the Sino-Soviet rivalry on 
the US, Soviet, and Communist China triangle”.13 The State Department, DOD, Kissinger, and 
the NSC all believed that the split changed the diplomatic circumstances and that both Moscow 
and Peking appeared to be extremely suspicious of US relations with the other.14 Nixon and 
Kissinger, in dealing with China and Russia, used the Sino-Soviet split to shift the nature of the 
Cold War.  
The NSC East Asia Group displayed a degree of indecision on which approach to take. 
Some argued that the Soviets were so suspicious of US-Chinese collusion that any move 
towards rapprochement would “make impossible greater Soviet-American cooperation”. Others 
argued that the “Soviets are more likely to be reconciliatory if they fear that we will otherwise 
seek a rapprochement with Peking”.15 The State Department wanted to move on improving 
relations with China so that “the Russians would be reminded that they cannot take us for 
granted” - thus assuming that Chinese rapprochement would encourage détente.16 The DOD also 
saw opportunities for the US “to obtain concessions from either the USSR or China” and, 
brushing aside those who feared harming US-Soviet relations, argued that “the US must accept 
increasing risks rather than acquiesce in a return of China to the Soviet sphere”.17 This indicates 
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cross-departmental concern for triangular diplomacy, and thus not just a Nixon-Kissinger 
concept. The administration proceeded to revise US China policy, using the Sino-Soviet split to 
their perceived advantage. 
 The US balance of payments problem also influenced Congressional, government, and 
pressure group opinion on foreign and economic policy. The US witnessed a drastic reduction in 
its trade surplus, from an average of $5 billion from 1959-1967 to less than $1 billion in 1968.
18
 
By 1970, the US had a trade deficit of $1.5 billion. Its trade balance with Japan had hit a $3.2 
billion deficit, while the trade balance with the EC fell by $1.1 billion (although it was still $500 
million in the positive). In terms of the overall balance of payments, the US went from minus 
$9.8 billion in 1970 to about minus $30 billion in 1971. By comparison, the Japanese balance of 
payments in 1971 was a surplus of $10.3 billion and in the EC by $10.1 billion. US growth had 
slowed. Its average annual GDP from 1961-1970 was a strong 4.0%, although in Japan it was 
11.1% and 5.3% in the EC. From 1968-1970 US average annual GDP growth fell to 2.3%, 
while that of Japan increased to 12.3% and the EC to 6.2%.
19
 Rapid inflation from 1966 
onwards, increasing the cost of US exports, had by 1968 led to a further reduction of exports, 
which contributed towards the US balance of payments problems, undermining confidence in 
the dollar as an international reserve currency. This led to calls for a reduction in US military 
commitments abroad, the creation of a more stable international monetary and trade system, and 
the growth of a protectionist movement on the US domestic scene. Economic decline, together 
with rough arms parity, and the Sino-Soviet split resulted in a shift of US Cold War strategy, 
which in turn influenced Anglo-American relations.             
 
Superpower Détente 
 
Détente marked a more apparent shift from the doctrinaire US and Russian Cold War 
policies of the 1950s to a more flexible approach in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. 
But although the key years were from 1969-1979, détente existed before and after that, and thus 
it is not a set period. Furthermore, détente was not a uniform process or trend; superpower 
relations were a mix of cooperation and competition at various times. 
While US-Soviet tensions were high throughout most of the 1950s following the 
breakdown of the World War Two alliance, attempts were made at easing East-West relations, 
most notably the Geneva Summit in July 1955, attended by the US, Britain, France, and the 
Soviet Union. A wide range of issues were discussed, from trade and arms control to German 
unification, but the optimism of the conference broke down following the 1956 Suez Crisis and 
the Soviet suppression of Hungary. After the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis came the 1963 
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Partial Test Ban Treaty, the first major arms control agreement, which sought to slow the arms 
race and place limits on nuclear testing, particularly in space. From the mid-1960s proposals for 
East-West détente continued. In 1968 US President Johnson and Russian Prime Minister 
Kosygin attempted to launch Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), but they were 
suspended following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Therefore the 
process of détente gradually developed; it did not suddenly start in 1969.
20
   
Major attempts at easing East-West tensions by European countries also had an 
influence on the international movement towards détente and on relations within the Atlantic 
Alliance. The Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Willy Brandt, sought to 
improve relations with the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, through a series of bilateral agreements, a process known as Ostpolitik.
21
  
An aspect of this involved the status of Berlin. Negotiations, held between the four 
wartime allies – the UK, the US, France, and the Soviet Union – resulted in the Four Power 
Agreement on Berlin (3 September 1971), re-affirming their rights over the city. This led to 
increased contact between to two parts of the city and recognition of both West Germany and 
East Germany at the United Nations (UN) in September 1973.
22
 Finally, throughout 1969-1972, 
a constant debate in diplomatic circles grew on holding a European security conference, which 
became known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in order to 
ease tensions across Western and Eastern Europe.
23
 The negotiations on European security took 
off in Dipoli, Finland in November 1972 and resulted in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. 
Ostpolitik and CSCE therefore formed a part of détente. 
But for the Nixon administration, superpower détente overshadowed any European 
developments in East-West relations. Serious arms control negotiations began in November 
1969. As discussed above, nuclear capability and nuclear strategy were directly linked to 
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détente, and hence were major factors influencing the administration.
24
 On 26 May 1972, Nixon 
and the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed ten agreements, which included the Interim 
Agreement on the Limitations on Strategic Arms (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABMT). The agreements also provided for cooperation in science and technology, health 
research, environment protection, space exploration, and commercial relations. The Nixon 
administration primarily focussed on SALT and superpower negotiations in the area of détente. 
The early Nixon administration reluctantly supported the FRG’s Eastern policy and 
expressed concern about its impact on the Atlantic Alliance.
25
 On 14 October 1970, Nixon held 
an NSC meeting to discuss Ostpolitik, by which time the FRG had already taken major steps.
26
 
Kissinger believed that Brandt’s policy would be viewed by the Soviets as “ratifying the status 
quo in Eastern Europe”, causing problems in Western Europe. Kissinger pondered: “we could 
oppose the policy and bring Brandt down”. However, the administration did not want to be 
responsible for a breakdown, although they could seek to slow down the process by highlighting 
Allied rights in Berlin.
27
 Members of the NSC staff thought that “Ostpolitik is...speculative and 
narrowly focussed”.28 Therefore, the US administration primarily concentrated on improving 
East-West relations at the superpower level through specific arms negotiations, thus overriding 
Ostpolitik in US government circles.
29
 
Nevertheless, on 6 November 1970 Nixon issued a directive offering “support for the 
avowed objectives” of Ostpolitik. US policy aimed to maintain and deepen relations between 
the FRG and the Western alliance, as well as displaying the US commitment to Western Europe. 
However, the US “should not conceal...our long range concern”. On the four power Berlin 
negotiations, the administration did not think it was an essential topic. Therefore, the US 
reluctantly backed the FRG’s Eastern policy. Meanwhile, the US also intended to avoid a 
European security summit while it concentrated on SALT. The NSC sought to find “a 
convenient way to delay” it, such as with the Berlin negotiations and attention to Mutual 
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) - whereby NATO and the Warsaw Pact would negotiate a 
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reduction of forces in Europe.
30
 But the administration noted that the progress made on 
Ostpolitik and the Berlin negotiations made the CSCE a likely prospect, and difficult to oppose 
in light of US détente policy and pressure from Europe and Russia.
31
 
The US administration even expressed scepticism about the SALT negotiations. In July 
1971, Melvin Laird and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) feared that the treaties would place too 
many offensive weapon limits on the US, at a time of Soviet technical advances.32  This might 
result in the US losing parity with the Russias, changing the strategic balance, thus undermining 
the US military and diplomatic position. Nixon also distrusted the Soviet leadership. Just two 
months before the signing of SALT, Nixon stated that “we should have no illusions. We believe 
in arms control but...they have been going for superiority”.33 Nixon continued to fund nuclear 
programs, including the development of ABM systems, because he thought that it would be 
irresponsible not to continue.
34
 This could cause a battle with the Congress, the press, and the 
Russians over the continued development of weapons. But Nixon believed that “the Soviets 
would go on regardless of what we agreed” on SALT.35 This recognised the difficulty in the 
Nixon administration’s dual policy, which sought both negotiation and competition in 
superpower relations.  
Generalisations about détente cover up the mix of competition and cooperation involved 
in superpower relations 1969-1974, as well as the differing conceptions of the policy in the US, 
the Soviet Union, and the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The two superpowers 
continued to compete in the political, economic, and cultural spheres, and in the further 
development of nuclear capabilities. Regional conflicts continued with superpower influence, 
such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, and in Africa and Latin America. 
The period 1969-1974 were important years for détente, a key aspect of Nixon’s first term 
foreign policy, which in turn influenced Anglo-American relations and wider US-European 
relations. 
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US-Chinese Rapprochement 
 
As one of the key aspects of Nixon’s foreign policy, many historians have focussed on 
Chinese rapprochement. The prevailing view is that the opening of China was a major foreign 
policy achievement in influencing the Cold War. Dallek thought that it worked as “a device for 
pressuring the Soviet Union into more accommodating relations with the West”.36 A number of 
historians have questioned the extent to which Nixon’s visit to China entailed showmanship 
over the actual normalisation of relations.
37
 There is also a debate over who initiated and drove 
forward the policy – Kissinger or Nixon?38 Furthermore, was it a systematic, decisive move, or 
uncertain and muddled?
39
  
In Sino-American relations, several political and defence issues existed which created 
the adversarial relationship. Firstly, China and the US fought an ideological and verbal battle in 
the international sphere, with competing government systems. Militarily, the tension partly 
stemmed from the Korean War (1950-1953), when the Chinese intervened on the side of North 
Korea, against the US-backed South Korea. By 1969, the NSC believed that China had the 
conventional military power to threaten its neighbours.
40
 This meant that the US needed to 
maintain large conventional forces and bases in the region. Moreover, the US thought that 
China sponsored insurgencies in Thailand, Burma, North Korea, and North Vietnam, which 
needed to be opposed. Finally, the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities, although 
dwarfed by US and Russian capacity, threatened US interests in preventing the spread of 
nuclear weapons. Several problems therefore existed which prevented a “normalisation” of 
relations between China and the US.  
The early Nixon administration internally debated whether to continue its overall policy 
of Chinese deterrence or to seek a rapprochement with communist China. The key factors 
influencing this debate were the Sino-Soviet split, the low impact of US deterrence policy in 
China since the Korean War, the economic benefits of improved relations, and the underlying 
assumption that a more open China would be in the US interest. At his first press conference in 
January 1969 Nixon made clear that “I see no immediate prospect of any change in our policy” 
with regards to US-Chinese relations.
41
 But soon afterwards in February he commissioned a 
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study into “alternative US approaches on China”, to be carried out by the NSC 
Interdepartmental Group for East Asia.
42
 
Nixon had contemplated a major innovation in US China policy for many years, and it 
was his initiative in government which carried Kissinger and the rest of the administration to 
opening China. It is generally considered by historians and political commentators that Nixon’s 
reputation as an anti-communist and ‘Cold War Warrior’ probably helped him politically, 
whereas Kennedy and Johnson may have encountered domestic problems in an opening to 
China. Nixon believed that strong relations with China would benefit the US in the long term. In 
Nixon’s well-known 1967 article, “Asia After Viet Nam” in Foreign Affairs, he stated that “we 
simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations....There is no place on 
this small planet for a billion of its...people to live in angry isolation”.43 Nixon also argued in the 
article that the development of a stable international system would facilitate global economic 
cooperation. Thus Nixon indicated that, firstly, the opening of China and its progressive 
development would benefit the US, and that, secondly, US containment / isolation strategy had 
failed to have a major impact on China.     
However, some government agencies supported a continuation and strengthening of 
Chinese containment, through increasing the US military presence in the region and backing 
independent Asian nations.
44
 The policy director of the JCS, Ferdinand Unger, told Kissinger 
that “he and his staff believed that we should stay with our present policy” because it “is 
working so well”.45 Gilbert Nutter, the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security 
Affairs, agreed, stating that “he was reasonably impressed with the success of our present 
policy”.46 Kissinger thought that undoing isolation might harm the US, wondering if “we really 
wanted China to be a world power like the Soviet Union....Fifteen years from now we may look 
back with nostalgia on the Chinese role today in the world”.47  For Kissinger, the main benefit 
of opening China was in the context of US-Soviet relations and taking advantage of the Sino-
Soviet split.  
The government agencies developed a consensus that an increased international role for 
the PRC would encourage openness, cultural exchange, and improved diplomatic relations. The 
NSC East Asia group concluded that “there is no prospect that China’s present form of 
government will be changed by force” and that “it is impossible effectively to isolate a nation as 
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large as China”.48 The group assumed that China, with its 700 million people, would not remain 
isolated, and so in the long term the US needed to improve relations with a growing China. This 
indicated that US deterrence policy had stagnated and thus undermined the argument for 
continuing and increasing a containment strategy against China.                   
The perceived economic benefits of improving relations with China also encouraged the 
administration to shift US policy, although this was secondary to the political aspects. The 
Senior Review Group argued that the opening of trade with China “would be a balance of 
payments gain for the United States and our exporters would compete in a market not now open 
to them”.49 The State Department voiced concern about “materially assisting the Chinese 
communists”, but concluded that it would “do more to promote US foreign policy and economic 
interests than it would benefit the Chinese communists”. Hence, State supported the relaxation 
of trade both for the economic benefits and to “hold open the door” for improved political 
relations with China.
50
      
Nixon revised US China policy, which now sought to improve diplomatic, economic, 
and military relations. The first steps, taken before Heath entered office, started in June 1969 
with the US unilateral relaxation of trade with China for non-strategic goods, such as food, 
pharmaceuticals, agricultural equipment, and fertilizer.
51
 Nixon explicitly prevented US firms 
from supplying petroleum products to Chinese ships, even if it “hurts our oil companies through 
loss of trade far more than it bothers the Chinese”.52 The administration discussed the option of 
gradually reducing the level of the US military presence in Taiwan following the end of the 
Vietnam War.
53
  
The next stage of rapprochement took place in secrecy, without consultation with the 
State Department, the DOD, or allies. Kissinger went on a secret visit to Peking in July 1971, 
followed by Nixon’s announcement that he would meet the PRC leader, Mao Zedong, which he 
did in August 1972. The opening of China mixed two desires in US policy: firstly, to alter the 
balance of power in the Cold War within the context of the Sino-Soviet split, and secondly, to 
have a more conciliatory relationship with China, independent from triangular diplomacy. This 
was a key aspect of foreign policy, which reduced the amount of time the administration spent 
dealing with Anglo-American relations and European integration, although they were still 
important alliances.  
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The Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine 
 
 Ending the Vietnam War, a priority for Nixon because of its domestic and Cold War 
importance, dominated all other foreign policy issues on the US political scene during Nixon’s 
first term, and played an important part in US foreign relations. While both orthodox and 
revisionist historians have praised Nixon’s China and Russian policies, the Vietnam War 
divided opinion. Interpretation focused around the purpose behind Nixon’s policy, the exact 
nature of it, and why the 1973 Paris peace agreements ‘failed’.54 Nixon’s focus on Vietnam 
contributed towards the view that Nixon had little interest in European integration and Anglo-
American relations.  
Elected in November 1969 with a mandate to end the war, soon after his inauguration in 
January he implemented a strategy of ‘Vietnamisation’ - the gradual withdrawal of American 
forces and the strengthening of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
55
 Nixon aimed to preserve 
an independent non-communist South Vietnam and keep American international credibility 
intact, as he sought to explain in his memoirs: “to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists 
now would cost us inestimably in our search for a stable, structured, and lasting peace”.56 Thus 
the conduct of the Vietnam War played an important role in Nixon’s foreign and domestic 
policy, in which he sought to end the war while maintaining US credibility.  
  Vietnamisation and the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam were elements of the 
Nixon or ‘Guam’ Doctrine, whereby the government would move away from the interventionist 
policies of previous administrations and seek a reduction in the number of US worldwide 
troops. Many historians have interpreted this as a shift in US foreign policy. However, this was 
less of a doctrine and shift than a continuation of previous policies and recognition of the 
changing circumstances, from nuclear arms parity and détente, to the economic and political 
difficulties on the home front.
57
 In particular, it resembled aspects of the Truman Doctrine, 
announced by President Truman on 12 March 1947, in which the US would provide economic 
and military aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent those countries falling under Soviet 
influence.
58
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Nixon informally announced the ‘doctrine’ to reporters in Guam on 25 July 1969 while 
discussing the US role in Asia after the Vietnam War. Nixon said that “Asians...do not want to 
be dictated to from the outside, Asia for the Asians....we should assist, but we should not 
dictate”. 59 Foreshadowing the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon had said in his 1967 Foreign Affairs 
article that “other nations must recognise that the role of the United States as world policeman is 
likely to be limited in the future”. Therefore, “a collective effort by the nations of the region to 
contain the threat themselves” would be needed.60 Moreover, Nixon had said that Vietnam 
created severe strains on the US – economically, militarily, socially, and politically.61 Nixon 
recognised it would be difficult for the US government to pursue interventionist policies. US 
foreign policy had been limited and undermined by, firstly, the domestic movement against the 
war in Vietnam and other conflicts, in Congress and on the streets (as discussed in chapter 1), 
and secondly, because of the economic strain and balance of payments deficit. This resulted in 
the Nixon Doctrine.    
 In dealing with the Nixon Doctrine it is important to consider the long-term origins of 
the strategy. As discussed in chapter 1, from the late 1960s a growing debate in the US, which 
called for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, eventually saw a general reduction 
of troops abroad because of economic pressures and military failures. Also, in evaluating the 
implementation of the Nixon Doctrine, an analysis of the actual number of worldwide troops 
under Nixon is important. The total of US troops abroad in 1969 was 3,449,271, which fell to 
2,157,023 by 1974.
62
 These statistics might suggest the success of the Nixon Doctrine in 
bringing down the level of US troops overseas, although it does not reveal the results of passing 
the defence burden on to other authorities.  
Moreover, the administration continued to be involved in other conflicts. During the 
process of Vietnamisation Nixon and Kissinger actually expanded the war, in contradiction to 
the doctrine. But Nixon believed that “there are three wars – on the battlefield, the Saigon 
political war, and US politics”.63 On the battlefield Nixon expanded the war on two key 
occasions; firstly in April 1970 with the Cambodia incursion; then in February 1971, when 
ground troops were sent to Laos. Nixon also launched three major air offensives against North 
Vietnam: “Freedom Train” (April 1972); “Linebacker I” (May to October 1972); and 
“Linebacker II” (18-29 December 1972), dubbed the ‘Christmas bombing’, which Nixon hoped 
would compel Hanoi to sign a peace agreement. The air raids killed an estimated 13,000 North 
Vietnamese in 1972, adding to the 851,000 total deaths in both North and South Vietnam from 
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1964 to 1972.
64
 Between the 1968 election and the 1973 peace agreement 20,553 US troops 
were killed (taking the total number of American fatalities to 58,000). Thus the administration 
expanded the war in selected areas before ending US involvement. 
Nixon told the NSC in 1969 that his strategy for the US domestic battle would be “to 
lower the level of forces and reduce casualties” which could help subdue the anti-war 
movement.
65
 He reduced the number of troops from 550,000 to 20,000 by the 1972 presidential 
election and ended the draft, while combat deaths were down to 641 (compared to 16,592 in 
1968).
66
 Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, in 1969 Kissinger entered into secret negotiations 
with the North Vietnamese in Paris, leading to the signing of a peace agreement on 27 January 
1973.
67
 Thus Nixon took several approaches to Vietnam, which included Vietnamisation, the 
gradual withdrawal of US troops, negotiations with the North Vietnamese, and the expansion of 
the war, which were all important preoccupations of the administration.  
 
The Atlantic Alliance and NATO Burden Sharing 
 
The Atlantic Alliance and NATO formed a central part of US Cold War policy, and set 
the foundation of the administration’s policy towards Western European integration and the 
preservation of the Anglo-American relationship.
68
 The Nixon administration, committed to 
maintaining a large conventional force in Europe, sought to uphold the political and military 
alliance of Western Europe and prevent Soviet domination of the continent. As with his 
Vietnam War policy, Nixon faced calls from the Congress to reduce the US troop commitment 
to Europe, which became an issue in Anglo-American relations. But the administration fought 
off domestic opposition because of NATO’s position as a key pillar of US Cold War strategy.    
The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington DC in April 1949, was a military and 
political alliance between North America and many European countries with similar political, 
ideological and economic systems, seeking to defend against Soviet influence in Europe.
69
 As a 
response to the West German accession to NATO in May 1955, the Soviet Union established 
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the Warsaw Pact between itself and several East European countries. Thus, the NATO and 
Warsaw Pact systems were central parts of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union.
70
  
On entering office Nixon implemented a major review of US NATO strategy, which 
reaffirmed US support for NATO and the Atlantic Alliance.
71
 The issues investigated by the 
NSC, State Department, and DOD were alternative approaches to European defence and 
security, US troop levels, NATO nuclear strategy and forces (held by the US, France, and 
Britain), the possibility of MBFR, and the division of forces between the NATO allies (burden 
sharing).
72
 Thus the administration took a comprehensive approach to NATO issues.  
But the starting point of the NSC review of policy options, that “NATO is a key 
element in the European-American community which the President seeks to strengthen and 
revitalize” and that “NATO is also the institutional capstone of the trans-Atlantic security 
system”, indicated that any changes would not alter the fundamental structure and importance of 
NATO in overall US foreign policy during Nixon’s term in power.73 At the 20th anniversary 
conference of NATO held in Washington DC on 10 April 1969 Nixon publically signalled the 
centrality of the Western alliance to US policy.
74
 Thus, the Nixon administration sought to 
continue post-1949 US policy on NATO. The continuation of US support for a strong NATO, 
based on political and military objectives, showed that, despite a general policy of détente, the 
US and the Soviets continued to compete in the European field.
75
 
Two key factors influencing Nixon’s review of NATO policy were détente and nuclear 
arms parity. On the issue of rough arms parity, the new strategic situation undermined the 
nuclear threat, thus increasing the importance of conventional NATO forces.
76
 Nixon told the 
NSC in November 1970, discussing NATO, that nuclear arms parity meant that nuclear 
weapons were no longer credible on their own, and that “we must have nuclear parity and also a 
significant conventional capability”.77 Thus, Nixon issued a directive that in view of the 
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“strategic balance” between the US and the Soviet Union, NATO would maintain a “credible 
conventional defense posture” with the US contribution up to the authorised level of 319,000.78 
This indicated the importance of the Atlantic Alliance to overall US foreign policy. 
Nixon also wanted the NSC to consider the status of NATO in light of détente.
79
 
Directly related to this issue was MBFR and the European security conference, both of which 
sought to ease tension between Western and Eastern Europe. The NSC thought that seeking 
MBFR would indicate US consistency in wanting to ease East-West tension, showing “NATO’s 
ability to pursue détente with the East” and that it could “lay the groundwork for later, more 
comprehensive, arms control arrangements”, as well helping the US avoid a European security 
conference. However, the NSC noted deep concern that the “Soviet Union may try to use 
MBFR negotiations to divide the alliance and weaken NATO’s will” to maintain significant 
forces in Europe.
80
 Following the NSC meeting on 17 June 1971, Nixon decided to explore 
MBFR with the Warsaw Pact, on the basis of developing “a consensus within the NATO 
alliance”.81 Thus, while the US would maintain a strong conventional force in Europe due to 
arms parity and the need to retain a political and military role in Europe, it would 
simultaneously give support to the idea of MBFR as a component of détente.      
The Congressional debate over US force levels in Vietnam, discussed in chapter 1, 
spilled into the European arena. In May 1971 Senate Leader Mike Mansfield sought to limit the 
number of US troops in Europe to 150,000 which he argued could be done without endangering 
Western European security (the Mansfield Amendment).82 The number of US troops stationed in 
Europe in 1971 was 274,082; the current authority allowed up to 319,000, and thus the 
Mansfield Amendment would reduce the troop level by nearly half.
83
  
Mansfield thought that the US carried too much of the economic burden of defence in 
Europe, relative to the role played by their allies. Furthermore, he argued that it weakened the 
US balance of payments and harmed the value of the dollar abroad which caused international 
monetary crises.
84
 There was also a degree of sympathy for this in the Nixon administration. 
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Rogers told Nixon that their allies “need to do more” and, showing concern for the domestic 
scene, argued that it “is important for our Congressional attitudes”. Laird believed that Western 
European countries “can afford it”. Moreover, the “allies have the ball in their court...they admit 
that they are not sharing the burden properly”.85 Therefore, the issue of burden sharing gained 
strong support from members of the administration. 
But, while the administration agreed with Congress that the allies should take on a 
greater role, they disagreed with Mansfield that force levels should be unilaterally dropped. 
Nixon and Kissinger would only reduce troops in Europe through negotiations with Allies and 
the Soviet Union, through MBFR.
86
 The White House viewed the Mansfield amendments as a 
threat to US post-war foreign policy in Europe.
87
 The amendments were defeated with the help 
of senior members of the Congress and advisers from Johnson’s administration, an interesting 
case of cross-party cooperation.
88
 The Mansfield Amendment did put pressure on the 
administration to seek a greater role from allies. This episode displayed the executive-legislative 
conflict, as well as the administration’s commitment to the defence of Western Europe.            
 
 
Nixon’s Early Policy on Anglo-American Relations and the EC 1969-1970 
 
 
Nixon’s early policy on Western Europe re-affirmed US support for the enlargement 
and integration of the EC, which would benefit the Atlantic Alliance and US political and 
defence policy. Furthermore, in Anglo-American relations Nixon sought to take a political 
hands-off posture towards the UK application to join the EC in order to prevent them appearing 
as a US Trojan horse, which could have a negative impact in the membership negotiations. This 
displayed recognition of the British dilemma in balancing relations between the EC and the US 
during the negotiation phrase.  
Nixon departed for his first major presidential trip abroad on 22 February 1969, a tour 
of Europe, which included bilateral discussions in London, Bonn, Rome, and Paris, as well as 
multilateral meetings at NATO headquarters. After meeting with President Jean Rey of the EC 
Commission, Nixon declared that it had “strengthened my convictions as to the high purpose 
and indispensability of European economic integration”.89 Nixon set out this policy in greater 
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detail in his first annual Foreign Policy Report to Congress on 18 February 1970, which 
continued the standard position of US governments since 1945. It accorded a high priority for 
Europe, reaffirming US commitment to Western Europe, the EC, and the importance of 
maintaining nuclear and conventional forces for the defence of Europe.90 But some members of 
the administration complained to Kissinger and Nixon that the Foreign Policy Report did not 
give enough attention to the growing economic competition between the EC and US. Kissinger 
feared that the “economic agencies would fervently oppose” any European policy that 
threatened US economic interests.
91
 
Also of note, Nixon’s report to Congress pointed to a policy of non-interference on 
European unity, arguing that it “is fundamentally the concern of the European. We cannot unify 
Europe.”92 This was in contrast to previous presidents, such as Kennedy, who actively pushed 
for EC integration. Nixon told Congress that “When the United States in previous 
Administrations turned into an ardent advocate it harmed rather than helped progress”.93 This 
suggested a hands-off approach. These early public statements by Nixon were the official line of 
the administration during its first year.    
But since February 1969 the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) had been pushing 
the White House for an examination of EC policy. Nixon had been occupied with developing 
policy on Vietnam, Russia, and China.
94
 The USDA had come under strong pressure from 
farming groups, criticising EC trade policies that affected their industries.
95
 So the USDA 
launched its own internal investigation. Its study, completed in August 1969, took a strongly 
sceptical view of the EC enlargement.
96
 Then in October 1969 two members of the NSC staff, 
Fred Bergsten and Helmut Sonnenfeldt, pointed out to Kissinger that “there is no systematic 
work going on” in the government about the upcoming enlargement negotiations, and that an 
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investigation was needed.
97
 They also warned about the need to keep a low profile because 
“leaks that a study was going on would undermine our hands-off posture” towards the 
enlargement of the EC.
98
 Nixon subsequently established an ad hoc group under the direction of 
the Department of State.
99
   
     This ad hoc group investigating EC policy failed to reach an agreement and present a 
unified report of policy options, which showed the wide differences within the administration 
on US European policy. State reported back to Kissinger that “we failed to agree on a common 
assessment or on a common statement of the problem.”100 Instead, State presented two reports 
on behalf of the ad hoc group which supported EC integration and a continuation of US policy. 
The Treasury, USDA, and the Department of Commerce told Kissinger that “there are many 
statements throughout the document with which we disagree”101 and that the ad hoc group had 
been a “State Department railroad”102, and therefore they submitted their own joint statement, 
objecting to the current policy line.  
The State Department viewed the EC as a key grouping in Western Europe, vital to the 
future of the Atlantic Alliance and US Cold War policy, and thus expressed support for the 
strengthening of the EC in its report to Kissinger and Nixon. The State Department mapped out 
the underlying influence on its position, stating that the 
 
Primary consideration of our support for European unification is the long term political benefit 
to the United States of an effectively united Europe which would assume a greater responsibility 
for the defense of the free world and play a more effective role in world affairs.
103
   
 
This suggested that the State Department supported EC integration and expansion, not just 
within the context of the Atlantic Alliance, but as a greater force in international politics. State 
also backed Nixon’s policy of non-involvement, reiterating the importance of “deliberately 
maintaining a ‘low profile’ on what is essentially a European issue”, which indicated 
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understanding for the British government’s need to not appear as an American Trojan horse. 
State also believed that British entry would be vital to US interests, creating a more Atlantic-
friendly EC, arguing that “with UK membership, a new balance of political forces will exist 
within the community...this addition will on balance contribute to the democratic, liberal and 
outward looking character of the European Community”.104 Thus, State supported the status quo 
on US European policy under Nixon. 
 The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture believed that the expansion 
of the EC would be a major factor affecting long term US foreign economic policy and feared 
that it would have disastrous effects on the US economy, and thus it recommended that the US 
take strong action to protect its interests during the enlargement process. Although the economic 
departments supported the EC in principle, they argued that political and economic factors 
could no longer be separated, stating that the US “for many years concentrated most of its 
attention on its political and military objectives”. However, in the “enlarged EC, we will have a 
competitor large enough and strong enough to damage our interests seriously”. Therefore, they 
argued that the US needed to inform the EC “without delay” that the political and military 
relationship “could be jeopardised” if the EC caused serious economic damage to US interests. 
They called on the administration to exercise US rights under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).
105
 Therefore, Treasury, Commerce and the USDA sought a major change in 
US European policy. 
 Congressional opinion on foreign economic trade policy also caused concern in the 
administration.  Sections of the Congress had moved towards limited protectionism because of 
unfair EC trading practices (see chapter 4). The administration needed to signal that US interests 
would be protected; otherwise it might threaten political and military domestic support for 
Western Europe. Treasury, Commerce, and the USDA warned Nixon that if the US did not 
“protect our basic economic and financial interests” then the administration would “not retain 
Congressional and public support necessary to maintain our foreign policy in general”.106  
Bergsten also showed concern for domestic factors. He told Kissinger that “we must defend our 
economic interests” both for “real economic reasons” and because of the need to “avoid 
jeopardizing domestic support of our pro-EC political stance”.107 Bergsten warned of “disarray 
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on the hill” and that the issue “will get hotter as the UK-EC negotiations come nearer”.108 
Therefore, the problems between the White House and Congress on foreign economic trade 
policy threatened to spill into the political debate on EC expansion, which Nixon needed to take 
into account.     
Kissinger and Nixon sought to find a middle way between the two sides. Essentially, 
the State Department position on the political and military importance of the EC and the 
positive impact of UK entry ran in line with Nixon’s view and current European policy. 
However, the economic departments throughout 1969 and early 1970 felt that the “economic 
problems have not gotten through to the President”. Kissinger’s NSC staff believed that State 
had “insisted on an unrealistically rosy picture of European developments, and that the 
economic agencies insisted on conjuring up vague fears of pending harm to our economic 
interests”, and thus room could be found for a common line between protecting US trade 
interests and supporting EC integration and Western Europe in the political and military 
fields.
109
  
But the key was to moderate the position of Treasury, Commerce, and the USDA 
because in the final analysis Nixon supported EC expansion, and thus he would need to overrule 
these departments. This could lead to “their resultant grumble”, thus undermining European 
policy.
110
 Kissinger believed that these departments had been far too influenced by business and 
agricultural interests, as well as congressional views.
111
 Furthermore, Kissinger feared that their 
position represented a dangerous intervention in the enlargement negotiations. He warned 
Nixon that “excessive US participation could...impede progress towards closer European 
economic unity” and that the US needed to avoid taking on “a very bitter battle which could 
wreck the British negotiations with the blame placed on us”. The US would be a “handy 
scapegoat” for justifying failure.112 Thus, Nixon sought to develop a policy which maintained a 
hand-off approach and support for enlargement, as well as taking into account the views of the 
economic departments. 
 The Nixon administration’s policy directive on EC enlargement reiterated support for 
the EC, and thus the administration did not take a sceptical view of Europe in its official policy 
as argued by some historians. US policy towards the EC would be guided by the principle of 
“support for expansion” and the “US willingness to accept some – but not excessive – economic 
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costs as a result of the accession of new members”.113 The Departments of Treasury, Commerce, 
and the USDA were not satisfied with this vague statement, arguing that the administration 
needed to take a tougher line with the EC and the UK in foreign economic trade policy.
114
 But 
they were overruled by Nixon, who believed that the political benefits of European integration 
for US Cold War strategy trumped the economic disadvantages to US agriculture and 
commerce.
115
 Nixon also expressed support for UK entry which he believed would have a 
liberalising effect on EC trade policy, and that the US should pursue a hand-off posture so as 
not to harm the UK’s accession application. 
 
UK Foreign Policy Priorities 
 
Britain’s Economic Decline and Structural Change 
 
Long term economic, political and strategic changes took place in British policy 
between 1945 and 1970, from a focus on empire and the Commonwealth to European 
integration. In 1950, Winston Churchill had said that there were three circles of British foreign 
policy, the Commonwealth, the US, and Europe. He argued that Britain was a world power, not 
a regional one, and thus the Commonwealth and Anglo-American relations must not be harmed. 
In 1961 a Macmillan defence directive stated Britain’s three main strategic roles – the defence 
of Western Europe and independent nuclear deterrent, an East of Suez role, and the 
Commonwealth.
116
 The maintenance of an East of Suez and Commonwealth role signalled the 
intention of the UK government to retain a world-wide military and political presence, from the 
Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf region, the Caribbean, and Africa, while the nuclear deterrent 
and protection of the Western Alliance involved cooperation with the US. However, by the time 
of the Wilson government, 1966-1970, East of Suez had become the least important strategic 
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and political area, as the government started its rundown of forces in the region. This marked a 
decline in Britain’s world defence role.117  
The push for greater political and defence integration by EC countries had an important 
influence in encouraging the Macmillan, Wilson, and Heath governments to seek membership. 
Economics also drove Britain’s application for a new international association. However, 
Britain’s move towards European integration and a largely regional defence strategy did not 
signal a move away from the Anglo-American relationship, as sometimes portrayed. Europe and 
the US were both economically, politically, and strategically vital to Britain. 
In the long term, Britain experienced relative economic decline and a structural trade 
shift which contributed to its move towards European integration. Britain’s relative economic 
decline was reflected in her place in world GDP/capita rankings. In 1950 Britain held seventh 
position, thirteenth by 1960, seventeenth in 1965, and then falling to twenty-second in 1970.
118
 
Furthermore, Britain had a low average annual rate of GDP growth compared to the countries in 
the EC, as shown in table 4 below. Hence, the Macmillan, Wilson, and Heath governments 
often cited economic factors behind their decisions to apply for EC membership, as a way of 
reversing Britain’s relative economic decline, even though political and defence matters were 
paramount to Britain joining the EC.    
 
Table 4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in selected countries and groups 1961-1970 (%)
119
 
Group or Country 
Average annual rate of GDP (%) 
1961-1970 1968-1970 
United States 4.0 2.3 
EEC 5.3 6.2 
United Kingdom 2.7 2.3 
Japan 11.1 12.3 
 
From 1945 Britain’s economy underwent a major change in trading partners, shifting 
from the Commonwealth and East of Suez to Western Europe and the US, which increased the 
importance of those regions. As table 5 shows below, Britain’s export and import market grew 
significantly in the US and the countries of Western Europe. British exports to the EEC 
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increased by 100% from 1951-1969 and accounted for a fifth of all exports by 1969. The 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) accounted for nearly 15% of all export trade in 1969, 
which, added together with EEC exports, totalled 35.5% of the British export market, vital to 
the economy.
120
 However, during the same period, export trade with the Commonwealth fell by 
over 50% and imports by 41.7%, although in 1969 it still amounted to a significant proportion 
of total exports and imports. British exports to Malaysia/Singapore, the area of the largest 
British military commitment ‘East of Suez’, remained minuscule throughout the period. The 
proportion of British exports to the US market increased by 132% from 1951-1969, the largest 
increase of any region. The US was the most important single country economy to Britain.  
 
Table 5: British Exports and Imports: Selected Areas 1951-1969 (% of total £ million)
121
 
 
Column A Column B Column C    Column D Column E 
Region 1951 1961 1969 
Percentage 
Change in Share 
of total 1951-1969 
Commonwealth 
Export 50.5% 33% 21.8% - 56.8% 
Import 39.9% 31.5% 23.2% - 41.7% 
USA 
Export 5.3% 8.5% 12.3% + 132.0% 
Import 9.8% 10.8% 13.5% + 37.8% 
ECSC/EEC 
Export 10.4% 18% 20.8% + 100.0% 
Import 13.2% 15.2% 19.4% + 47.0 
EFTA 
Export _ 12.7% 14.7% + 15.7% 
Import _ 12.3% 15% + 22.0% 
Middle East 
Export 5.5% 5.9% 6.6% + 20.0% 
Import 7.7% 7.4% 7.9% + 2.6% 
Malaysia/Singapore 
Export 1.5% 2.1% 1.3% - 13.3% 
Import 2.4% 1.4% 0.8% - 66.7% 
Total (£ million) 
Exports 2,566.4 3,954.6 7,337.6 _ 
Imports 3,892.1 4,546.4 8,323.6 _ 
 
 
The trade shift from the Commonwealth to Western Europe and the US can be 
accounted for by the vast increase in Britain’s manufacturing production. In 1970 five-sixths of 
British exports consisted of manufactured goods, especially expensive engineering products, 
which found a market in the rich, developed countries of Western Europe and in the US, and 
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thus there was a boom in trade between the developed countries. Furthermore, Britain also 
expanded its domestic agricultural production, with the share of imported foodstuff of total 
imports falling from 39% in 1954 to 23% in 1970 – most of which came from primary 
producing countries in the Commonwealth.
122
 The transformation in trading patterns influenced 
the relative economic, and sometimes political importance of those areas.  
Short term factors, such as the Vietnam War and the Malaysian/Indonesia 
Confrontation, in the context of the Cold War and Anglo-American relations, affected the level 
of UK military and political commitment to South East Asia in the 1960s.
123
 Furthermore, the 
import of vital goods also influenced policy. For example, British imports from the Middle East 
were less than 10% of the total in terms of monetary value, but the form of the commodity, oil, 
increased the importance of that region. Furthermore, the import of certain goods from the 
Commonwealth, such as Caribbean sugar, continued to be vital trading links. Many members of 
the Commonwealth were developing countries, dependent on preferential trading arrangements. 
This meant that Commonwealth trade arrangements played a central role in the EC enlargement 
negotiations, despite its declining position in Britain’s overall trading patterns. Nevertheless, the 
changes in Britain’s post-war economy provide a long term underlying explanation of Britain’s 
diplomatic focus on the EC and the Anglo-American relationship.  
 
Heath’s Concept of European Integration 
 
Edward Heath’s concept of European policy when he became Prime Minister in June 
1970 comprised the aims of preserving a world role and influence, promoting free trade and 
economic growth, and providing security through an effective defence system. Therefore, it was 
a combination of political, economic, and defence factors.  
But Heath’s initial objective for European cooperation was on a more idealistic basis - 
to end rivalry and warfare and create prosperity and security in Europe following the Second 
World War. Heath’s maiden speech in the House of Commons on 26 June 1950 had called for 
Britain to participate in European cooperation in order to “secure peace and prosperity in 
Europe”.124 But Britain did not, and the Schuman Plan led to the building of a framework of 
European cooperation without British participation, beginning with the establishment of the 
European Coal and Steel Community in 1952. When the Harold Macmillan Government 
decided to apply for membership of the EEC in 1961, Heath was appointed Lord Privy Seal and 
handed responsibility for negotiating Britain’s entry.125 Heath wrote some years later that as 
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Chief Negotiator from 1961-1963 he saw the EEC as an opportunity for Britain to discover a 
new role: “It signalled the end of a glorious era, that of the British Empire, and the beginning of 
a whole new chapter of British history.”126 Thus, Heath’s concept of European unity in his early 
political career included support for the European ideal of political unity, and both economic 
and defence cooperation.   
Heath also supported the view that membership of the EC would help Britain retain 
world influence. Heath’s first comprehensive policy document in October 1965, Putting Britain 
Right Ahead, addressed the purpose of Britain’s European role: “…in building up our strength 
to exert political influence in the world, we can best achieve our objectives in a wider 
grouping.”127 Heath believed that the European countries could pool their strength, and through 
the EC institutions extend their political influence and power in the international system. But on 
the issue of sovereignty, Heath believed that there needed to be a gradual process of integration. 
By European governments working together, understanding old habits, and developing new 
operational systems, in the long term they would be willing to resign power to the European 
centre. Heath felt that once confidence and trust grew, cooperation should be extended into the 
political and defence fields.
128
 On this basis Britain in the EC could compete with Russia, the 
US, and the growing Japanese economy.    
Economics also took central stage in the Heath government’s argument to voters and 
the parliament that Britain should join the EC. He believed that membership would re-vitalise 
British industry, through economies of scale, competition, and new business practices. 
Technological collaboration would help with this, as he argued in Putting Britain Right Ahead:  
“in aircraft, electronics, space development and tele-communications there is immense scope for 
much closer European cooperation”, which would improve the British economy.129 The 1970 
Conservative Party manifesto, A Better Tomorrow, also reiterated the point that joining the EC 
could help reverse Britain’s economic decline, telling voters that “economic growth and a 
higher standard of living would result from having a larger market”.130 These perceived benefits, 
in combination with the long term changes in UK trading patterns and political and defence 
priorities, led to Britain re-applying for EC membership.
 131
 
The need for a European recovery after the Second World War influenced Heath’s early 
idealistic vision of Europe. But as chief negotiator of Britain’s first application to join the EEC, 
Heath gained an insight into the workings of the new European institutions, in which he 
perceived that countries pursed their national interests, but were also willing to give up power to 
the community for the benefit of its members. Heath sought to increase Britain’s influence and 
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role in the world through building a European voice in the political, economic, and defence 
fields. This in turn would have an impact on foreign policy strategy under Heath.  
 
Heath Government’s Policy on the EC and the US 
 
Following Heath’s election victory in June 1970, he implemented a review of overall 
foreign policy strategy, a process which revealed the close attention paid to balancing British 
relations with Europe and the US. Heath wrote to Carrington and Douglas-Home on 15 July 
1970 on the importance of making “decisions in the field of defence and overseas policy”   
within the “context of a general and coherent strategy.”132   
Subsequently, Douglas-Home, in consultation with other Whitehall departments and 
cabinet ministers, put together the government’s first statement of foreign policy on 21 July 
1970. The statement ‘Priorities in Our Foreign Policy’ analysed British overseas policy, national 
security and national prosperity on the basis of current economic transactions, political and 
security importance, and potential economic growth between regions.
133
 
This revealed the perceptions of Whitehall departments as to where Britain’s interests 
lay and the general strategy used in conducting foreign affairs. It concluded that Western 
Europe and Anglo-American relations were the pillars of UK policy. For the volume of 
economic transactions and political and security interests, Western Europe topped all regions, 
followed by North America and the Caribbean. On estimated contributions to UK GDP for 
1975, North America and the Caribbean received the highest marking, followed by the 
European regions. The regions of Africa, Asia, and Middle East were considered the least 
important overall. The government’s first foreign policy statement declared that: 
 
“Our basic objectives of security and prosperity will best be served by policies which centre on 
our relations with Europe and North America…for it is on our success in promoting our interests 
in Europe that our ability to play a wider role will depend.”134     
   
The key objectives of the Heath government’s early European policy were, first, to 
maintain the strength of NATO for the defence of Europe, the government’s top defence 
priority, and a key part of the Atlantic Alliance and Anglo-American relations. The second 
objective, to obtain membership of the EC, would be the key political focus.
135
 Although the 
government had not yet taken into account budget restraints, nor set out detailed policy 
initiatives, the memorandum represented the government’s broad views, and a guide to 
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implementing policy and conducting relations with other states.
136
 The Heath government had 
held the notion that Britain’s key areas of interests were Europe and North America. But they 
thought Europe, central to Britain promoting their political and economic interests, should 
therefore have primacy.  
The memorandum had also emphasised the importance of improving relations with 
France. President Charles de Gaulle had vetoed Britain’s first two applications to join the EC 
because of economic differences and the view that Britain would be America’s ‘Trojan Horse’ 
in the community of Europe.
 On the first de Gaulle’s veto, 14 January 1963, he had warned that 
UK membership of the EC might create “a colossal Atlantic community under American 
dependence and direction”.137 Hence, Heath and the FCO believed that they needed to convince 
the French government that Britain genuinely supported European integration.  
Heath commissioned a paper from the Planning Staff of the FCO, in consultation with 
the British Embassy in Paris, on post-Gaullist France, which they completed in September 1970. 
Heath supported the papers’ recommendations, saying that it “should be read and absorbed and 
acted upon by all Whitehall, including ministers.”138 In the short term the paper advised that 
steps needed to be taken to remove French suspicions that Britain sought membership of the EC 
to tip the balance of power away from France and to promote Atlantic interests in the 
community. This could best be done through personal visits, such as a meeting between Heath 
and Pompidou.
139
 Therefore, in the immediate term, Heath sought to build a strategy for 
conducting relations with both the US and the EC, in which France, one of the major players, 
needed to be taken into account. The FCO believed that Germany and the other four members of 
the EC largely supported UK entry, although the UK’s application would create certain issues 
for each country – a topic outside of this thesis which requires more research on the Heath 
application.
140
 
It is also important to consider the role of the FCO, a leading player in Anglo-American 
and EC relations under Heath. The FCO supported Britain’s EC application, mainly as a means 
to increase Britain’s political and economic influence in the world, similar to Heath’s concept of 
European policy. The FCO expected that during the EC negotiations and shortly after joining 
the Community, relations with the US would become strained. However, in the long term, the 
FCO perceived that Britain as a member of the EC would strengthen the Anglo-American 
relationship.  
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Sir Denis Greenhill, the FCO Permanent Under-Secretary of State, mapped out in a 
letter to the incoming Secretary of State Douglas-Home on 23 June 1970 the underlying 
influence on the FCO perspective. It argued that Europe: 
 
lies at the centre of our policies….Unless we can find a new power base in Europe our influence 
in Washington is bound to decline....We shall wish to keep our special links with the U.S., e.g. in 
the intelligence and nuclear fields…but it will be necessary on occasion to demonstrate that for 
us Europe has priority.
141
 
 
Greenhill also stressed the need to “concentrate our defence effort in Europe in support of the 
Atlantic Alliance”.142 The outlook of the FCO, which had developed over a long period, argued 
that EC membership would help maintain Britain’s global role and a strong Anglo-American 
partnership in the long term. The switch in focus to European politics represented a new method 
for Britain to pursue the aim of world influence.  
The Planning Staff of the FCO, headed by Percy Cradock, initiated an internal review of 
current foreign policy in May 1970, in preparation for the incoming Heath government, which 
also revealed the state of play at the FCO.
143 The position papers stated that the application 
to join the EC remained “the cornerstone of British European policy.” The FCO concluded that 
Britain’s “foreign and defence policies have been generally re-orientated in a European 
direction.”144 The FCO also argued that Britain should participate in progress towards the 
“political construction of Europe”, which would “remove long-standing suspicions that British 
Governments have never understood the European idea.”145 This paper indicated that for the 
FCO, entry into Europe trumped other foreign affairs issues in the short term. However, the 
FCO planning papers also indicated the vital importance of Anglo-American relations to overall 
foreign policy strategy.
146
 Therefore, the FCO wanted to balance relations between the EC and 
the US, although gaining membership of the EC took priority in the short term.    
The FCO also warned the Heath government in its first few weeks in office of the 
importance that Nixon attached to Vietnam policy.
147
 The Anglo-American relationship had 
been particular strained in the 1960s because of Vietnam. Wilson had refused Johnson’s 
requests to send British troops to Vietnam. Moreover, the British government dissociated itself 
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from the US bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in June 1966.
148
 Wilson’s actions were for 
domestic consumption. He faced pressure from his parliamentary party and public opinion. In 
1966, 51% of people polled in the UK disagreed with US armed action in Vietnam, while 41% 
wanted the US to pull out. By December 1969, 43% of those polled thought that it would be 
wrong for the British government to support US policy on Vietnam.
149
 The UK government was 
also constrained by sterling economic crises in the late 1960s and major troop commitments 
‘East of Suez’, particularly in Singapore and Aden, which reduced the UK’s ability to send 
troops to Vietnam. While the U.S. did not retaliate in other fields, this issue strained the Anglo-
American relationship.
150
 
The troop issue in Anglo-American relations had disappeared under Nixon’s policy of 
‘Vietnamisation’. Nevertheless, the FCO recognised that support for America’s overall 
objective, of establishing an independent, non-communist South Vietnam, would be strongly 
welcomed in the US, and the Heath government accepted this view. Unlike Wilson, Heath did 
not have a problem with the Conservative parliamentary party on the issue of Vietnam, although 
public opinion still opposed the US intervention in Vietnam in the early 1970s. 
  The new Heath government took on board the views of the FCO, in seeking an in-depth 
analysis of foreign policy issues.
 151
 But ministers believed that the conflict between the EC 
negotiations and US-UK relations might be greater than perceived by the FCO. At the first 
meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) on 1 July 1970 the FCO 
circulated its position, which stressed that the top priority in British foreign affairs were Europe 
and the Anglo-American relationship.
152
 It concluded that “there is no real conflict here and no 
reason why our European policies should lose us goodwill.”153 However, Sir Burke Trend 
(Cabinet Secretary) told Heath on 30 June 1970 that he thought this sentence was “over-
optimistic”, and that “we must continue to walk a tight-rope as long as we can….We may hope 
to defer this dilemma for as long as possible; but we can hardly evade it indefinitely.”154 The US 
had long supported the political integration of Europe and British membership of EC. But there 
were Whitehall officials who thought that as Britain began the actual EC membership 
negotiations, there could be a conflict between Britain and the US in the economic field. 
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Ministers agreed with Trend’s assessment, and noted on 1 July 1970 that “the conflict of interest 
in those two fields might therefore be sharper.”155 
 
Heath’s Cold War Policy 
 
The maintenance of a strong and credible NATO, for the defence of Europe, topped the 
Heath government’s Cold War agenda. This formed a key part of the Atlantic Alliance and 
Anglo-American relations.
156
 The FCO advised the government on 29 June 1970 that the US 
commitment to Europe’s defence via NATO “remains critical to our security”. While pursuing 
Western European integration, the UK would need to maintain its “full contribution, political 
and militarily, to NATO” and seek “closer military cooperation”.157 The government supported 
this position and argued that the importance of Western European unity lay in the need to 
“ensure that the strategic balance in Europe does not tip in favour of the Soviet Union”.158 
Therefore the government viewed European integration and Anglo-American relations as 
important in the larger context of the Cold War.   
The FCO observed the emerging issue of NATO burden sharing and the Congressional 
pressure on Nixon to withdraw US troops from Europe. They thought that this may be an 
opportunity for “increased European defence cooperation”.159 Douglas-Home remarked that any 
move on burden sharing needed to ensure that the “credibility of the Alliance is 
not...impaired”.160 The UK government commenced an enquiry, conducted by the Ministry of 
Defence. Carrington reported to the DOP on 25 September 1970. He perceived that the US 
would progressively disengage from Europe in the long term, and so in order to “maintain the 
solidarity of NATO” the UK should embark on an “effective” burden sharing initiative.161 But 
the UK had a continuing balance of payments problem and other defence commitments as part 
of NATO, such as the nuclear deterrent and maintaining bases in Malta and Cyprus. Moreover, 
the UK had a defence presence in the Indian Ocean, East of Suez, and in the Caribbean. For 
these economic reasons, Heath decided not to make a firm political commitment on burden 
sharing.
162
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Through 1970 to 1972 the Heath government expressed deep concern about aspects of 
détente. The UK questioned the Soviet Union’s intentions in improving relations with West 
Germany and the US, and in wanting to participate in a European security conference. Douglas-
Home wanted to improve East-West relations as part of the government’s general foreign policy 
priorities, but warned that “we should...be under no illusion of the intransigence of the Soviet 
position in Eastern Europe and the persistence of Soviet long-term aims”. Furthermore, 
Douglas-Home noted that the “Soviet Union is consolidating its position in Eastern Europe and 
maintaining very large conventional forces” and that détente may both improve their strategic 
position and legitimise Soviet control of Eastern Europe.
163
  
On the CSCE, the FCO advised Heath in December 1970 that “we don’t believe that 
there has been sufficient progress in East-West exchanges to justify going to a European 
security conference” and that the time “is not right”.164 By December 1971, the FCO’s position 
was unchanged, telling Heath “we regard it as undesirable, but politically inevitable”.165 Thus, 
the UK government approached the movement towards a relaxation of East-West tension, 1970-
1972, with a degree of scepticism over Soviet intentions and the long-term implications for 
Europe.      
On Ostpolitik, the new Heath government officially supported West German policy, 
although they were sceptical of the process. The UK supported Ostpolitik because firstly, it 
coincided with the UK’s general aim of reducing tension in Europe and improving East-West 
relations, and secondly, the UK wanted to develop close relations with West Germany in order 
to increase their chances of gaining entry into the EC.
166
 In Douglas-Home’s first meeting with 
the Foreign Minister of the FRG, Walter Scheel, in July 1970 he told him that the UK 
“supported his policy and profoundly hoped it would succeed”. The UK was concerned that any 
agreement with Russia should “not have an adverse effect on Allied rights in Berlin”. Scheel 
declared that the “FRG had to maintain Allied rights” for their security and defence. He also 
assured Douglas-Home that the FRG’s Ostpolitik policies were “firmly based on her position in 
Western Europe”.167 Yet privately the FCO were sceptical about the negotiations and results of 
Ostpolitik, advising Heath in December 1970 that there was no evidence that the other side 
would make genuine concessions or fulfil commitments to match those made by West 
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Germany.
168
 Nevertheless, the UK backed Ostpolitik on the basis of the FRG’s firm place in the 
Western Alliance and the need to gain entry into the EC.     
Meanwhile, US-Soviet developments on SALT concerned the British government 
because of the special Anglo-American nuclear relationship. Prior to the arms negotiations, the 
US had assured the UK that they would continue to supply and support the Polaris nuclear 
system. But upgrading Polaris, already under Anglo-American discussion, made the results of 
SALT a key issue for the Heath administration and central to their Cold War strategy (see 
chapter 6).
169
  
 Linked to the US and European détente movements were nuclear arms parity and the 
Sino-Soviet split. The implications of nuclear arms parity between the superpowers filtered 
through to the UK government. Initially the FCO expressed concern that the Soviet achievement 
of nuclear parity had produced “a noticeable tendency for the United States and the Soviet 
Union to treat more bilaterally with each other” which could create “a tendency to down-grade 
us”. Nevertheless, the FCO also saw it as an opportunity to increase Anglo-American 
cooperation in defence and security affairs within the Atlantic Alliance.
170
 Nixon explained to 
Heath at their first meeting at Chequers in October 1970 that “we had reached a position of 
nuclear ‘stand-off’ in which neither side could afford...a nuclear exchange”, and therefore both 
sides would be seeking détente.
171
 After the meeting Heath observed that Nixon “is clearly 
prepared to deal with his opposite numbers in the Kremlin” and that it was “symptomatic of the 
new and more realistic climate which is gradually emerging in international affairs”.172 
Therefore the UK recognised that rough arms parity would have an important influence in Cold 
War relations.          
In Whitehall initial investigations into the Sino-Soviet split underestimated the role it 
would play in wider Cold War relations and the government adopted a neutral position on the 
dispute. In March 1970, an FCO study into the split, approved by the Defence and Overseas 
Policy Official Committee, believed that on balance it benefited the West by dividing the world 
communist movement, and that it was “better to have the Soviet Union and China at odds than 
actively linked against us”. However, the FCO strongly recommended against interference, 
stating that the West should “avoid involvement and confine itself to the role of spectator”. 
Moreover, it opposed any triangular tactics, saying that “policy towards the Soviet Union and 
China should continue to be decided on grounds unconnected with the dispute”. Thus 
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Whitehall’s approach to the Sino-Soviet split differed from the Nixon administration’s 
strategy.
173
 
 
Conclusion 
  
Much has been discussed in Nixon historiography on his relations with Russia, China, 
and Vietnam. European integration and Anglo-American relations have been considered less 
significant. It has been argued that the Nixon administration was sceptical of increased 
European integration and enlargement. Indeed, the USDA, the Treasury, and the Department of 
Commerce wanted to revise US European policy to take into account the economic competition 
between the US and the EC. However, Nixon and the State Department continued to support the 
move towards greater political and economic European unity, which would support the Western 
alliance and benefit their overall Cold War strategy.      
 The two key priorities in British foreign policy under the Heath government were 
gaining membership of the EC and maintaining strong Anglo-American relations. Both were 
important to Heath, thus contradicting the prevailing position in Heath and Anglo-American 
historiography. The FCO and the government believed that good relations with the US needed 
to be retained in the nuclear and security fields, as well as in the broader defence of Western 
Europe through NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. However, in the short term the EC 
negotiations had priority. The long term economic changes in the UK economy, the push for 
greater political European integration, and the perceived political, defence, and economic 
benefits of European membership were the main motivations behind the Heath government’s 
policy.  
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Chapter 3: 
Anglo-American Political Relations and the EC Enlargement  
(1969-1974) 
 
This chapter, in exploring Anglo-American political relations during the EC 
enlargement, shows the fine balancing and subtle adjustment made in Anglo-American 
diplomatic circles. While previous histories have offered general overviews of the key political 
issues, this chapter contributes to historical knowledge by offering a nuanced look at early 
Heath-Nixon consultations and the attempt to protect Anglo-American cooperation while not 
jeopardising the EC enlargement negotiations.  
Several political episodes also arose during this period, which are analysed: the opening 
of China, the Year of Europe, and the Yom Kippur War. All three cases showed Anglo-
American differences emerge over the substance of policy. They also displayed a 
misunderstanding and lack of communication over each other’s motives and interests, which 
created unrealistic expectations and therefore leading to Anglo-American political tensions. On 
China and the Middle East, it can be seen that long-standing Anglo-American policy differences 
were the key factors in causing problems, not Britain’s negotiations and entry into the EC. On 
the Year of Europe, the UK made a determined effort to react positively to the US 
administration’s proposals, while at the same time participating in the formation of EC foreign 
policy as a full member.  
Some historians have referred to this period as the nadir of the Anglo-American 
relationship.
1
 Indeed, there were many tensions. Moreover, some have presented these events in 
a single narrative of poor relations between Heath and Nixon between 1970 and 1974, in which 
Heath fundamentally turned towards Europe and rejected the ‘special’ Anglo-American 
relationship and the Nixon administration started to oppose the European integration project.
2
 
The enlargement posed major economic, political, and defence question which naturally had an 
impact on all the countries concerned and other external players, and so a subtle evolution did 
take place. But it did not suddenly eradicate old alliances or fundamentally alter them. These 
episodes showed the continuation of strong Anglo-American political relations and the desire to 
seek a balance between various interests. This chapter firstly looks at the UK’s EC negotiations 
stage (1970-1972), followed by the UK’s membership stage (1973-1974). 
________________ 
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UK’s EC Negotiations Stage (1970-1972) 
 
Anglo-American Relations and the EC Enlargement, June 1970 to May 1971 
 
 In the first dealings between the Nixon and Heath governments both sides displayed a 
desire to build strong ties, although the potential problems over the EC membership 
negotiations were immediately apparent. The Nixon administration initially expressed pleasure 
with the result of the British general election because they felt it would be easier to work with 
the Conservative government than with the previous one.
3
 Nixon wrote to Heath offering a 
positive opinion on the alliance, stating that the “essential ingredient of the close Anglo-
American relationship has been the ability of the governments in our two countries...to share a 
common global concern and perspective”. He then called for “close communication between 
London and Washington”.4 It showed Nixon’s eagerness to establish a close personal 
relationship with Heath.  
But members of the US administration privately warned John Freeman (the British 
Ambassador in Washington) that Britain should expect that “the Administration will take 
vigorous action to protect US interests” during the EC enlargement negotiations. Freeman 
reported this back to the FCO and 10 Downing Street on 20 June 1970, just ten days before 
Britain’s EC negotiations opened and two days after the general election, which raised alarm 
bells in London.
 
 The main source of disillusionment came from the US Secretaries of 
Commerce and Agriculture, and the US Treasury Department, who expressed opposition to the 
CAP, EC trading policies, and EC technological collaboration, which would be barriers to US 
exporters. Freeman reported that this could result in an American intervention in the EC 
enlargement negotiations, in the shape of a formal representation to the EC, the UK, or through 
the GATT, in an attempt to have US commercial interests taken into account.
 5
 
 Freeman advised Heath that despite this warning and review into EC policy, Nixon 
supported the EC enlargement on “broad political and strategic rather than economic grounds” 
and that this basic support would not be reversed. Freeman emphasised the need to “reinforce 
the President’s commitment to this basic support,” which could be done by focussing on the 
political aspects of the enlargement within the context of the Atlantic Alliance, recognising the 
legitimate concerns of the US, and supporting a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.
6
  
Heath wrote on the telegram: “important and should be kept in mind”.7 This displayed the early 
clash between Anglo-American relations and the EC enlargement. 
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Heath and the UK government faced a dilemma. As discussed in chapter 2 on foreign 
policy priorities, British policy makers knew that the US had expressed concern about the 
economic policies of the EC, and so the government needed to strengthen the administration’s 
political support for the enlargement and integration, and prevent any intervention in the 
negotiations. At the same time, Heath and officials, through their experiences during the first 
and second applications, believed that a key to the successful outcome of the negotiations 
depended on improving relations with France. In the UK government’s eyes and in the view of 
the US administration as well, France’s main reservation towards British membership of the EC 
was the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship and the threat that Britain might potentially be 
an Atlantic ‘Trojan horse’. Heath needed to find a balance between relations between the US 
and France.   
An initial meeting between Heath and Nixon had been delayed because of UK concerns 
over the EC negotiations, which showed tension in this field. Nixon told Kissinger that he 
believed Heath would be “highly complimented to see us” and so in July 1970 they pushed for 
an early bilateral meeting to be held in August at San Clemente.
8
 Douglas-Home thought that 
such an early visit might “be open to misunderstanding in Europe”.9 Heath accepted the 
invitation in principle.
10
 But more concerns were raised in Heath’s private office and the FCO, 
leading to a delay.  
Kissinger warned Freeman that if a meeting is not arranged soon then “something could 
be lost in personal communication between the men”. Moreover, Kissinger claimed that Nixon 
would “be very disappointed and however unreasonably might feel a little rebuffed”.11 But 
internally, the US recognised the UK’s dilemma. The NSC noted that an early Heath-Nixon 
meeting could “rouse again the worries about the special relationship and hamper the Common 
Market negotiations”.12 Despite the Kissinger pressure, the FCO strongly advised against an 
early meeting, in case the EC countries would think that the UK was seeking “prior 
consultation...with the Americans privately behind their back” before the enlargement 
negotiations.
13
 Thus, the UK turned down the meeting, on the grounds that “a number of major 
decisions” needed to be made by the new Conservative government.14 This immediately 
displayed the balancing act of preserving close Anglo-American relations while the UK 
negotiated entry into the EC during the Heath-Nixon period.          
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  Regardless of all this, in early Anglo-American consultations the US actually took a 
‘hands-off’ position on the EC enlargement. Rogers and State Department officials visited 
London on 10-12 July 1970 for the first face-to-face contact. Martin Hillenbrand (Assistant 
Secretary of State for European Affairs) told Anthony Barber (Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster) that, despite Freeman’s telegram, the administration’s review of EC policy had 
confirmed US support for UK membership, and that Nixon had overruled the economic 
departments. Furthermore, he told Barber that the administration would not “intervene actively” 
because “an attempt to play a more active part would defeat its own ends” as a result of 
potential “French reverse reactions”. Therefore, the US would “adopt a low-profile posture” and 
that the “days of an activist US policy in Europe were over”. 15 In Roger’s discussion with 
Douglas-Home, he also emphasised that the “Americans wanted to be careful what they said in 
public, and indeed would say nothing”, although they wanted close communication of a “semi-
formal nature”.16     
 The UK sought to promote the political and liberal economic benefits of UK 
membership in the EC. Douglas-Home told Rogers that UK membership would be an advantage 
for the US, “as our influence would work to make the community outward looking”.17 Barber 
assured Hillenbrand that the UK was pushing for “political cohesion” in the EC, important for 
the Western alliance and that the UK’s approach to trading problems was “a liberal one”.18 
Therefore, early Anglo-American relations displayed understanding of the complications 
involved in the UK membership negotiations.            
Heath and Nixon finally held their first meeting at Chequers on 3 October 1970, which 
displayed strong cooperation in Cold War diplomacy. Meeting for only two 45 minute sessions, 
the primary purpose of the summit for both sides focussed on building a good working 
partnership. The FCO briefed Heath on the importance of establishing “a close personal 
relationship” and that despite the application to join the EC, “we still stand closer to the United 
States than other countries”.19 Meanwhile Kissinger briefed Nixon on the need to “establish 
direct communications with Heath”.20 Nixon opened the discussions, calling for the “closest 
personal communication. He talked of a “special relationship” which should “not be limited to 
moments of crisis or to the formal exchanges between Heads of Government....It should be a 
matter of free exchange and discussion of ideas, suggestions, opinions”, while Heath also said 
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that he looked forward to “a close personal relationship”. But Heath and Nixon did not discuss 
the enlargement of the EC and potential economic conflict in that field.         
Heath and Nixon did agree on the importance of ending the Vietnam War while 
maintaining US credibility. In April 1970 Nixon had invaded Cambodia, which drew mass 
criticism both domestically and internationally. But Heath praised his strategy for helping to 
make peace in South East Asia, while Nixon warned Heath that “if the United States failed in 
South East Asia, you could forget about Israel and that goes for Western Europe too”. Heath 
“entirely agreed” and that Nixon’s strategy was “important in relation to Europe, where the 
attitude of the Soviet government would undoubtedly harden”. Therefore, Heath backed US 
Vietnam policy, in order to protect the US defence commitment and credibility in the European 
field, while also maintaining close Anglo-American relations.
21
  
On 16 November 1970, a directive, sent from London to British officials in Washington 
and New York, set out a publicity strategy for dealing with Anglo-American relations and the 
EC enlargement. It ordered its officials to “emphasise at every opportunity” to US politicians, 
journalists, and pressure groups “the importance we attach to the political aspects of 
enlargement” and that “the E.E.C. is outward looking”. But immediately afterwards the 
directive warned that “we must of course bear in mind the possible playback in Europe, avoid 
alarming those who still…see entry as an Atlantic ‘Trojan Horse’”. Throughout, the directive 
displayed the tension and conflict of interests between the EC membership negotiations and the 
Anglo-American relationship.
22
 
In December 1970 Nixon and Heath met for several hours over two days in Washington 
and Camp David, in contrast to the short meeting at Chequers. The meeting displayed both the 
developing conflict in US-EC relations and close Anglo-American cooperation in Cold War 
diplomacy. On the foreign economic policy front, the White House and Congress were fighting 
over the introduction of trade legislation throughout 1969-1970. The Congress, through the 
Mills Bill, wanted major protectionist measures, covering all sectors, in order to protect the US 
economy from EC and Japanese traders, while Nixon primarily wanted to safeguard the textile 
industry, important to his election strategy. The UK considered this a threat to free trade and 
their economic interests. On the UK side, Heath wanted to introduce the EC agricultural system 
into the UK during the membership negotiations, as well as protecting traditional 
Commonwealth trading links, both of which the US viewed as an economic disadvantage. 
Therefore serious discussions took place between Heath and Nixon, which caused tensions in 
their economic relations (see chapter 4). 
However, the overall importance of political and defence relations overrode the 
problems in the trade field as a result of the EC enlargement. Nixon confirmed his support for 
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the “creation of a strong political and economic entity in Europe” and that Britain’s failure to 
join the EC would cause “political damage to Europe”. Heath promoted the view that the UK 
would help to make the EC an outward looking, Atlantic community, by “exerting all our 
influence in favour of moderating the protectionist tendencies of the EEC”.23 On East-West 
relations and Cold War diplomacy, the US and the UK both expressed scepticism regarding 
West Germany’s Ostpolitik and calls for a European security conference. Heath suggested to 
Nixon that West Germany were “going too far and too fast in their desire to normalise relations 
with the Soviet Government”. Nixon agreed, suggesting that the Soviet Union’s real objective 
was to cause a split in NATO and that “in their [US] eyes the Ostpolitik was a dangerous affair 
and they would do nothing to encourage it”.24 Heath strongly believed, throughout his time in 
office, that the Soviets wanted to “drive a wedge between the allies”, particularly as the EC 
adapted to the enlargement.
25
 
In terms of personal relations, Freeman observed after the summit an “unusual degree of 
personal cordiality”. In planning for the meeting, Heath wanted some “private and relaxed 
conversation” at Camp David to discuss Anglo-French nuclear cooperation (see chapter 6).26 
Nixon considered that “this Camp David thing is just a special treat for him”.27 Freeman 
reported that the Camp David discussions were “informal and as intimate as possible”, rather 
than the “rigid restricted pattern” usually seen at Heads of Government meetings, which 
contributed towards building close personal relations over the coming months.
28
 
At this summit Heath frequently referred to Anglo-American relations as a “natural” 
alliance, in contrast to Nixon, who repeatedly talked of a “special” relationship, both in private 
and in public, commented on by most historians of this period as an example of a transformed 
relationship or Heath’s ‘Europeanism’.29 Just prior to the first discussions, Nixon and Heath 
exchanged remarks on the White House lawn. Nixon explained that the US and the UK “have a 
special relationship” because of a common language, common law, and similar government 
institutions. Nixon said that more importantly, the “dedication of our two nations...to great 
principles of justice, progress, freedom, opportunity and peace” created the “special 
relationship”. But Heath took a different approach. He said that it is a “natural” and “happy” 
relationship. He also emphasised that Britain’s application to join the EC did not conflict with 
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Anglo-American relations and that British membership would benefit the US and the Atlantic 
Alliance.
30
 That evening in the White House State Dining Room Heath expanded on the idea. 
While also referring to a common language, law and government institutions, he said that “I 
cannot feel other than at home here tonight on this festive occasion. It is perfectly natural”.31 
These words should not be analysed in isolation, but in the context of continual Anglo-
American consultation under Heath and Nixon and their internal policy reviews discussed in 
chapter 2, which showed that the Anglo-American alliance still retained significance, despite a 
change in terminology or personality issues. Nevertheless, it also indicated the UK’s dilemma of 
balancing relations between the US and the EC.            
 On 25 February 1971, Nixon sent his second annual foreign policy report to Congress, 
which re-stated US support for the EC enlargement, although it noted the increased trade and 
monetary competition between the two blocs. The report also said that the US “does not view 
our allies as pieces in an American Grand Design”. Nixon went on to say that Heath has 
“declared his intention to see that British policies are determined by British interests”.32 Heath 
wrote to Nixon on 25 March 1971 praising his “sense of realism and restrained responsibility”. 
Heath argued that “for our part...we shall use all our influence to support outward-looking 
policies” in order to reduce the economic differences between the US and Europe.33 Nixon 
replied that within the Atlantic Alliance “the natural relations between our two 
countries...remains essential”, and thus Heath’s terminology of the relationship caught on 
quickly in the US administration.
34
  However, close Anglo-American communication in general 
foreign and economic policy would soon be disrupted by the Nixon shocks – the opening of 
China and the disintegration of the Bretton Woods system.  
 Meanwhile, through secret talks between the British Ambassador in Paris Christopher 
Soames and the Secretary-General at the Élysée Palace Michel Jobert, it became clear by March 
1971 that Heath and Pompidou would hold a bilateral meeting in order to resolve the 
outstanding issues on British accession.
35
 The FCO had already advised Heath in June and July 
1970 that re-assuring the French on the ‘Trojan horse’ issue was the key.36 On 21 April 1971 
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Soames then recommended tactics to Heath, which included the need to convince Pompidou of 
his support for “the emergence of a Europe which will be far more independent of the United 
States – politically, financially and industrially”.37 Heath held a meeting with his advisers at 10 
Downing Street on 30 April 1970, where he decided to open the Pompidou meeting by 
expressing his views on the future of Western European integration, thus “demonstrating his full 
commitment to ‘Europeanism’”.38 
 On 20-21 May 1971 Heath met with Pompidou in Paris which revealed the UK’s 
obsession with the ‘Trojan horse’ issue. Heath described to Pompidou how Britain had 
historically always been a part of Europe and the connection to the US had only developed since 
the Second World War. Heath said that Anglo-American relations suffered from a power 
imbalance, and thus the UK must join the EC. Moreover, if the EC wanted to increase its 
influence in the world, it must enlarge to include the UK. Heath’s “purpose was to see a strong 
Europe, which could speak with a single voice”. Pompidou agreed with this assessment. 
However, it soon became clear that a key stumbling block to Britain joining the EC was actually 
on the international role of sterling and its connection to the dollar (see chapter 5).
39
 After the 
meeting Heath reported to Nixon, saying that a strong political and economic entity in Europe 
would benefit the US and the Atlantic Alliance, and that the UK would take account of US 
economic interests.
40
 This meeting once again showed the balancing act between Britain joining 
the EC and preserving the close Anglo-American relationship.     
 
The First Nixon Shock: Anglo-American Relations and the Opening of China, July 1971 
 
In 1970 and 1971, the UK government sought to improve its relationship with China. 
This section argues that the Heath government consulted and worked with the Nixon 
administration on China policy. But in July 1971, Nixon announced his decision to visit China 
without consulting the UK and his other allies. This did not cause a major rift because the US 
and the UK shared the same objective of improving relations with China.  
On the whole, the UK supported US policy on China throughout the 1950s and 1960s in 
order to protect the Anglo-American relationship, particularly in the defence and intelligence 
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fields.
41
 However, there were some keys differences festering underneath which came to the 
forefront during the Heath-Nixon period. Firstly, ever since the Communist Party of China 
seized power in the mainland in 1949 and established the PRC, the US continued to recognise 
the Government of the Republic of China (GRC), who had withdrawn to Taiwan and the 
Penghu Islands, as the sole legitimate government. The UK disagreed with this position and 
recognised the PRC in January 1950. Since 17 June 1954, Sino-British diplomatic relations 
were conducted at the chargé d’affaires level.42 The Heath government sought to upgrade this to 
the full ambassadorial level.   
Secondly, a key part of the US government’s Chinese deterrence policy involved 
opposing the PRC control of Chinese representation at the UN, whose seat on the Security 
Council was occupied by the GRC.
43
 This caused a long term Anglo-American disagreement 
over Chinese representation in the UN – an issue known in London and Washington as 
‘Chirep’.44 On 15 December 1961 the ‘Albanian Resolution’ (named after one of its primary 
sponsors) sought to expel Taiwan from the UN seat in favour of Peking.
45
 The British 
government supported this resolution. The FCO believed that Taiwan could not claim to be the 
government of “all China”.46 However, the UN decided that in order to change the 
representation of China, a resolution would require a two-thirds majority, known as an 
‘Important Question Resolution” (IQR), a proposal introduced by the US and also supported by 
the UK.
47
 This issue continually arose at the UN throughout the 1960s, with the UK always 
supporting both the Albanian Resolution and the US-sponsored IQR.
48
 For the first time, in 
November 1970, the Albanian Resolution passed by a small majority of 51-49. The US-
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sponsored IQR also passed preventing the expulsion of Taiwan.
49
 However, momentum was 
moving in favour of Peking representation at the UN, which threatened US China policy.          
In reaction to these developments at the UN the US administration launched an 
investigating into Chirep in November 1970.
50
 From December 1970 onwards the 
administration informed the UK that their investigation into Chirep favoured duel representation 
for Taiwan and Peking, with the Security Council seat going to the PRC, as the only means of 
keeping Taiwan in the UN. By April 1971 this position was formalised.
51
 But the UK 
government considered this position “unrealistic”, as both Taiwan and Peking opposed it.52 
Therefore a collision course was set on the Chirep issue.   
In late 1970 and early 1971 the Heath government, unaware of the top-secret 
discussions in the US administration on the opening of China, as discussed in chapter 2, 
developed their own plans to establish full diplomatic relations between the UK and China, and 
to ease economic controls. The UK sought to maximise income from trade with China, reinforce 
the security of the Hong Kong tenure, and modify the attitudes of the Chinese leaders.
53
 UK and 
Chinese officials discussed upgrading the chargé d’affaires to full ambassadorial status. They 
agreed that the UK would withdraw its consulate from Taiwan and oppose the IQR at the UN in 
1971, in order for Peking to take control of China’s UN seat. The UK would also have to 
publically “acknowledge the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a Province of 
China”, although the UK would be permitted to maintain its position, that the legal status of 
Taiwan remained undetermined.
54
 The UK hoped to exchange ambassadors by May 1971, 
putting in place John Addis.
55
 This had important implications for Anglo-American relations 
because of the US deterrence policy and the NSC study into China.           
In February 1971, the FCO decided to push the issue with the US administration, 
fearing that a delay in the exchange of ambassadors with Peking might provide time for a 
hardening of the PRC’s position on Taiwan. Sir Denis Greenhill (the FCO Permanent Under-
Secretary of State) told Walter Annenberg (the US Ambassador in London) that the UK needed 
to “move quickly on Chirep”. Annenberg advised State that the US needed to urgently engage 
the UK on the matter before they move into a “rigid and unhelpful posture”.56 Senior NSC staff 
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member Marshall Wright picked up on the telegram and noted: “danger that British position 
will prematurely jell against us”, obstructing the NSC investigation into China.57 Wright wrote 
to Kissinger, under the heading “The British Being Unhelpful on the Chirep Issue”, pointing out 
that the UK were “going off on their own”. He advised that the US needed to “put a little rein on 
them”.58 Kissinger subsequently urged State to “earnestly and urgently” raise the topic with 
Lord Cromer (British Ambassador in Washington) and make sure that “they will take no steps” 
until “we have formulated our policy”.59 Therefore, the US administration sought to delay the 
UK’s policy of increasing diplomatic links with the PRC.              
At the Douglas-Home and Rogers meeting in London on 27 April 1971, the US 
succeeded in further delaying the UK’s plans. Douglas-Home argued that the IQR “was wearing 
terribly thin” and that the UK “will certainly have to change” its vote. Rogers said that the US 
was thinking in terms of dual representation and that the expulsion of Taiwan would have a 
“severe impact on American opinion” and produce “disenchantment with the UN”. However, 
Rogers said that the administration would “hope to reach a decision within a month”.60 Yet, at 
the next meeting between Rogers and Douglas-Home at the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon on 
3 June 1971, the US once again deferred the decision.
61
 FCO officials still feared that the 
Chinese might produce additional pre-conditions on the exchange of ambassadors and that 
“time is not on our side”.62 Therefore, considerable difference remained in Anglo-American 
relations on Chirep, and the US managed to delay the UK’s move towards full diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. 
On 9-10 July 1971 Kissinger went on a secret mission to China, which was shortly 
followed by Nixon’s abrupt announcement on the 15 July 1971 that he would be visiting the 
PRC, sometimes referred to as the first “Nixon shock”.63 This dramatically changed the situation 
and caused difficulties between London and Washington. On 10 July 1971, as Kissinger was in 
Peking, China informed the UK chargé d’affaires John Denson that in order for there to be an 
exchange of ambassadors the UK must state that “Taiwan is a province of China” – rather than 
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the previous position, of only having to “acknowledge” the Chinese “position” on Taiwan.64 
Therefore, Kissinger’s secret visit to Peking, unknown to the UK government, had an influence 
in boosting the diplomatic position of the PRC and toughening their negotiating position with 
the British.    
On 11 August 1971 Nixon belatedly wrote a lengthy letter to Heath on his China 
announcement, hoping that “we can maintain close cooperation on this matter” and that Anglo-
American relations “continue to be fundamental to American foreign policy”.65 Nixon asked for 
Heath’s views on the initiative. Heath responded almost two months later with a short thank you 
letter.
66
 Kissinger viewed this as “a brush off” and remarked that the “delay and terseness of the 
Prime Minister’s letter to the President...had not passed unnoticed”.67 But in the intervening 
time the second “Nixon shock” had come, on 15 August 1971, with the introduction of the New 
Economic Policy. This broke the convertibility of the dollar into gold, imposed a 10% import 
surcharge, and created a four month international monetary crisis (see chapter 5). This period 
marked a collapse in friendly Anglo-American cooperation.              
The Heath government complained to the Nixon administration over the lack of 
consultation over Chinese rapprochement, signalling the breakdown in communication. The 
FCO informed the US Embassy in London of their “irritation” and Heath’s “unhappiness” 
regarding the administration’s “failure to consult”, and that the US had adopted policies that 
“disregard British interests”. The UK had provided the US with “candid notice” on their 
intentions to exchange ambassadors with China, and that on the insistence of the US, they had 
postponed their negotiations. Yet the dramatic announcement on 15 July 1971 had “undercut 
their position”. According to Annenberg, the UK’s annoyance stemmed from the “highly 
exaggerated importance they attach to the proposed UK/PRC ambassadorial exchange” and that 
there was “frustrated expectation” from the FCO that “Britain could have played a central role” 
in the opening of China.
68
  
Kissinger defended US actions, informing Cromer that the “State Department was in 
ignorance throughout”, and therefore they could not reveal the hand that the White House was 
playing.
69
 Moreover, Kissinger claimed that he had told the UK “more than anyone else...more 
than he had been vouchsafed even to Rogers”.70 Cromer believed that the breakdown in 
communication partly stemmed from “Dr. Kissinger’s distrust of the State Department and the 
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Department of Defense”.71 The State Department had actually sought to work closely with the 
UK on the development of China policy.
72
 But Kissinger and the White House cut out State’s 
influence and failed to consult with their allies, which caused a temporary collapse in Anglo-
American communication.       
In any case, the FCO thought that on the substance of US China policy the Nixon 
initiative was “to be welcomed”.73 UK officials and ministers praised Nixon’s initiative on 
China. Cromer noted in his annual diplomatic report that “history will surely give President 
Nixon credit for trying to move towards normal relations with China. Perhaps the decision to go 
to Peking is the move of the year with the most important long-term implications” – a bold 
statement in light of the action on SALT and the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system.
74
  
Following on from the tension over China and the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system, Heath wanted a discussion on the broad question of relations with the US, in 
preparation for an upcoming meeting with Nixon in order to re-ignite close cooperation. An 
FCO study pointed out several trouble spots – China, US economic pressures, NATO burden 
sharing, and the enlargement of the EC. It noted the tendency of the US to ignore Europe while 
it focussed on superpower relations, China, and Vietnam. The FCO warned 10 Downing Street 
of the “risk” of “little or no US consultation”. This would lead to UK interests being 
overlooked.
75
 It also said that the European commitment must have priority, but that the UK 
needed to “maintain as much influence in Washington as we can”, especially in the nuclear and 
intelligence fields.       
However, a persistent problem in Anglo-American relations intensified from 3-16 
December 1971 on the Indo-Pakistan War. The war itself had been building since the beginning 
of 1971, and differences between the Heath and Nixon government on the conflict continued 
throughout 1970 and 1974, as they had on Middle Eastern policy, discussed below.
76
 In 
February 1971 the administration had already started an investigation into a possible move by 
East Pakistan towards secession.
77
 While the Nixon administration blamed India for the conflict 
and sought to protect Pakistan, as the smaller state, the UK government were greatly concerned 
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about alienating the Indians which would “merely force them further into the arms of the 
Russians and forfeit such influence as the West retains”.78 Both sides viewed the war in the 
context of the Cold War, their relationships with China and the Soviet Union, and their interests 
in the region.
79
     
Nevertheless, Nixon and Heath re-established close relations at the Bermuda summit on 
20-21 December 1971.
80
 Heath believed that “the particular relationship between Britain and the 
United States need not change in any way. Britain did not intend to pursue a ‘pro-European’ 
policy” and that British interests included “maintaining the closest links between the two sides 
of the Atlantic”. Nixon concluded that “we must hold together politically, despite the increased 
economic competition which would...rightly develop” between the US and the EC.81 Moreover, 
Nixon believed that Anglo-American differences were only “tactical”.82 This meeting 
recognised the growing importance of the EC bloc, its continued political importance to US 
foreign policy, and the importance of Anglo-American relations to the UK.     
 
UK’s EC Membership Stage (1973-1974) 
 
The Year of Europe, April to December 1973  
 
Due to the enlargement of the EC and increased economic and monetary competition 
between Western Europe and the US, the Nixon administration embarked on a reform of the 
US-European relationship in 1973, known as the ‘Year of Europe’. The UK, as a new member 
of the EC, became directly involved in the initiative.  
This section argues that the ‘Year of Europe’ caused personal tensions at the top level in 
Anglo-American relations, although it continued to be a strong alliance. The reasons for these 
tensions were that (a) differences emerged on the substance of policy; (b) both the US and the 
UK misunderstood each other’s motivations and developed unrealistic expectations; (c) the 
centralised and secretive nature of White House policy making under Nixon and Kissinger 
exacerbated Anglo-American misunderstandings; and (d) the US administration encountered an 
unwieldy, bureaucratic enlarged EC that found it difficult to develop a common policy. To add 
to this, the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973 also exposed policy differences 
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between the US and the UK. These contributed to harming Anglo-American friendly relations 
between April and December 1973. 
Some historians have argued that the Year of Europe provided Heath with the 
opportunity to prove his ‘Europeanism’. Catherine Hynes said that Heath wanted to “publicly 
remould British foreign policy within a European framework” and seek “a Europeanised drift to 
British foreign policy”.83 Daniel Moeckli also took the view that Heath seemed ready to “forfeit 
the special relationship” for the sake of a “leading British role in Europe”.84 Thomas Robb 
argued that the Year of Europe led to cancellation of nuclear and intelligence cooperation.
85
 
However, the desire from both sides for intimate communication, seeking a balanced 
relationship rather than a fundamental re-orientation, needs to be taken into account. Many of 
the difficulties in Anglo-American relations under Heath and Nixon occurred at specific times 
and during particular crises.
86
 Close cooperation between the US and the UK took place 
throughout this period, despite the UK’s membership of the EC. Moreover, the US agreed to 
cooperate with the UK on the upgrade of the nuclear Polaris system during this period.      
 In November 1972 Nixon opened a NSC review of US policy on Western Europe. This 
formed the basis of Kissinger’s unilateral announcement of a Year of Europe. Nixon wanted the 
study to look at the interrelationship between political, economic, military, security, and 
scientific issues between the US and Western Europe. Nixon regarded it as “of prime 
importance” for building a framework for future relations.87  
The NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe conducted the investigation and reported 
in December 1972. It observed that through EC integration, Western Europe had moved to a 
more independent position from the US, yet they still relied on the US through NATO and 
nuclear guarantees. The “military and security elements bind us; but economic and political 
issues tend to divide us”, and so it concluded that “US-Western European relations are today 
unbalanced”. It offered three policy options: (1) move towards an integrated political, economic, 
and security US-EC relationship; (2) allow the US relationship with the EC to deteriorate and 
move towards closer bilateral cooperation with the USSR; (3) pursue the present policy of 
separating US-EC security issues from economic and political questions.
88
 It thus considered a 
serious change in the US-EC relationship. However, the administration, occupied by other 
major issues, such as the November 1972 presidential election and the Vietnam War peace 
negotiations, delayed any major action in the European field.  
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 In December 1972, Nixon had implemented his “Christmas bombing” campaign of 
North Vietnam. Heath strongly backed Nixon in contrast to most Western European 
governments, which signalled solidarity with the US. Nixon strongly appreciated the support.
89
 
Trend reported back to Heath that Nixon “is now very angry indeed with practically all the 
European countries....We alone emerged from this episode with credit, we alone are good; 
everybody else is bad”.90 Cromer informed the FCO of the “intensity of rage against all those 
who have publicly criticised President Nixon’s recent Vietnam policy” and that the UK stood 
out as the “blue eyed boys”.91 Kissinger told Nixon over the phone that the British think “we did 
the right thing” and that “Europe will be thankful to you someday for what you did”. Kissinger 
pondered “why did he [Heath] do it? Not for himself. Not even primarily for the United States”. 
Nixon interrupted with “not even for a miserable Vietnam but because of Europe, the Mid-East, 
let’s face it” – meaning that it was important to preserve US credibility for the defence of 
Europe, as discussed between Heath and Nixon at Chequers in October 1970.
92
            
In 1973 Kissinger and Nixon revived their plans for an initiative on reforming US-
European relations. On 1 February 1973, Nixon told Heath in Washington that the “United 
Kingdom would understand more clearly than France the dangers, both economic and political, 
of an outright confrontation between Europe and the United States”, and hence the two 
countries should work together to bridge the problems in the Atlantic Alliance.
93
 This final 
meeting between Heath and Nixon marked a high point in their relationship because of the 
British government’s support on Vietnam. Nixon told Heath that he “would remember for the 
future” that the British government stood by the US during the resumption of the bombing 
campaign and did not “climb on the bandwagon of momentary popular sentiment”. Heath told 
Nixon that his “political judgement on the mining of Haiphong had been clearly justified” and 
praised the peace agreement signed on the 27 January 1973.
94
 
In March 1973, pushing on with their attempt to re-define Atlantic relations, Kissinger 
requested that the British cooperate with him on devising a “conceptual framework” on East-
West and trans-Atlantic relations over the next ten years. Heath agreed to this, while “keeping a 
weather eye on the reactions of our European allies”.95 The FCO passed on a paper to Kissinger 
written by Sir Thomas Brimelow (FCO Deputy Under-Secretary of State), which warned that a 
“trade war within the West could rule out any Western solidarity in East-West relations”.96 
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Heath considered this “an important document”, and sent the Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend 
and Brimelow to Washington to discuss Atlantic relations with Kissinger.
97
     
   On 19 April 1973 Kissinger met with Brimelow, Trend, and Lord Cromer for a four 
hour discussion. Kissinger informed them of his idea for a “reaffirmation of Atlantic solidarity” 
which he planned to make in a forthcoming speech, and that he hoped for a positive response.
98
 
Kissinger’s delivered his Year of Europe speech on 23 April 1973 at the Associated Press 
Luncheon in New York. He called for “a new Atlantic charter” between the US and Western 
Europe, but also including Canada and Japan. He reiterated US support for European 
integration, but only as “a component of a larger Atlantic partnership”. Moreover, he called for 
a “unifying framework” to deal with monetary, trade, political, and defence issues as a whole.99 
Therefore, Nixon and Kissinger wanted an integrated US-EC relationship as recommended in 
the December 1972 NSC report, significant as US policy usually separated European defence 
cooperation from economic and political competition. 
The UK originally offered a positive response to the Year of Europe. Trend reported to 
Heath that the speech “is very much in line with what K said to us in Washington”, but that “it 
is a good deal more forthright, more in the nature of a challenge to Europe, than he led us to 
expect”.100 Trend also observed that “K continued to be obsessed by the problem” of trans-
Atlantic relations and talked with a “new urgency and an additional impatience”, although he 
appeared to “genuinely want to make progress”.101 Cromer advised against being “too cautious 
and suspicious” which would cause series damage to US-UK relations and believed that “its 
political significance and potential effectiveness could be considerable”102 On 27 April 1973 
Douglas-Home publically commented on the “real importance” of Kissinger’s initiative and that 
“it is essential to reaffirm the underlying common interest of the Western world”. However, he 
criticised the timing of the Year of Europe, saying that the UK would have preferred that the 
enlarged EC had time to develop its own common policies. Nevertheless, Douglas-Home 
committed the UK to “play our part”.103   
 Following the UK’s initial welcome and approval of Kissinger’s speech, Trend 
informed Heath of the preliminary views of officials, who argued that the UK “must be wary of 
the United States attempt to drive a political wedge between ourselves and our European allies 
or to use us as a stalking horse for Washington’s purpose in Europe”. Trend advised Heath to 
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avoid taking up a leading role, while at the same time being “positive and constructive”. Heath 
commented that “this seems to be the right approach”.104 Meanwhile, the NSC reported to 
Kissinger on the European response to his speech, noting that the UK, Germany, and France all 
thought that “the new Europe is too young to speak with a unified voice on foreign policy”, and 
so Kissinger immediately became aware of problems with his Atlantic proposition.
105
                
 Kissinger met with Trend and FCO officials in London on 10 May 1973, which 
revealed Anglo-American differences on how to proceed with the drafting of an ‘Atlantic 
Declaration’. Kissinger explained that the US was “not motivated by narrow national self-
interest” and that if the UK could agree with the US, then it would help gain the support of 
Germany and France. But Trend and Greenhill pointed out the considerable difficulties in 
persuading the EC to move on the initiative, particularly over procedural issues within the 
enlarged EC institutions, and therefore separate discussions would be needed, within NATO and 
within the EC. Kissinger reacted poorly, expressing “regret that the British government, whom 
the United States...had particularly taken into their confidence, had at times appeared to lack 
understanding of American intentions”.106 At this meeting the UK adopted a more cautious tone, 
while Kissinger expressed displeasure at the lack of enthusiasm and progress in Europe over his 
Atlantic initiative. Soon after this Nixon ordered the NSC to start planning for an Atlantic 
declaration, based on the principles of a continuing US commitment to the defence of Europe 
and “support for the cause of European unity”.107  
 Despite the UK’s cautious attitude with Kissinger, Heath met with the French President 
Pompidou on 21 May 1973, where he sought to persuade the French to react positively to the 
Year of Europe. The UK had been a member of the EC for five months, and so Heath did not 
have to worry about Trojan horse accusations in the same way as during the negotiations phrase. 
Heath argued that Nixon had a “genuine” desire to improve relations and that he disagreed with 
the view that the US wanted to divide Europe. Moreover, Heath told Pompidou that the EC 
“could have confidence in our approach to relations with the United States”. Heath suggested 
that Pompidou draft a declaration, at which Pompidou “indicated dissent with a deprecating 
smile”. Interestingly, Heath criticised Kissinger’s speech for referring to the EC as a regional 
organisation. Heath believed that the EC had a global role. Pompidou disagreed, arguing that 
actually the EC had a “regional vocation...the Community was based on the European 
continent”, which displayed a major difference in Anglo-French thinking.108  
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Heath reported to Nixon that Pompidou wants to have “constructive trans-Atlantic 
relations” but that it could not take place through the EC official machinery, and that there were 
serious bureaucratic difficulties on the European side.
109
 Nixon replied that “I appreciate your 
efforts to arrange a constructive European response to the review of US-European relations”, 
but that “questions of institutional arrangements or forums for proceeding are not critical”.110 
While this exchange showed close Anglo-American cooperation, it also exposed US 
misunderstanding of EC institutional mechanisms.   
 In July and August 1973 Anglo-American relations took a major turn for the worse 
because of US frustration over the length of time in building a consensus in Europe and over the 
UK unauthorised sharing of confidential US-UK information. Nixon wrote to Heath on 18 July 
1973 urging him to help push forward the Year of Europe initiative.
111
 Following a ministerial 
meeting of the nine members of the EC in Copenhagen on 23 July, Heath informed Nixon on 25 
July that the EC had decided to work on a paper on the “European identity” to serve as a basis 
for the establishment of an Atlantic declaration. More significantly, the EC nine had decided 
they would “exchange the information which they obtain in the framework of bilateral 
conversations with the US and try to harmonise their reactions”. Heath assured Nixon that the 
UK “said absolutely nothing to our partners...about Kissinger’s meetings with Trend and 
Brimelow”. However, he believed that the UK should “adhere” to the decision to share 
information on US-UK bilateral conversations.
112
  
Nixon sent an immediate, frosty reply on 26 July, which according to Kissinger was 
“personally dictated by the president”, not a “staff effort”.113 Nixon said that “I am quite 
concerned about the situation....it is hard to understand the refusal of our allies to discuss the 
substance of our mutual relationships after three months of strenuous efforts on our part”. Nixon 
was convinced that Heath had agreed on a major initiative at their January 1973 meeting. 
Moreover, Nixon said that “I find it puzzling what you say about the exploitation of our private 
bilateral contacts by the country that had initially insisted on them”.114 Therefore, the early 
Anglo-American cooperation on the Year of Europe seemed to develop into a personal quarrel 
over the sharing of confidential bilateral exchanges.      
Shortly after on 30 July 1973, Trend and Brimelow faced a tough encounter with 
Kissinger in Washington. Kissinger entered into “a long and repetitive expression of 
disappointment and dissatisfaction”, wondering whether there “was an adversary relationship 
developing?”, although Kissinger admitted that he had “misjudged what the European reaction 
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would be” to his initiative.115 Later that night Kissinger telephoned Trend to ensure that their 
conversation would be kept private, out of the hands of the State Department, which showed the 
personal distrust growing in Anglo-American consultation. Kissinger said that “it is a sad day in 
the history of our two countries. It is not...natural”. He continued that someone once wrote “half 
facetiously if Britain is forced into the Common Market it will be forced to pursue Gaullist 
policy with British method. And it may be coming true”. Trend replied that “I personally don’t 
think so” and that the situation “will come right”. Trend was soon stepping down as Cabinet 
Secretary, and Kissinger told him that on a personal level “we have not only a natural but a 
special relationship”. But then he said that “you know our two people really belong on the same 
side”.116  
 On 9 August 1973 Kissinger’s personal anger regarding the state of Anglo-American 
relations reached a new level, following his failure to obtain information from UK officials on 
an EC meeting. Kissinger told Nixon that: 
 
I’m cutting them off from intelligence special information they are getting here. I mean if they 
are going to share everything with the Europeans we can’t trust them for special relationship. I 
am putting it on the basis that we are reassessing all liaison relations....It was a horrible mistake 
that we pushed them into Europe.  
 
Nixon replied “Sure. No special relations. Correct. They’ll have the relations with the French”. 
But then Nixon sought to counter Kissinger’s bluster and anger, by saying “it is just part of the 
international game....It is a passing thing”. The conversation also turned to tactics. Nixon 
thought that “as far as we’re concerned though lets not be too eager”, while Kissinger said that 
“I think they’ll come around but they are going to be tough....The Europeans will be on their 
knees by the end of the year”.117  
However, this personal breakdown must not be exaggerated in terms of the overall 
Anglo-American relationship. Frequent consultations continued between the two governments 
throughout the rest of the Heath-Nixon period. Only a few weeks later on 17 August 1973 
Kissinger reported to his deputy Alexander Haig that “the British have pretty well caved; 
they’re going to put out a statement...strongly supporting our initiative...on the Year of Europe. 
But we can’t let up the heat yet”, which showed Kissinger’s tactics in seeking to push through 
an Atlantic Declaration.
118
 Heath wrote to Nixon on 4 September 1973 explaining that “there is 
certainly no question” of “any loosening” of close Anglo-American ties. Heath placed great 
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emphasis on “how difficult it is for a number if separate states to develop a common policy and 
common institutions”.119 Nixon responded on 9 September: “I too believe we must maintain a 
close relationship”.120  But more importantly, one of the key components of the ‘special 
relationship’ – nuclear cooperation – remained unharmed, despite Kissinger’s threat in the 
above telephone conversation. Just a few months later, in January 1974, Nixon approved the 
upgrade of the UK’s Polaris system, and therefore a special link remained between Britain and 
the UK (see chapter 6).
121
         
The 1973 Year of Europe, or what Kissinger later termed as “The Year That Never 
Was”, ended with the EC Copenhagen Summit, on 11-12 December 1973. 122 The EC released a 
“Declaration on Europe’s Identity”.123 But it took another six months for an Atlantic 
Declaration, approved and published at the Ottawa North Atlantic Council on 19 June 1974, and 
signed by the Heads of Governments in Brussels on 26 June 1974. It recorded the 
“irreplaceable” role of the US in the defence of Europe and that greater EC unity contributed 
towards the defence of the Atlantic Alliance.
124
 It therefore leaned towards Kissinger’s concept 
of the EC as part of the Atlantic Alliance, although also reflecting the independent role played 
by both the US and the EC, as two separate entities, and so mainly a consensus between the 
views of the US and the EC.  
 
The Yom Kippur War, October 1973 
 
War broke out in the Middle East on 6 October 1973 between Israel, Syria, and Egypt, 
which disrupted progress on the Year of Europe. It is argued here that the war created further 
strain in the Anglo-American relationship. But this had little to do with Britain’s entry into the 
EC, but with long-standing US-UK disagreement on Middle Eastern policy.
125
  
Anglo-American historiography has tended to overstate the US-UK disagreement over 
the Yom Kippur War as another case of “Heath’s Europhilia”.126 Richie Ovendale thought that 
“Heath clearly aligned Britain with its European partners”.127 Christopher Bartlett argued that 
Heath’s “European-mindedness...dictated a policy of caution in the Middle East”.128 However, 
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once again, this overlooks the high level of Anglo-American communication and intelligence-
sharing during the crisis, as well as the long term problems between the US and the UK in the 
Middle East. 
Four main areas of Anglo-American contention developed over: (1) the UK arms 
embargo on Israel and the Arab states; (2) the passing of a ceasefire resolution at the UN; (3) the 
US military alert; and (4) US operations from UK military facilities, in support of Israel.   
Kissinger, the US Secretary of State since 22 September 1973, spoke daily to the British 
government throughout the crisis, either through Lord Cromer in Washington or Douglas-Home 
in London. On the first day of fighting, Kissinger phoned Cromer and declared that “Our worst 
mistake was to throw you out of the Canal”. He then passed on information “for the Prime 
Minister only”, of secret intelligence reports regarding the Israeli and Arab positions on the 
front.
129
  
But the US and the UK had differing interests in the Middle East which translated into 
policy. The UK based its policy on the need to protect economic links and oil supplies from the 
Arab states. In contrast, the US administration focussed on ensuring the survival of the State of 
Israel and countering Soviet support for Arab states in the region.
130
 On the first day of the Yom 
Kippur War the UK government stopped the shipment of arms to the combatants, just as the 
Wilson government had done during the 1967 Six Day War.
131
 The UK arms embargo directly 
conflicted with the US policy of re-supplying Israel during the war. Throughout Nixon’s 
presidency, the US provided massive financial and military backing to Israel. In October 1970, 
Nixon had approved $500 million of aid to Israel in order “to maintain continuing support for 
Israel’s military position”, allowing Israel to negotiate with Arab states from “a position of 
strength”.132 Yet the British government displayed an obsession with oil supplies. The FCO 
boasted to the Cabinet on 25 October 1973 that due to the arms embargo “Saudi Arabia and Abu 
Dhabi...do not wish to reduce our supplies” and that the “UK will be supplied on the same scale 
as during the first nine months of this year”, while most Arab producers “have placed embargos 
on shipments to the US”.133 After reviewing the situation on 29 October 1973, the FCO advised 
Heath to continue suspending arms and ammunition to the conflicting parties, to avoid 
“jeopardising our oil interests”, despite causing problems with arms purchasers under contract 
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and US disapproval.
134
 This displayed that the US and UK had fundamentally different 
approaches to the Middle East, whether or not the UK joined the EC in January 1973. 
As permanent members of the Security Council, both the US and the UK played a key 
role in the passing of a ceasefire resolution, although a degree of tension grew over the actual 
ceasefire line due to policy differences over the Arab-Israeli wars. Moreover, the nature of UN 
politics, with five permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers, ensures that 
these counties will sometimes enter into frank debate over potential UN action and the drafting 
of resolutions.   
From 1949-1967, the UN recognised the 1949 “Armistice Line” as the border of Israel. 
During the Six Day War, June 1967, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula (up to the East Bank of 
the Suez Canal) and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and parts of 
Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan – the 1967 borders. On 22 November 1967, the UN 
passed Resolution 242, which proposed the establishment of peace through negotiation in 
exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 Armistice Line. Up to 6 October 1973, Israel and 
the Arab states were stationed on the 1967 border. During the first three days of the Yom 
Kippur War Syria and Egypt both crossed the 1967 ceasefire lines. But thereafter Israel repelled 
the Arab forces.
135
  
An Anglo-American divide developed immediately. On 6 October 1973, Kissinger 
informed Cromer that the US wanted a ceasefire, in which each side returned to the 1967 
ceasefire line.
 136
 However, this included an Egyptian and Syrian withdrawal from land, such as 
the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula, captured by Israel in the 1967 war, which the UK 
government believed belonged to the Arab states anyway. Thus, the UK were only prepared to 
accepted a ceasefire in situ – meaning in each side’s current position, allowing Egypt and Syria 
to retain their land – or a ceasefire on the basis of the Armistice Line, under UN Resolution 242. 
Cromer reported back to London that “Kissinger did not take this well” and that the UK position 
would in “effect be giving its blessing to aggression and land-grabbing”.137 The US and the UK 
failed to reach an agreement and so no ceasefire resolution passed in the first week of the war.  
On 13 October 1973 Kissinger sought to push again for a ceasefire agreement at the 
UN, by which point Israel had nearly re-established the 1967 borders. Kissinger now supported    
either a return to the 1967 line or a ceasefire in situ. Douglas-Home had opened a 
communication link with the Egyptian President Sadat, who said that he would only accept a 
ceasefire in situ on the basis that Israel returned to the Armistice Line. Kissinger opposed this 
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position, and urged the British to push the Egyptians.
138
 Sadat told the British that “he would 
invoke a Chinese veto” if the US went ahead with the ceasefire in situ, and thus the UK also 
refused to support a resolution.
139
 Kissinger expressed displeasure to Cromer, claiming that 
Nixon was “taking it extremely ill”, and that the US had started a major arms airlift to Israel.140 
Cromer warned that the Arab countries will “start screaming oil at you” – revealing the UK’s 
primary preoccupation. Cromer informed the FCO of Kissinger’s “bullying tactics”.141 The next 
day, Kissinger told Nixon that “the British basic attitude is lousy....they are just passively sitting 
there picking up the pieces, they are not shaping anything” and that the British do not want “to 
run any risks” with the Arab countries. But Nixon thought that only “Brezhnev and Nixon will 
settle this damn thing”.142 Despite these immediate problems Kissinger still sent for Cromer to 
come to the State Department for a secret intelligence report that could not be read over the 
phone.
143
 Eventually, Egypt and Israel accepted a ceasefire in situ, under a US-Soviet proposed 
UN Resolution (338) on 22 October.
144
   
On 6 November 1973, the governments of the EC released a joint statement on the 
Middle East crisis, calling for the implementation of UN Resolution 242 (1967), which marked 
a step in the direction of European political cooperation, although this hardly conflicted with US 
policy since UN Resolution 338 called for the implementation of UN Resolution 242 – which 
the US had originally voted for in 1967.
145
  
Anglo-American difficulties also emerged over a US military alert, due to inefficient 
Whitehall crisis management. During the war Israel had seized the Sinai Desert, encircling the 
Egyptian Third Army, stranded on the East Bank of the Suez Canal. Brezhnev sent a message to 
the Nixon administration on 24 October in the evening, threatening to take “appropriate steps 
unilaterally” to support Egypt, which Kissinger interpreted as sending Russian troops into the 
Sinai.
146
 In response, Kissinger convened a meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group 
(WSAG) – the administration’s crisis management team – at 10.30 p.m. in the White House 
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Situation Room.
147
 Kissinger and the White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig decided not to 
wake Nixon.
148
 During the meeting the US went to “DEFCON III” – increasing US force 
readiness for war, and sending a nuclear carrier into the Eastern Mediterranean. The WSAG 
alerted the US carriers (John F. Kennedy and Franklin Delano Rossevelt) and the 82
nd
 Airborne 
Division at approximately 12.20 a.m.
149
 Kissinger telephoned Cromer from the White House 
Situation Room at 1.03 a.m. (6.03 a.m. GMT) on 25 October, just after the alert officially went 
into force, saying that “we feel that the only chance we now have...is defence readiness around 
the world....We are going to what they call our Def Con three alert”. He asked for the UK’s 
“very strong support” and “don’t say the Americans have gone crazy”. 150 Cromer telephoned 
the FCO at 6.20 a.m., with a telegram sent to the FCO and 10 Downing Street at 6.55 a.m., 
while the Minister of Defence received notification at approximately 8.35 a.m., and therefore 
the US had sought to inform the UK over the military alert upgrade.
151
  
Due to a major Whitehall blunder, nobody informed Heath or Douglas-Home, who both 
found out about the military alert while in the House of Commons on the morning of 25 
October, as the news “appeared on the tape”.152 This allowed the Labour Party to embarrass the 
government in parliament over their apparent lack of information.
153
 The next day the Guardian 
newspaper ran the headline: “Britain in Dark on Nuclear Alert”.154   
Heath wrote a furious note to his Private Secretary Lord Bridges and the Cabinet 
Secretary John Hunt, demanding to know why he was not informed earlier and that he viewed 
the alert as an over-reaction. Furthermore, Heath, unaware that Nixon took no part in the 
decision, complained that the Watergate scandal may have affected Nixon’s judgement: 
 
I fail to see how any initiative, threatened or real, by the Soviet leadership required such a 
worldwide nuclear alert....the American action has done immense harm....we must not 
underestimate the impact on the rest of the world; an American president in the Watergate 
position apparently prepared to go to such lengths at a moment’s notice without consultation 
with his allies...without any justification in the military situation.
155
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Heath also expressed shock that the US would have been able to use their forces and bases in 
the UK without consulting the British. A subsequent investigation pointed out to Heath that in 
fact the US had informed the UK government, via Lord Cromer, and thus there appeared to have 
been a Whitehall defect in passing on the information. Moreover, “there is no specific American 
undertaking to inform or consult the Alliance before a purely American alert....we were not put 
in the firing line since the alert was a low level one”. If a case developed in which the US 
wanted to use forces and bases in the UK, then “they would have consulted us”.156 Heath 
responded that in the future “Ministers must be informed at once”.157    
 Another area of Anglo-American contention developed over the use of UK military 
facilities, usually an area of close cooperation between the US and the UK. During the 14-15 
October, the US re-supply operation for Israel continued at a fast pace, which led to press 
questions regarding the UK’s role. An FCO spokesman said that “the Americans had not asked 
for use of their facilities in Britain for re-supplying Israel” and “that no re-supply had taken 
place”. The US Embassy in London apparently passed this information to the State Department 
and, according to Cromer, “no doubt correctly” judged that the UK government “would prefer 
not to be asked to allow use of these facilities”. Kissinger viewed this as a “lack of 
cooperation”.158 Indeed, the Heath government in 1970 had already formally requested that the 
US stop all reconnaissance flights over Egypt from the UK’s base in Akrotiri, Cyprus because 
of the “increased risks to our own interest...in the Middle East”, thus indicating the UK’s 
reluctance, over a period of time, to be directly involved.
159
 In any case, throughout November 
and December 1973, the UK supplied over 17,000 tons of fuel to the US navy at UK bases in 
Singapore and in the Indian Ocean, so a small degree of cooperation did take place.
160
       
On 22 November 1973 Kissinger gave a press conference, saying that “the allies who 
had been consulted most about US policy in the Middle East turned out to be the least 
cooperative” – viewed in Whitehall as a dig at the UK.161 A large amount of Anglo-American 
communication and intelligence sharing took place during the war. But the US and UK 
approached the Middle East from different perspectives, which created conflict and 
misunderstanding. 
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Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has discussed the fine details of early Anglo-American relations between 
Heath and Nixon which has brought a new aspect to the historical topic. Immediately, US-UK 
consultations displayed the UK dilemma in maintaining close Anglo-American relations while 
negotiating entry into the EC. This revolved around the Anglo-American perception that the UK 
must not appear as an Atlantic ‘Trojan horse’ in order to gain French support for British 
membership. The US intentionally adopted a ‘hands-off’ approach while Heath avoided the use 
of the term ‘special’ when referring to Anglo-American relations. At the same time, the Heath 
government sought to bolster the Nixon administration’s support for the political enlargement 
and integration of Western Europe by actually expressing a desire to promote an Atlantic-
friendly EC.  
A major Anglo-American divide existed on the question of Chinese representation at 
the UN. While the UK sought to consult with the US administration on Chirep, the US 
succeeded in delaying the UK’s negotiations with China on the establishment of full diplomatic 
links. Meanwhile, the Nixon-Kissinger China initiative hardened the Chinese position with 
Britain and caused a communications problem in Anglo-American relations. But ultimately the 
US and UK shared the same policy on improving relations with China, and therefore it did not 
cause a substantial rift. This episode showed that the UK sought close Anglo-American 
cooperation despite seeking to join the EC, and therefore the alliance was still very important. 
The problems over China policy were unrelated to the UK’s move towards Europe, but 
connected to the nature of policy making in the US administration and Nixon’s focus on Cold 
War triangular diplomacy. 
 The Year of Europe and the Yom Kippur War created a tense period in Anglo-
American relations, between April and December 1973.  Major differences emerged on the 
substance of Middle East policy due to conflicting interests, which has been a long standing 
issue in Anglo-American and US-European relations. But this episode, along with the Year of 
Europe, also reveal the continuation of close Anglo-American consultation, and a genuine desire 
to balance relations between the EC and the US-UK alliance. It does not mark the 
Europeanisation of British foreign policy and a rupture in US support for European integration. 
Soon after the Year of Europe failure the US administration approved the upgrade of the UK’s 
nuclear deterrent, in January 1974. Therefore, a unique link remained between Britain and the 
US despite these specific political episodes. 
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Chapter 4: 
Anglo-American Economic Relations:  
Part I – Trade and the EC Enlargement (1969-1974) 
 
This chapter investigates Anglo-American trade relations in the context of the EC 
enlargement negotiations. It argues that the EC came to dominate Anglo-American trade 
relations as a result of the British accession, and thus an alteration took place. However, the 
trade problems that arose in the UK’s negotiations to join the EC were actually overridden by 
the strong political and defence collaboration in Anglo-American relations. Furthermore, this 
did not mark a fundamental transformation in the Anglo-American partnership, as argued by 
some historians.
1
   
As part of the UK application to join the EC, the Heath government adopted policies 
that directly affected the composition and volume of trade amongst the EC, the UK, and the US, 
and thus major Anglo-American negotiations took place to deal with the changes. Firstly, the 
UK introduced agricultural levies, a system based on the Common Agricultural Policy, which 
the US had long opposed as a barrier to free trade. Secondly, the UK sought to establish 
bilateral and multilateral trading agreements between the Commonwealth and the EC as a 
component of the Treaty of Accession, in order to protect traditional trading markets and 
dependent economies, which discriminated against US exporters. Meanwhile, in the US, a 
protectionist movement grew on the domestic scene, from Congressional leaders and unions to 
big business, in reaction to monetary difficulties and EC trade policies, which threatened 
international trade relations. Serious and tough negotiations took place between ministers and 
officials, which caused tension in the Anglo-American relationship.         
Of the growing material written on Britain’s application to join the EC under Heath, and 
on Nixon’s foreign and economic policy, rarely does it consider the specific Anglo-American 
trade aspects of the EC enlargement, such as on the issues of agricultural levies, Commonwealth 
association, and Congressional protectionist legislation, and therefore this chapter contributes 
towards the historical debate on US-EC and Anglo-American relations under Heath and Nixon.
2
           
__________________ 
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US-UK-EC Trade Issues 
  
Trade policy formed a key aspect of the US-EC relationship, which in turn affected 
Anglo-American relations during Britain’s negotiations to join the EC. There were developing 
trade tensions between the EC and the US, and outstanding trade policy issues under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an international agreement and forum which 
sought to establish a world free trade system.
3
 GATT provided a base for trade negotiations in 
order to support international economic stability and cooperation. The original agreement 
included important rules and principles for general commercial policy. For example, the most 
well-known principle was the “General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment” in article 1, clause 1 
of GATT, which said that “any advantage...granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to...all other contracting parties”.4 In other words, it sought to stop all discrimination or 
preferences in world trade. Prior to the Nixon-Heath years there had been six major multilateral 
tariff cutting negotiations, with the results of the Kennedy Round (1964-1967) coming into 
effect from 1968-1972 during the period under discussion.
5
  
The passage of the Trade Expansion Act in the US Congress in 1962 opened the way 
for the Kennedy Round, which gave the US president authority to negotiate tariff reductions of 
50% across the board. The act specifically mentioned trade problems between the US and the 
EC.
6
 The Kennedy Round was a major step in bringing down tariff barriers, with an average 
reduction of 35% of tariffs. But major trade issues between the US and EC remained 
unresolved.
 7
 The wide and deep cuts in tariffs in the Kennedy Round resulted in revealing the 
problems with non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in world trade. Common forms of NTBs were quotas, 
export subsidies, embargoes, border taxes, government procurement policies (“buy national”), 
all of which affected the volume and composition of trade. NTBs hindered free trade and 
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therefore it became a major issue in international trade relations in the late 1960s and 
throughout the 1970s.
8
    
Agriculture trade policy particularly caused friction between the US, UK and EC. The 
various structures of farming subsidies, levies, and price fixing (i.e. NTBs) used in the 
participating countries, as well as domestic concerns and the influence of organised farmer 
unions, prevented a major solution to agricultural trade barriers in the Kennedy Round. US 
agricultural producers had issues with subsidised European farmers, under the EC Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), while the EC in turn criticised the US farming support systems.  
US farm support programs, largely the product of the Great Depression in the 1930s, 
sought to manage and protect the US food supply and supplement agricultural incomes. In 1930 
25% of the US population resided on farms. Therefore the US Congress and executive took 
action to protect US agriculture.
9
 They introduced three key pieces of legislation, known as the 
“three permanent laws” of agriculture, which have been updated on a regular basis in the 
Congress through omnibus, multi-year farming bills, taking into account changing conditions in 
domestic and international farm markets, budgets, and policy goals.
10
 When Nixon entered 
office in January 1969, the 1965 Food and Agricultural Act was still providing commodity 
programs for wheat, feed grains, and cotton, which the EC viewed as an unfair trading practice.      
The USDA also had discretion to offer farming subsidies to any commodity not dealt 
with in specific farming bills, which increased the department’s influence in policy making and 
with farming pressure groups.
11
 As discussed in chapter 1, the agricultural sector represented an 
important constituent for the Nixon presidency during elections, prominent in the “swing”, 
southern, and heartland states. The USDA had strong communication links with important 
farming lobbies, such as the National Farmers Union. As well as being used for electoral 
purposes, the subsidies sought to increase farm exports, encourage domestic consumption, and 
for purchasing farm surpluses, a type of NTB.
12
       
The other major issue in US trade policy that caused international friction, the American 
Selling Price (ASP), allowed the president to calculate import duties on the basis of US prices 
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for certain goods rather than the foreign good. By equalising the difference between home and 
foreign production, it acted as an NTB and a breach of GATT principles.
13
 Kennedy, and then 
Johnson, sought to deal with the ASP problem during the Kennedy Round, and committed the 
US to its repeal, but the Congress rejected the negotiated GATT package because authority had 
not been granted in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Johnson attempted to repeal the ASP again 
in the 1968 Trade Expansion Act, but Congress removed the clause, added some new trade 
restrictions, and thus Johnson vetoed the bill.
14
 On Nixon’s entry into the White House, the ASP 
remained a long-standing problem in US-EC and international trade relations, as well as a 
sticking point in US executive-legislative policy making.  
The CAP, the major EC system of agricultural subsidies that caused international 
tension, came into force in 1962, and guaranteed a minimum price to EC producers. Tariffs 
were placed on specific goods imported into the EC, thereby bringing the world market price up 
to the EC target price. If EC prices fell below the ‘intervention’ level, then the EC would buy up 
goods to increase the price. Direct subsidies were also paid to farmers growing certain crops. 
The policy sought to have a stable internal market and Community preferences, and was a 
central component of the new common market. However, this system had an effect on third 
countries, altering the composition of trade, and therefore it was an NTB. The CAP system 
caused a fall in the importation of US agricultural goods into the EC and provided EC farmers 
with an advantage over US farmers in world markets, and thus a major US-EC trade issue. 
Another outstanding trade issue in US-EC relations were EC special bilateral trading 
preferences with former colonies. EC trade relations with their former colonies were governed 
during this period by the Yaoundé Convention (1964-1969) and Yaoundé II (1971-1975) which 
included 18 African independent countries.
15
 Previously, the EC had made trade provisions for 
overseas territories and former colonies in the original 1957 Treaty of Rome (Part IV). The most 
serious US objection, with the most potential to cause a breakdown in relations with the EC and 
the UK, were ‘reverse preferences’ or reciprocal discrimination, which the EC demanded its 
developing associates should grant EC exporters in their markets. This put US exporters at a 
disadvantage to EC exporters.
16
 This problem would be increased with the prospect of special 
trading agreements between the EC and the Commonwealth territories, as part of Britain’s EC 
negotiation strategy, which would quadruple the number of territories receiving preferential 
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agreements. This became a major issue in Anglo-American trade relations during the EC 
enlargement negotiations. 
 
The Development of the Nixon Administration’s Trade Policy 1969-1970 
 
Nixon’s foreign economic trade policy, a fundamental component of the US-EC 
relationship, sought to promote a free trade system and a move away from protectionism. 
However, Nixon faced tough pressure from special interests groups, particularly from key 
economic sectors in the southern states which had elected Nixon. Furthermore, the Democratic 
Party controlled Congress, during a period of increased executive-legislative tension, wanted to 
introduce compulsory trade limits against specific international industries to safeguard the US 
economy. This domestic debate led to members of Congress and the economic federal 
departments and agencies to question the expansion of the EC and resulted in a major executive 
review of US policy towards the UK accession negotiations. 
The US balance of payment problems (as discussed in chapter 2) contributed towards 
Congressional, pressure group, and federal government support for protectionism.
17
 The 
growing deficit undermined the reserve role of the dollar in the international monetary system, 
which weakened the US domestic and international economic position, thus leading to this 
domestic debate on EC and Japanese trading practices.            
The NSC launched an early investigation into US trade policy, on 5 February 1969. Its 
terms of reference were to look at “overall US trade policy”, and discuss the “need for new 
legislation”, in consultation with the economic departments.18 Shortly afterwards, Nixon 
publicly indicated the administration’s general support for a free trade system. But he also 
argued for limited protection of certain industries, displaying the domestic tensions over trade 
policy. In his second press conference on 6 February 1969, Nixon stated that he would combat 
the growing Congressional feeling towards protectionism, arguing for “freer trade” and noting 
that he took “a dim view of this tendency to move toward quotas”.19 However, Nixon also told 
the press that he believed that the textile industry was a special case and that he would seek 
voluntary import quotas, an election pledge as part of his “southern strategy” (see chapter 1). 
While Congress wanted mandatory controls, Nixon would seek import limits through bilateral 
negotiations with trading allies, which would safeguard the southern state economies from 
Japanese and EC competitors. These voluntary restraints did not violate GATT commitments 
and they could easily be removed in changing market circumstances. This was in contrast to 
legislative import quotas, which were contrary to GATT regulations and were rigid NTBs.  
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Some major US newspapers noted and criticised Nixon’s “campaign debt to the South”, 
arguing that “the cost of honouring that regional debt is much too high”, even though the 
Democratic Party candidate Hubert Humphrey had also promised trade quotas at the election.
20
 
The Johnson administration had managed to negotiate voluntary import restraints with Japan 
(by January 1969) for the steel industry, an important sector of the economy and thus a 
precedent for such economic safeguards. The Nixon administration claimed that 100,000 jobs a 
year were at risk in the US cotton industry as imports of synthetic fibres continued to grow.
21
 
Nixon’s support for protecting the textile industry indicated its importance to the US economy, 
Nixon’s political election strategy, and the power of the textile industry in Washington. This 
free trade-protectionism dilemma displayed the early domestic debate on foreign economic 
policy.         
 During the formation of Nixon’s trade bill and after, the administration encountered 
strong demands from special interest groups. However, the overriding principles of the 
administration were free trade and political support for western allies, despite economic 
pressures. The NFU emphasised the importance of improving the “relatively low income of 
farm families”. They wanted a balance to be found, arguing that “what we must have is neither 
this Victorian free market internationalism nor monumental national isolationism” and thus the 
NFU called for trade negotiations, the continuation of domestic farm support programs, and the 
abolition of the ASP.
22
 The US Chamber of Commerce, a major business federation, praised 
Nixon’s commitment to expansionist trade policy.  But they worried about the “potential effects 
of UK entry into the Common Market” and the “absence of concerted initiatives in the United 
States to protect its trade interests”. The Chamber called on Nixon to fully investigate EC 
policies and UK entry, and that European unity should be on the basis of “open and liberal trade 
relations”.23 The National Council of Farmer Cooperatives (NCFC), a powerful body 
representing farming groups, also prompted Nixon to negotiate voluntary import quotas, in “the 
best interest of the US”.24 Nixon ordered the administration to “take greater cognizance of the 
problems of US businessmen”. At the very least, they should be “convinced” that their 
“interests are adequately represented”. However, “ultimately they may have to be overridden by 
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foreign policy considerations”.25 Therefore, pressure group opinion would not override the 
overall objectives of free trade and support for the Western alliance. 
The ad hoc group reported in April 1969, arguing for executive legislation that sought 
to promote an international free trade system, a continuation of US post-war trade policy. The 
“modest” legislation should indicate to “domestic and foreign audiences” the “Administration’s 
tone in trade policy”, rather than seeking radical executive power for another international trade 
round, which would cause executive-legislative tension. Moreover, on relations with the EC the 
report concluded that the “trade picture is clouded” by differences on agriculture. This study 
also thought that a free trade policy increased international cooperation, which bolstered the US 
“political role of world leadership”. 26  
However, the group report also warned Nixon that protectionism and Congressional 
trade policy could lead to an Atlantic trade war. It pointed out that these “pressures could lead to 
widespread restrictions here, retaliation abroad, and a downward spiral in world trade”.27 
Kissinger particularly drew attention to this point, writing to Nixon in preparation for the NSC 
meeting on this report, that the growing protectionist measures in Congress and abroad “raise 
the spectre of a possible trade war between major allies” and that “the spill over from the trade 
field” could “damage our over-all foreign policy”.28 At the NSC meeting on 9 April 1969 Nixon 
reiterated his support for free trade and sought to adopt the recommendations of the report.
29
  
This policy review displayed the general liberal trade sentiments within the 
administration and accepted the use of limited NTBs in order to safeguard the domestic 
economy. But it also indicated the short term US domestic conflict over trade policy and its 
clash with international relations, and that the administration and federal government 
departments believed that the international trade system required a long term readjustment, 
without harming their political alliances.   
 
The “Mills Bill” / Congressional Trade Policy and Anglo-American Relations 1969-1971 
 
 While the Nixon Administration sought to push for greater trade liberalisation through 
new legislation, it encountered opposition from Congress who wanted to implement strong 
protectionist measures. The executive-Congressional confrontation resulted in legislative ping-
pong and four years of deadlock before the passing of the Trade Act of 1974, which in turn 
caused tension in Anglo-American economic relations  
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 Nixon submitted his trade legislation to Congress on 18 November 1969, which 
accepted the principle of free trade, but displayed a mix of liberalising and protectionist 
measures. The bill (H.R. 14870) based its provisions on the trends of increased economic 
interdependence and competition, a reduced US trade surplus, and the continuing economic 
trade problems of the LDCs. On the free trade front, Nixon sought authority to make “modest” 
reductions in US tariffs up until 30 June 1973. It requested the repeal of the ASP because “its 
removal will bring reciprocal reductions in foreign tariffs” and that it will “unlock the door to 
new negotiations”. On the protectionist side, the bill requested greater authority to support 
domestic industries and to negotiate voluntary import restraints, especially for textiles.
30
  
 Just like trade policy under Kennedy and Johnson, the Congress altered Nixon’s trade 
bill and failed to pass legislation, which resulted in continual institutional and foreign conflict 
over trade policy, from 1969 to 1974. Nixon’s trade bill went straight to the Ways and Means 
Committee in the House of Representatives, a key committee, with responsibility for taxation, 
tariffs, and other revenue-raising legislation. From 1958 to 1974 the committee was often 
referred to as the “Mills Committee” after its chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark), a powerful 
member of Congress.
31
 Twenty of the twenty-five members of the committee had introduced 
quota legislation, along with nearly 300 other members, from 1969-1971. The committee were 
already dealing with fifty-nine bills on steel imports, forty-seven on textile imports, forty on 
milk and dairy products, and twenty-four on footwear. Mills himself had introduced a bill on 13 
April 1970 (with 184 co-sponsors) seeking to impose import quotas.
32
 Nixon’s trade bill 
collided with a mass of trade legislation which resulted in major alternations.  
Hearings opened on the various trade and tariff proposals, including Nixon’s trade bill, 
on 11 May 1970, with testimony from 377 witnesses, including members of the administration, 
and business and union leaders, reporting on 11 August 1970 with a new bill, which became 
known as the “Mills Bill”, or the Trade Act of 1970.33 The committee maintained the repeal of 
the ASP, initially a major achievement for the administration, as it formed a central aspect of the 
original trade bill and because of the problems that Kennedy and Johnson had in seeking its 
removal. However, the bill set import quotas, limiting future imports to 1967-68 levels, which 
thus posed a threat to liberal trade policies. 
The Mills Bill and congressional protectionism caused concern in London, which 
became an issue in Anglo-American relations during Britain’s application to join the EC. Heath 
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and Nixon met at Chequers on 3 October 1970, just as the Mills Bill was going through the 
House of Representatives. The UK Board of Trade briefed Heath in late September on the 
“protectionist trend in the USA” which created the “prospect of a trade war”.34 The FCO also 
warned Heath of the negative consequences “for world trade if the Mills Bill becomes law”.35 
Then a couple days before the Chequers summit the Board of Trade pushed the point further 
that “you should put the case against this legislation as strongly as you can” to Nixon.36 
Kissinger briefed Nixon that he must “reiterate opposition” to congressional protectionism at 
the meeting with Heath in order to maintain good US-UK economic relations.
37
  
However, Heath and Nixon largely discussed areas of Anglo-American cooperation in 
Cold War international affairs.
38
 In an off the record conversation Nixon told Heath that he 
understood the implications of the Congressional trade policy and that “he might find himself 
having to use the veto”.39 Rogers also told Douglas-Home at their meeting that Nixon would 
veto the bill in its current form.
40
 This indicated that the US sought to reassure the UK of their 
commitment to liberal trade policies, while Anglo-American problems were mainly left aside at 
Chequers in October 1970.    
The Nixon Administration’s initial victory in maintaining the repeal of the ASP after 
the hearings of the Ways and Means Committee was short lived; the House of Representatives 
removed the repeal clause, and passed the bill by 205-165 on 19 November 1970.
41
 Publically 
the administration said that it had “deep reservations” about the provisions in the Mills Bill 
which were “contrary to the interests of the nation as a whole”, although Nixon did not state 
whether he would use the veto.
42
 Privately Nixon said that he found it “distasteful” and 
Kissinger said that “we don’t like the language a bit”, passing it off as a protectionist bill, one 
which the executive would veto.
43
 The bill went to the Senate Finance Committee on 11 
December 1970, one week before Heath’s arrival in Washington D.C. for major bilateral 
discussions with Nixon. 
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At the Anglo-American summit in Washington and Camp David in December 1970 
Nixon switched tactics and sought to use the Mills Bill to push for UK trade concessions as a 
part of their application to join the EC, which added pressure to the economic relationship. 
Nixon had noted the possibility of using the Congressional move towards protectionism as a 
bargaining chip with allies in economic affairs back in April 1969.
 44
 Later, in November 1970, 
Nixon told Kissinger that the Mills Bill would “have a useful bargaining purpose” with other 
countries, and so the Mills Bill “in some respects...might be useful to have”.45 This tactic would 
be important in bilateral negotiations with the UK and EC.  
The first topic discussed between Heath and Nixon at the White House on 17 December 
was European integration and the US-EC-UK trade dispute. Both sides were fully briefed on the 
trade issue, with Kissinger noting as a key objective the need to minimise “potential friction 
over economic issues” but not to “acquiesce” in the British economic proposals to make an 
early switch over to the CAP.
46
 Nixon told Heath that he could not predict whether the Mills 
Bill would succeed in the Senate and that “I can’t be caught killing it, because of the textile 
people”. Nixon also supported the textile quotas in the bill because of the administration’s 
failure to negotiate voluntary restraints with Japan and other countries in the Far East and 
Europe throughout 1969-1970.
47
 Nixon told Heath that the next move in trade liberalisation 
needed to be made by the EC and the UK because “we have gone as far down the road as we 
can go”. Heath assured Nixon that the UK would “exert all our influence” as a member of the 
EC to moderate protectionist tendencies, but Nixon warned that the impression had grown that 
the UK was moving towards protectionism which made the US government’s domestic political 
difficulties “virtually insurmountable”.48 This indicated an intensification of tactics since the 
Chequers meetings, in which the US demanded that the UK take their economic interests into 
account, which put pressure on the Anglo-American trade relationship during Britain’s 
application to join the EC.   
The 1970 Mills Bill was not acted upon before the adjournment of Congress in January 
1971 and was re-introduced later as the Trade Act of 1971 for further debate and amendment, 
which resulted in the continuation of a free trade-protectionist dispute on the US domestic scene 
which spread into foreign economic affairs, until the passage of major trade legislation in late 
1974.
49
 Thus, Nixon’s trade bill faced legislative, institutional, policy, and international conflict. 
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By the time Nixon and Heath next met in December 1971 in Bermuda the debate had shifted in 
reaction to Nixon’s NEP and the international monetary crisis.  
A further measure taken by Nixon to develop US trade policy and economic relations 
with the UK and the EC was the establishment of the Presidential Commission on International 
Trade and Investment Policy, appointed on 21 May 1971. Nixon’s difficulty in passing a trade 
act through Congress and the divisions in the administration contributed towards its 
establishment, as a means of building consensus amongst the domestic opinion makers. Nixon 
wanted the commission to “have a strong staff and a prominent chairman” and to look at “the 
entire range of trade and production relationships”.50 The creation of a “blue-ribbon 
commission” had been recommended in the original review on trade policy. It became known as 
the “Williams Commission” after its chairman Albert Williams (President of IBM, 1961-1966). 
It took testimony from hundreds of industry experts, and from members of Congress and the 
Nixon administration.
51
  
The commission report, United States International Economic Policy in an 
Interdependent World, submitted to the president in July 1971, proposed a major new round of 
multilateral trade talks, with the view to removing “all barriers to international trade and capital 
movements within 25 years”, and was hence an internationalist, free trade document.52 Nixon 
praised the Williams Commission’s work in his third annual report to Congress on US foreign 
policy in February 1972, and ordered his Assistant for International Economic Affairs, Peter 
Peterson, to develop legislation through the Council of International Economic Policy (created 
in February 1971), which became the basis of Nixon’s Trade Act of 1974.53 This led to the 
Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations (1973-79). Therefore, this commission played a key part in 
the development of overall US trade and EC policy. However, it also displayed the tensions in 
the administration and Congress and from pressure groups over the expansion of the EC, which 
influenced bilateral relations with the UK and the US-EC relationship.   
 
UK Agricultural Levies and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1971 
 
The Heath government’s general economic policy sought to promote free markets, 
trade, and competition, and to reform and revitalise British industry. The government wanted a 
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reduction in public expenditure, including the removal of direct subsidies for UK farmers to a 
system of general import levies on agricultural goods which would guarantee farmer’s incomes.  
But this policy involved the expansion of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and thus had 
international implications. Britain had obligations under GATT to allow duty-free entry of 
certain products from some countries, such as wheat from the US. This brought Anglo-
American economic relations into the US-EC agricultural trade war. Major negotiations took 
place between Heath and Nixon to resolve the dispute. Members of the US administration 
questioned the assumption that Britain might have a liberalising influence on the EC as a 
member, in the face of strong pressure from farming interests and the Congress to defend US 
agriculture from EC protectionist policies and to protect their overall balance of payments 
position.  
Domestically, Heath also faced pressure from the parliament and unions on the switch 
in agricultural support, because of the prospect of a rising cost of living. Moreover, the UK 
government feared that the UK might appear as an Atlantic ‘Trojan horse’ in the eyes of EC 
members if trade concessions were made to the US, and thus Anglo-American tensions grew in 
the economic trade field. But ultimately, the political and defence importance of Anglo-
American relations and the political unity of Western Europe took priority over the developing 
Atlantic trade friction, and thus strong bilateral relations continued.  
 The UK government argued that they wanted to introduce agricultural import levies as a 
means to reduce public expenditure, improve production efficiency and protect UK farming 
from overseas dumping, and thus the levies were a  key part of their overall economic policy. 
Heath established the Ministerial Committee on Agricultural Policy on entering government to 
push forward and review the government’s intention to replace the agricultural support system, 
which displayed his determination to fulfil a policy pledge made in opposition.
54
 The 1970 
election manifesto A Better Tomorrow had argued that “this fundamental change will provide 
much needed scope for agricultural expansion” and that it would save the Exchequer £250 
million a year which would be used for tax cuts and improved welfare payments.
55
 The 
committee opted for a system of general variable levies, in which the government would set a 
minimum import price (or target price). A levy would be charged on all imports equivalent to 
the difference between the target price and the offering price. It thus functioned in the same way 
as the CAP, protecting the domestic agricultural sector from international competitors, as well 
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as reducing farmers’ dependence on direct government subsidies.56 The actual mechanism of 
minimum import prices had already been introduced by the 1964 Wilson government to fight 
off low priced offers of grain in the UK market. This worked on a country by country basis, and 
because it had such a low level, very few products were levied and only intermittently. The 
Heath government’s plan involved sharp increases in the price levels, and thus most agricultural 
commodities would be levied on a continual basis.  
The government attached the change in agricultural support to their overall package on 
public expenditure and taxation, announced to the House of Commons on 27 October 1970 by 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber, who stated that “our objective is to lessen 
government interference and reduce government subsidies”.57 He argued that at the start of the 
1964 Labour government the public sector accounted for 44% of GDP. By 1969 this had risen 
to 50%, and thus the government needed to bring public expenditure down. On agricultural 
support he told the house that he wanted to “reduce the cost to the taxpayer” and that the 
savings “could be substantial”.58 However, the initial report by the agricultural committee 
concluded that actual savings for 1972-1973 would be around £55-75 million and then £150 
million by 1974/75, based on the highest price range of levies. Moreover, the balance of 
payments benefits would be no more than £30 million and the official committee thought that 
the plans “are not expected to stimulate domestic production”.59 Nevertheless ministers were 
committed to their undertakings, made both before and after the general election.
60
         
Furthermore, the Heath government also viewed this policy as a transitional move 
towards the EC system of agricultural support, and thus an important step in the EC 
negotiations.61 Initially, the government’s tactic for negotiating the introduction of the levies 
with their overseas suppliers focussed on their general economic policy, arguing that “it was our 
intention to change over to such a system whether or not we joined the EEC” as a new “means 
of agricultural support”.62 But under pressure from the US to revise their plans following the 
public announcement to introduce levies in October 1970, ministers stated that a reversal would 
be “inconsistent with our aim of moving towards EEC mechanisms”.63 Moreover, the 
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government’s plans “had been favourably received from the Community”.64 The government 
also feared that a reversal would display to the EC members “a lack of determination to adjust 
to community policies”, as well as “evidence of our readiness to respond to American 
pressure”.65 This indicated the UK dilemma of pursuing Anglo-American economic trade 
negotiations whilst seeking to join the EC.      
While parliament, public opinion, and some trade unions were concerned with the rising 
cost of living, this did not alter the government’s policy and the passing of legislation. The 
government were prepared to accept higher agricultural price levels as a result of these changes 
and for joining the EC. In the July 1971 White Paper The United Kingdom and the European 
Communities, the government said that adopting the CAP would “raise food prices in the 
United Kingdom and the cost of our food imports”, but it would also “stimulate British farm 
output” and in the long term the standard of living would increase.66 The Shadow Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, responding to the government’s economic package on 27 October 
1970 in the Commons, claimed that it failed to deal with prices and that it “is inflationary, 
regressive” and full of “petty dogmatism and short-sighted materialism”.67 However, the change 
in the agricultural support system was overshadowed by other aspect of the programme, such as 
tax cuts.
68
 Some trade unions also showed concern about rising retail food prices. The Economic 
Committee of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) told Rippon that “the TUC’s primary concern 
was the cost of living. We were faced with an increase in food prices...This could have an effect 
on wages”.69 These unions closely aligned themselves with the Labour Party, which opposed the 
terms of entry negotiated by the Conservatives in an attempt to force a general election. But the 
government signalled that they were willing to take a political and economic short term hit in 
order to gain membership of the EC, their top priority.  
Moreover, the government had the support of the National Farmers Union (NFU), an 
important electoral constituency for the Conservatives. The President of the NFU Henry Plumb 
noted “with especial satisfaction” Rippon’s remarks on the “prospective increase in agricultural 
prices and expansion of British agriculture, whether or not Britain joined the EC”.70 He also 
criticised the popular debate on the EC negotiations which “always centred on food costs”, 
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whereas agricultural production “received less publicity and attention”.71 This view fitted into 
the Conservatives’ economic policy of improving conditions for the agricultural, manufacturing, 
and business communities.   
The public perception on the effects of Britain joining the EC also focussed on rising 
costs. The Social and Community Planning Research’s extensive 1971 survey into the British 
public’s views on the EC indicated a clear cut view amongst the public, with 81% subscribing to 
the view that prices would rise, higher than any other anticipated effect of EC membership.
72
 
Gallup polls consistently showed the same trend on the perceived effects of Britain joining the 
EC.
73
 This made Heath’s job in gaining public approval more difficult (as discussed in chapter 
1), as well as adding public backing to the Labour Party and TUC opposition to agricultural 
levies and the EC terms of entry, but this domestic pressure did not alter the government’s 
policy on agricultural reform.         
The introduction of agricultural levies would be a breach of the UK’s international 
commitments under the GATT and the Five Party Agreement, and thus the Heath government’s 
policy created an Anglo-American trade dispute. When Wilson introduced minimum import 
price in 1964 he assured the UK’s main agricultural suppliers (Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
and the US) that their shares in the UK market would be safeguarded in return for suspending 
their rights under GATT tariff bindings. This continued at the end of the Kennedy Round of 
GATT under the Five Party Agreement (1 July 1968 to 30 June 1971). Heath’s change to the 
agricultural system required him to renegotiate these terms. Furthermore, if agreement was not 
reached by 1 July 1971, then the GATT trade bindings came back into effect and the UK would 
have to compensate those countries with a principal supplying interest.
74
 By 1969/1970 the US, 
the biggest supplier of cereals (wheat, barley and maize) to the UK, wanted to protect their 
farming industry from European NTBs and their overall trade surplus, and therefore the 
agricultural levy proposals created a clash in Anglo-American economic relations 1970-1971.         
The initial Anglo-American trade negotiations revealed tension over the expansion of 
the EC. US Secretary of State Rogers wrote to Douglas-Home on 4 November 1970, informing 
him that the UK’s agricultural proposals “have engaged our most serious attention” and 
“concern”, and that the administration wanted to express “its determination to safeguard its 
agricultural trade interests by all appropriate means”.75 Discussions between US and UK 
officials started immediately in London. Stanley Cleveland, Minister for Economic and 
Commercial Affairs at the US Embassy in London, said to UK officials and ministers that 
Washington viewed the move as the last straw in their battle against EC protectionism, such as 
the CAP and border taxes. Moreover, the proposals undermined Britain’s “free trade 
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tradition”.76  The US threatened to intervene in the EC negotiations by seeking to have their 
trade interests taken into account.
77
 However, UK officials highlighted the inconsistency in the 
US opposing the UK bilaterally and through the GATT, while continuing to suspend their trade 
rights with regards to the CAP amongst the EC countries, and therefore a deal should be worked 
out along those lines.
 78
 Officials pencilled in the issue for discussion between Heath and Nixon 
at the Washington summit in December 1970, with the aim of resolving the trade dispute before 
the 1 July 1971 deadline.      
On the US domestic political front, the administration faced a problem with the 
Congressional protectionist movement and pressure from farming interests. A few months 
before Heath’s announcement on agricultural levies, the powerful National Council of Farmer 
Cooperatives (NCFC), which represented many key farming groups, expressed concern with US 
trade policy on the EC enlargement. While the NCFC supported Nixon’s policy of trade 
liberalisation, they told him that the CAP threatened “US agricultural interests” and that the 
EC’s NTBs would be “expanded because of the possible entry of the United Kingdom into the 
EC”. Therefore they argued that the CAP needed to be reformed before a “decision is reached 
on the question of UK entry”. 79 This pressure filtered through to the agencies. The USDA 
frequently argued the case of the faming lobbies, complaining to Nixon and the NSC that “our 
grain trade is constantly threatened under the EC system of...import levies”.80 In February 1971, 
an internal Treasury study pointed out that EC trade policies where creating “protectionist 
sentiments on the hill”.81 The Treasury reported to Nixon in March 1971 that “our farmers feel 
their economic interests are not being protected adequately”, and thus politically the 
administration needed to take a strong position against the UK’s agricultural levies.82  
An internal State Department memorandum in October 1970 noted the “excitement 
generated by the British proposals” within the USDA and in “US grain trade circles”.83 The 
Secretary of State Rogers warned Nixon about the “concern of our corn and wheat producers 
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and traders” and the possibility that US negotiations with the UK could be seen as a “failure on 
the part of the Administration to protect our trade interests”.84 Kissinger also advised Nixon that 
the administration needed to consider the “justified pressure from our agricultural community 
for a strong US position”.85 Therefore, the views of farming pressure groups received serious 
attention amongst the federal government departments and ministers.    
At the first ministerial Anglo-American discussions between Rippon and Hardin in 
London on 14 December 1970, the US took a hard line in opposing the UK measures. Rippon 
offered the US a “package” which modified the agricultural levy proposals. Instead of 
increasing the minimum import prices to £7 per ton above current levels, they would be limited 
to £5 per ton for 1971, and to no more than £7 per ton for 1972. The US would also preserve 
their rights under GATT tariff bindings on cereal. Hardin expressed disappointment and 
associated the UK move with EC policies, telling Rippon that “every single action of the 
Community constituted another attack against US agriculture”. Rippon insisted that “our 
proposals are not protectionist” and that it “fitted in well with our EEC negotiations”.86 Hardin’s 
counter-offer wanted the maintenance of minimum import prices at no more than £2 for 1971 
and £3 for 1972. UK officials viewed the US position as “weak” because under the GATT 
Kennedy Round, they had already accepted the higher CAP prices. Thus the UK saw no reason 
to reverse their position.
87
 The failure to reach an agreement left the issue unresolved before the 
upcoming Heath-Nixon summit.  
The UK Ministerial Committee on Agricultural Policy later concluded that Hardin’s 
counter-offer was “narrow, rigid, and unacceptable”, as well as “wholly unrealistic”.88 Sir Con 
O’Neill, who led the British Official Delegation at the EC negotiations, described the 
situation as “an awkward deadlock”.89 The State Department reported back to the White House 
that “the proposals given to Secretary Hardin do not overcome our original serious 
concerns...the UK proposals would have to be improved considerably”.90 Hardin returned to 
Washington on 15 December 1970 and told Kissinger that “we have had stern talks”.91 He then 
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briefed Nixon that “Heath probably will press hard for our acquiescence now” and that Nixon 
should “avoid making any commitment to the United Kingdom” while negotiations on the 
agricultural levies were ongoing, which Kissinger supported.
92
 The Cabinet Office briefed 
Heath that he should seek to gain Nixon’s agreement in principle for a settlement, so as to avoid 
a dispute through the GATT. Moreover, Heath needed to remind Nixon that if Britain joined the 
EC, “we shall be a liberalising influence in agricultural and trade matters”.93 
At the 17 December 1970 meeting in Washington D.C. Nixon and Heath failed to settle 
the agricultural issue but agreed to continue with negotiations. Nixon told Heath that the 
political pressure from Congress and the protectionists would be “seriously aggravated” by the 
“agricultural lobby, apprehending the creation of new barriers to United States agricultural 
exports”. Moreover Nixon warned that it seemed that “the United Kingdom was moving 
towards agricultural protectionism as part of the approach to Europe”. Heath robustly replied 
that the UK’s policy had been “misrepresented as a move toward protectionism”, but that it was 
merely transferring the cost of support from the Exchequer to the consumer as well as helping in 
the EC negotiations. Heath said that once the UK gained membership of the EC “we should 
exert all our influence in favour of moderating the protectionist tendencies of the EEC” and 
“seek to moderate the EEC prices”.94  As discussed above, Nixon decided to use the threat of the 
Mills Bill at this meeting to push for UK concessions on agricultural levies, while Heath assured 
the US government that there would continue to be a “natural” Anglo-American relationship 
when Britain entered the EC, despite economic trade difficulties, and that they would seek 
liberal trade policies as a member. 
On the US domestic scene, both the pressure from Congress and the farming groups 
started to cause a policy disagreement within the US administration, over the need to preserve 
US economic interests without threatening the political Anglo-American relationship. All the 
relevant agencies – the USDA, State Department, the Treasury, and the NSC – agreed that the 
UK-proposed measures would only have a small short-term economic effect on US exports, but 
that the US needed to preserve their trading rights. Furthermore, the agencies agreed that the 
wider issue and real problem involved the expansion of the EC and its effect on the US-EC 
trade friction. However, the USDA and the Treasury wanted to take a strong line with the UK. 
The USDA sought to oppose Britain’s unilateral action, either forcing a reversal in UK policy or 
seeking compensation through GATT, while the US still had legal rights. After accession, it 
would become a wider US-EC trade issue and thus harder to protect US agriculture. This policy 
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choice would harm political and economic Anglo-American relations, but would fully satisfy 
US farming interests.
95
 The Treasury agreed with the USDA. Connally wrote to Nixon, calling 
on the US to “exercise our full international rights” as a bargaining chip with the UK and, 
moreover, “if forced, seek retaliation”.96 However, State wanted to continue to negotiate with 
the UK to seek an improved level of minimum import levies in order “to defend our important 
trade interests and maintain the support of our agricultural sector without jeopardising the UK’s 
chances of entry into the Common Market”.97 This tactic would avoid a confrontation with the 
UK. A divide thus developed between the need to preserve US trading rights and to avoid 
harming the UK’s negotiations to join the EC and the Anglo-American political alliance. 
While the federal government departments maintained their positions throughout the 
US-UK trade negotiating period (from November 1970 to March 1971), the decision on US 
strategy went to the NSC and White House, because of the “President’s broader interest in good 
relations with the Heath Government”.98 Kissinger argued that the US needed to protect US 
trade by negotiating with the UK over the level of minimum import prices, maximising value 
for the US. He described the USDA position as “extremely tough”, which would “inject us 
directly into the EC-UK negotiations, embittering our relations with both”.99 If the 
administration took a stronger stance, as proposed by the USDA and the Treasury, it “could 
create significant difficulties for Heath and raise doubts about our support for UK entry”.100 
Thus Kissinger supported the State Department, and Nixon approved. Hence, the administration 
developed a policy which aimed to preserve US commercial rights, maintain strong relations 
with Heath, and avoid having a negative influence on the EC enlargement negotiations. 
 Meanwhile, the robust Anglo-American negotiations on agriculture and Hardin’s strong 
bargaining led to a minor policy disagreement within the UK government. The Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) James Prior called for a reversal of British policy on 
agricultural levies “in the interests of the Americans” despite “our aim of moving towards EEC 
mechanism”.101 Furthermore, he argued that the UK should stick to its current agricultural 
support system until Britain signed the Treaty of Accession. This would avoid an Anglo-
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American conflict. Nield warned the committee chairman Whitelaw that “if we retreat...as the 
Minister of Agriculture proposes, the Community will see us retreating from their system under 
American pressure”, and therefore potentially harm the EC application.102 The Minister of Trade 
Michael Noble argued against Prior’s position, saying that the government should take steps to 
unbind the UK’s tariff commitments at GATT, which “would seriously embarrass the United 
States Administration in their efforts to contain domestic protectionist pressures”.103 Noble, 
Whitelaw, and Nield all believed that the US had an overall weak bargaining position because 
Nixon would not want to threaten the political Anglo-American relationship, nor the EC 
enlargement negotiations, over agricultural levies. The committee concluded that the UK would 
stick to their policy to switch the agricultural support system.        
The final Anglo-American ministerial discussions on agricultural levies in Washington 
D.C. in March 1971 showed that sections of the US administration remained disappointed and 
sceptical of the EC enlargement, its long term effects, and future Anglo-American relations. 
Thus, the UK had been injected into the US-EC trade disputes. Rippon, accompanied by Lord 
Cromer, the British Ambassador in Washington, met with representatives from the State 
Department, USDA, Department of Commerce, and White House. He argued that in the long 
term, as a member of the EC, Britain would seek to reform the CAP and EC trade policies, but 
gaining membership of the EC remained the priority in the short term. Hardin and Stans 
expressed strong displeasure with the UK’s policies and move towards the EC, criticising the 
UK’s timing and lack of regard for US domestic issues. Moreover, Stans expressed his 
“pessimism about the long term effects of the enlargement”.104 However, the White House had 
already decided to work out a compromise. Nixon’s special advisor on international economic 
affairs Peter Peterson, when meeting Rippon, focussed on the importance of “avoiding...sour 
relations between the two countries” and that the final negotiations could be concluded with a 
“carefully thought out public dialogue” that exploited the UK concession for US domestic 
purposes.
105
 Cromer warned that the presentation must not suggest that Britain would be “some 
kind of stalking horse inside the community”. Rippon said that “it would be better to attack us” 
than to suggest that Britain would attempt to alter the CAP as a member of the EC.
 106
 This 
displayed British anxieties about the perception of Anglo-American relations amongst the EC 
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members, particularly sensitive in early 1971 because of the likelihood of a meeting between 
Heath and Pompidou to resolve the remaining accession issues.
107
  
The final agreement dropped the minimum import price for 1971 to £3.50 per ton 
(down from £7 per ton). The minimum import price for 1972 would rise to no more than £6 per 
ton. Nixon’s strongly worded statement on the agreement focussed on the “substantial 
improvements” in the British proposals secured through his negotiations and that the 
administration would “use all appropriate means to safeguard our very important agricultural 
trade”.108 The USDA statement outlined the “benefits for US grain trade” obtained in the Anglo-
American negotiations.
109
 Heath’s statement to the House of Commons on 18 March 1971 
supported this, praising Nixon for the “importance attached by his government to their cereals” 
and support for the expansion of world agricultural trade.
110
 Thus the Washington and London 
public presentation of the levies agreement was geared towards indicating that the UK 
concessions benefited the US farming lobbies. Heath and Nixon exchanged personal letters on 
the matter. Heath said that he was “delighted” that they had reached an agreement which 
“accommodated our respective requirements”,111 while Nixon saw it is an episode of how “our 
Governments will be able to keep in mind our broad commonality of interests” as future 
problems arose as a result of UK membership of the EC.
112
 However, Sir Con O’Neill described 
the negotiations (in his official report on the EC accession) as “increasingly difficult and 
acrimonious discussions” and that it “soured the atmosphere of our relations”.113 Under the 
surface serious tensions existed between sections of the US administration and the UK 
government over the expansion of the EC and future Anglo-American relations.  
 
Commonwealth Association, Sugar, and Anglo-American Trade Relations 1970-1971 
 
A central component of the UK negotiation strategy for joining the EC involved 
preserving special trading links between Britain and the developing Commonwealth territories, 
known as Commonwealth association. The British government sought to defend 
Commonwealth interests in the EC negotiations because of the economic importance of trade to 
the UK economy and the need to support the developing Commonwealth territories, especially 
those which were part of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, due to run out in 1974. 
Moreover, the strength of UK domestic support for preserving Commonwealth trade from the 
Parliament, special interest groups, and public opinion posed a direct threat to the passing of the 
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European Communities Bill, and thus the government needed to gain special arrangements for 
the Commonwealth countries. This illustrated that Britain’s traditional trading partners 
continued to be important to the UK, both politically and economically, and thus did not signal 
a fundamental re-orientation of British foreign policy as sometimes portrayed in the 
historiography. However, the creation of a Commonwealth-EC trade system changed 
international trade relations, between the less developed Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries and the industrial economies. 
An association between the Commonwealth territories and the EC involved ‘reverse 
preferences’ – reciprocal discrimination required under the EC’s Yaoundé Convention, whereby 
the EC countries would gain preferences in the markets of the associated territories. This caused 
concern in the US government, which viewed this as a dangerous obstacle to the development 
of free trade, especially in the Caribbean, situated on the doorstep of the US.
114
 Thus another 
major trade dispute developed in Anglo-American relations during the EC enlargement 
negotiations, in which the US officially intervened in an attempt to have its interests taken into 
account. However, like with the negotiations over the UK’s agricultural levies, the importance 
of Anglo-American political and defence relations, and the Atlantic Alliance, prevented a 
significant breakdown. 
The UK Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe (chaired by Douglas-Home) 
investigated the Commonwealth issue and established the negotiating aims for the Brussels 
delegation.
115
 This turned out to be the most technically and politically complex issue during the 
entire negotiations because of the diversity of economic and political structures amongst the 
members of the Commonwealth and the different trade structures between the EC and the UK. 
The domestic political scene in all the countries and territories directly involved also 
complicated the issue. Interested parties ranged from the importing and exporting companies, 
the refineries, the farmers and workers, the unions, the politicians, and wider public opinion.      
Legal association to the EC could be negotiated in a number of ways: under Part IV 
(Articles 131-136) of the Treaty of Rome, which directly dealt with the association of overseas 
countries and territories; Part VI (Article 227: 4) of the Treaty of Rome, which allowed for the 
association of European territories (such as Cyprus and Gibraltar); and Part VI (Article 238) of 
the Treaty of Rome, which permitted special association (which the EC used in such cases as 
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Spain, Israel, Greece and Turkey).
116
  Finally, association could be established through the 
Yaoundé Convention.  
A summary of the results of the EC negotiations for the Commonwealth territories were 
as follows. Firstly, nine countries of the Commonwealth Preference Area (CPA) were excluded 
from gaining association to the EC - Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, 
Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. The Common External Tariff would be applied by the 
UK over a transitional period for these counties (from 1 January 1971). They were excluded 
because they were either developed countries (Canada, Australia and New Zealand) or their 
economies were less dependent on the British market (the Asian territories).
117
   
Secondly, although New Zealand found itself excluded from EC association for being a 
developed country, it also had special needs. In 1969, 90% of New Zealand butter and 80% of 
her cheese were exported to the UK market, which accounted for 16% of New Zealand’s export 
earnings.
118
 Therefore serious and complicated negotiations took place between the EC and the 
UK to safeguard these industries, which resulted in a six year transitional arrangement which 
guaranteed quantities of New Zealand cheese and butter imports before normal EC 
arrangements applied.
119
 The UK also remained a major importer of New Zealand lamb and 
wool, but UK government estimates suggested that this would not be affected by the normal EC 
arrangements for third countries. The New Zealand deal, as well as the transitional 
arrangements for the excluded developed countries and Asian territories, made no significant 
impact on Anglo-American trade relations, as they were transitional, designed to normalise 
trade between the EC and these territories.
120
      
Thirdly, all British dependent territories (apart from those in Europe and Hong Kong) 
were given association status under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.
121
 For the African territories 
this was a relatively straightforward process because the issue had been discussed during the 
application to join the EEC under Macmillan in 1961, when it was decided that the 
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Commonwealth territories with a similar economic structure to the 18 Africa territories already 
associated to the EC would be offered similar trading relations. Following the failure of the 
application in January 1963, the Council of Ministers issued a “Declaration of Intent” on 20 
July 1963 (at the signing of the first Yaoundé Convention) which upheld that agreement. The 
EC Commission reaffirmed this again in 1969. Following the opening of the UK negotiations 
(30 June 1970) the EC rapidly agreed to the association of the developing African 
Commonwealth countries (on 1 December 1970), and thus an example of how the Heath-led EC 
negotiations of 1961-1963 benefited the 1970 negotiations. However, the sugar producing 
British dependent territories had to wait until the EC dealt with the question of the 
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement separately before they were offered association, as discussed 
below.
122
     
Fourthly, the European territories were offered full association under Part VI (Article 
227: 4) of the Treaty of Rome, although the UK negotiated various opt-outs in the Treaty of 
Accession at the request of the territories.
123
 The Channel Islands and Isle of Man joined the EC 
customs territory - free trade arrangements in industrial and agricultural goods. But they opted 
out of other EC laws such as the free movement of labour and tax regulations, under Protocol 3 
of the Treaty of Accession. Gibraltar decided to opt out of a full association, via Article 28 of 
the Treaty of Accession, which excluded Value Added Tax (VAT), the CAP and the Common 
Commercial Policy, thus retaining their free port status. The EC’s rules on the free movement of 
labour were applied. The UK left out Cyprus and Malta in the negotiations because as 
independent European countries they could negotiate EC membership or association 
themselves. 
Finally, the independent Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian 
Ocean and the Pacific would be given the option to associate under the renewed Yaoundé 
Convention (scheduled for 31 January 1975 – after which it became known as the Lomé 
Convention) or to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the EC. After the UK accession (on 
1 January 1973) until the renegotiation of Yaoundé, the current trading arrangements between 
the UK and those Commonwealth countries remained in place.
124
   
The major Commonwealth issue in Anglo-American trade relations and the EC centred 
on the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) and the association of the Caribbean countries 
and territories. Signed on 21 December 1951 for eight years, extended year on year until 1974, 
Britain provided a market for a set quantity of sugar, at a set price (usually above the market 
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price), from Commonwealth territories.
125
 This exclusively covered raw sugar, from the stems 
of cane, grown only in sub-tropical countries, imported into the UK for refining. British colonial 
sugar cane preferences originated in the mercantilist trade of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries as Britain steadily expanded its presence in the Caribbean. Between 1703 and 1814, 
colonial sugar was England’s number one import.126 But preferences for colonial sugar were 
abandoned in 1854 during a period of increased free trade policies. Meanwhile, a new 
commercial form of sugar discovered in 1747, taken from the roots of beet grown in northern, 
temperate countries, created self-sufficiency in Europe for the growing and refining of beet 
sugar by the twentieth century. By 1913, continental sugar beet accounted for 80% of UK 
supplies (imported mainly from Germany, Austria, and France).
127
 This caused economic ruin in 
the British Caribbean, with bankrupt West India merchants, abandoned plantations, and high 
levels of unemployment.
128
 UK Commonwealth sugar cane preferences were revived following 
the First World War, set at the 1932 Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa, due to disruption in 
supplies and unpredictable prices. The UK then established bulk purchasing of raw cane sugar 
from the Commonwealth during the Second World War to once again avoid high market prices 
and supply disruption. This created two sugar markets – Commonwealth raw sugar cane 
(mainly imported into the UK) and a continental European sugar beet market. Post-1945 
decolonisation and colonial reform created the desire to improve the economic and social 
conditions of the developing territories, as well as maintaining a stable sugar cane market, for 
both the UK and the sugar exporters. It also kept trade within the sterling area, which helped 
with the UK’s post-war monetary problems. This led to the establishment of the CSA.129  
Heath’s objective to protect key Commonwealth trading links in the UK accession 
treaty was because of its economic importance, in terms of monetary volume and industrial 
structure, to both the UK and the Commonwealth. From 1945-1970, Britain’s economy 
underwent a change in trading partners, away from the Commonwealth and East of Suez to 
Western Europe and the US. This can be accounted for by the vast increase in Britain’s 
manufacturing production, which found a market in the rich developed countries of Europe and 
the US, as well as an increase in agricultural production, thus reducing the import of foodstuff 
from the developing Commonwealth countries.
130
 As late as 1969, the volume of imports and 
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exports between Britain and the Commonwealth continued to be a major aspect of trade for the 
UK and Commonwealth economies. As table 6 below indicates, both imports and exports to and 
from the Commonwealth still accounted for over one fifth of all UK trade, despite a major 
decline from 1951. Preserving these trading links was important to the UK economy and thus a 
key aspect of the UK’s EC application.131  
 
Table 6:  
British Exports to and Imports: the Commonwealth 1951-1969 (% of total £ million)
132
 
Column A Column B Column C Column D Column E 
 1951 1961 1969 
Change in share of total 
1951-1969 (%) 
Export 50.5% 33% 21.8% - 56.8% 
Import 39.9% 31.5% 23.2% - 41.7% 
 
Moreover, many of the developing Commonwealth territories were highly economically 
dependent on the UK market, and thus formed a part of the UK’s general aid policies. As table 7 
below indicates, the principal Commonwealth producers of sugar were highly dependent, in 
terms of employment and as a share of exports, on the sugar cane market, most of which 
operated through the CSA. UK officials divided the territories into four groups of dependence 
levels. The top group, labelled “virtual monocultures”, included Mauritius, Fiji, Barbados, St. 
Kitts, and British Honduras, all of which (as illustrated in column B of  table 7 below) were 
between 50% to over 90% dependent on sugar in terms of export value. The second group, 
classified as “heavily dependent”, included Guyana, Swaziland, and Jamaica. Officials believed 
that the possibility of economic diversification in the territories in these two groups remained 
small and that “the sugar industry may be regarded as a matter of life and death for them”.133 
The Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe supported this view and noted that 
“there might be serious unrest” if jobs were not protected.134 The other territories were only 
moderately or scarcely dependent on sugar exports (such as India). Heath wanted 
Commonwealth association with the EC in order to avoid economic, political, and social 
damage to the principal sugar exporters.   
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Table 7: Dependence on Sugar Cane by the Principal Commonwealth Producers
135
  
Column A Column B Column C Column D 
Territories 
Sugar as a share of total 
export value (1967) 
Total employed in sugar 
(1965-1967)
136
 
Share of total 
workforce (%) 
West 
Indies 
Barbados 90.5 % 31,800 19.6 % 
Guyana 32.6 % 21,000 10.5 % 
Jamaica 22.5 % 46,500 10% 
St. Kitts 92.1 % 4,950 58% 
Trinidad 5.0 % 23,600 12% 
British Honduras  53 % 4,500 12.6% 
Mauritius 92.5 % 103,000 40% 
Fiji 69.3 % 27,000 30% 
Swaziland 24 % 11,500 22% 
India 1% 20,225,000  4% 
 
The CSA also created a UK structural dependence on raw sugar cane which added to 
the economic and political argument for preserving Commonwealth trading links within the EC. 
But it also directly conflicted with the EC sugar beet market. The UK sugar industry in the 
1970s comprised three major refining companies. Tate & Lyle in 1973 had a 54% market share, 
41% of which depended on raw Commonwealth sugar cane. Manbre & Garton’s 16% market 
share depended entirely on the CSA, while the British Sugar Cooperation focussed on home 
grown beet (26% market share). The raw sugar cane refiners employed 8,750 people with assets 
of over £50 million in 1973.
137
 The majority of factories were set up for the production of sugar 
cane which required a different refining process than that for sugar beet. The Ministerial 
Committee on the Approach to Europe noted that the UK sugar cane refiners in the short term 
“would suffer from a marked reduction in raw sugar imports”.138 Thus the structure of the 1970 
UK market revolved around the CSA, which in turn led to political backing from pressure 
groups and politicians for Commonwealth trade. However, the original six countries of the EC 
were producing more sugar beet than the entire British West Indies and the Caribbean 
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production of raw cane by 1970.
139
 A strong sugar beet lobby developed within EC politics. On 
1 July 1968 the EC introduced sugar regulation into the CAP (due for renewal on 30 June 1975) 
which protected the EC’s sugar beet market and would entirely shut out Commonwealth raw 
sugar cane.
140
 This reveals the direct conflict between the CSA and the CAP system of sugar 
beet. Nevertheless, the UK had key economic interests involved in the import of 
Commonwealth sugar cane. Thus it formed a key part of the UK’s objectives, which 
complicated the EC negotiations, the renegotiation of the Yaoundé Convention, and caused 
serious tension in Anglo-American trade relations.
141
   
While economic factors provided sufficient reason for the UK government to pursue 
Commonwealth association, domestic politics made the protection of the developing CSA 
territories in the Treaty of Accession essential to the survival of the Heath government. The 
failure to pass the European Communities Bill in parliament would result in a general election. 
As analysed in chapter 1, Heath entered power in 1970 with a small majority in the House of 
Commons which strengthened the legislature and party fringes. A significant number of 
Conservative MPs were sceptical or totally opposed to membership of the EC, and thus Heath 
needed the support of pro-European Labour and Liberal MPs to pass his EC legislation. 
Moreover, as all three party leaderships supported the principle of joining the EC, the domestic 
battle centred on the actual terms of entry, of which the Commonwealth question remained key 
(as it had in the 1961-1963 negotiations).
142
 The government also faced pressure from special 
interest groups, such as the Commonwealth Sugar Exporters Association, headed by Lord 
Campbell of Eskan (Jock Campbell) from 1950 to 1984, who played a key role in the 
establishment of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and sought to protect the Caribbean 
countries in the EC negotiations.
143
 
Public opinion had a long standing support for Commonwealth association which both 
added weight to and influenced parliamentary opinion. In September 1961, 72% of those 
questioned thought that joining the EEC should include protection for Commonwealth trade.
144
 
By February 1969, 54% and 31% said that it was “very important” and “important” for Britain 
to have a close relationship with the Commonwealth – 85% in total.145 Following the 
publication of the EC White Paper in July 1971, only 1% agreed with the view that joining the 
EC would be “good in the long run for the Commonwealth” while 54% believed it would have a 
negative influence on UK-Commonwealth relations, significantly higher than on any of 
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Britain’s other relationships, including the US.146 This indicated long-term public support for 
Britain’s traditional Commonwealth trade and relationships. The government noted the sensitive 
domestic political situation at the Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe, observing 
that “public opinion in this country would be very concerned that we should not come to an 
agreement with the Six which would cause serious damage to the interests of the 
Commonwealth sugar producers”.147 Therefore, members of Parliament from all parties, public 
opinion, and the government considered and expected Commonwealth association to be a 
fundamental component of the terms of entry.     
In early Anglo-American negotiations the US expressed concern about Commonwealth 
association and warned of the possibility of a US intervention in the negotiations, while 
continuing to support Britain’s overall objective to join the EC. Abe Katz, a key State 
Department official dealing with Atlantic political and economic affairs, warned the FCO prior 
to the re-opening of the accession that the US would “intervene from time to time” with the UK 
and the EC “about specific points in the arrangements as they emerged”, a major concern for 
UK officials and ministers.
148
 Ten days before the opening of the EC negotiations, the British 
Ambassador in Washington John Freeman also advised the new Heath government on Anglo-
American relations and EC policy, reporting that “objections are heard against the association 
agreements with former dependent territories...of the Caribbean” and that “we are likely to 
become...the recipients of US representations”.149 For the first Nixon-Heath meeting at 
Chequers in October 1970, both sides were briefed on Commonwealth association, with Rippon 
urging Heath to raise the issue of “US opposition to the Community’s preferential 
agreements...important to us in meeting African and Caribbean Commonwealth interests”.150 
But EC matters were left aside for discussions on superpower diplomacy, and these early 
exchanges focussed on maintaining broad Anglo-American cooperation.  
At the Washington D.C. meeting on 17 December 1970, the discussions displayed an 
Anglo-American understanding on the EC Commonwealth issue. Britain’s EC application 
dominated the early Nixon-Heath exchanges, especially on the Mills Bill and agricultural levies. 
Heath updated Nixon on the current state of the negotiations, saying that “we should face 
problems also as regards sugar and New Zealand dairy products” from the EC members. 
Douglas-Home informed Rogers that for “members of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, 
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principally the Caribbean countries...we would have to ensure that satisfactory arrangements 
were made”. Nixon put pressure on the UK over the introduction of agricultural levies, and 
sought to use the Congressional Mills Bill as a bargaining tool in order to have US interests 
taken into account on a bilateral level. He gave no indication of a US intervention into the EC 
enlargement negotiations, and told Heath that there would be “political damage to Europe as a 
result of the loss of British leadership” if Britain did not join the EC and thus backed the UK’s 
overall application.
151
 Rogers said that the US had adopted a policy of “quiet support, without 
publicity”, and so the US would pursue a hands-off approach to the negotiations.152 The 
Washington meeting ended with unresolved agricultural trade problems which caused tension in 
the economic Anglo-American relationship, but it indicated an acknowledgment from both sides 
that the UK needed to seek Commonwealth association.         
However, just a few weeks after, on 30 December 1970, the US administration, through 
the State Department, officially tabled its objections on Commonwealth association to the UK 
and the EC – the intervention that UK officials had long feared, and thus causing alarm. The 
State Department sent instructions to the US embassy in London which then reported to FCO 
officials and the EC Commission that the US administration “had strong objections to the offer 
of associate status” to the Commonwealth on the grounds that it would “enlarge an already 
discriminatory trading bloc and would be a backward step in liberalisation of world trade” and 
that the US regarded it as contrary to GATT regulations. Stanley Cleveland of the US Embassy 
said that the message was to “put American views on record” with the UK and the EC. 
However, there “would be no American campaign”.153 On 1 December 1970 the EC had already 
agreed to the association of the African Commonwealth. This action threatened the UK’s 
ongoing discussion with the EC on Commonwealth association for the sugar producing 
territories in the Caribbean. But it did not override the US political support for UK membership 
of the EC expressed by Nixon to Heath in Washington on 17 December 1970.            
Many of the Caribbean Commonwealth territories petitioned the UK government to 
take the CSA into account during the negotiations, which added to the case for Commonwealth 
association.
154
 Rippon visited the Caribbean from 7-19 February 1971, meeting government 
ministers, sugar producers, and union leaders to discuss the implications of Britain’s entry into 
the EC. In Jamaica, Prime Minister Hugh Shearer expressed concern that the “British might not 
press the issue of Commonwealth sugar” because of the “increasing importance of her trade 
with Western Europe as compared to the Commonwealth”. Rippon replied that “the government 
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stood firmly on the assurances...given” but also highlighted the “difficulty arising from the 
American attitude” and that it would be “useful” if the Caribbean countries would make it 
“publicly clear that they wanted the offer to be made”. This would be “a vital bargaining 
point”.155 
Similar opinions appeared in Rippon’s meetings with the other Caribbean territories. In 
Guyana, Dr. Ptolemy Reid, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture, in charge of 
EC-Guyana matters, told the UK government that “it was impossible to change the pattern of 
agriculture in Guyana” and that they were going through “a period of anxiety and 
uncertainty”.156 The Trinidad and Tobago Minister of External and West Indian Affairs 
Kamaluddin Mohammed argued that unless the UK could “secure safeguards for the primary 
products” of Caribbean countries, then “chaos and confusion would result”.157 Robert 
Bradshaw, the Premier of St. Kitts, stated that “the economy of the West Indies was designed by 
the British to serve the interests of the metropolitan power. Britain’s responsibility was clear”.158 
The Prime Minister of Barbados, Errol Barrow, also defended the CSA arguing that “the sugar 
industry was vital to the Caribbean economy and affected it at all levels”. Rippon replied that 
Britain was “at one with the Caribbean on this issue” and that sugar “was not just an economic 
problem but very much a social and human one”.159 Rippon’s visit to the Caribbean in February 
1971 pointed out the importance of sugar to the region and that Britain intended to fulfil its 
pledge on Commonwealth association, despite objections from the US and conflict with the 
CAP sugar regime.  
 At the Anglo-American discussions in Washington, D.C. on 8 March 1971 Rippon 
focussed primarily on highlighting the political threat to the Caribbean if the UK failed to 
achieve Commonwealth association. Hardin and Stans expressed their opposition to EC 
preferences and Commonwealth association. Rippon replied that the EC negotiations “would 
not be helped by American pressure by means of formal approaches to the EEC to 
stop...preferences”, and that the US intervention on 30 December 1970 jeopardised the process. 
He also said that the UK government “were not prepared to opt out of our obligations to the 
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Caribbean”. 160 Nathaniel Samuels (Deputy Under-Secretary for Economic Affairs, State 
Department) told Rippon that “the prospect of these countries granting Europe reverse 
preferences caused the US real problems”, and expressed strong State Department opposition to 
long term association.
161
 Rippon then asked Kissinger if “the Americans would...be willing to 
provide an alternative market” and that if Britain did not support the Caribbean Commonwealth 
then “there would be a severe risk of the United States finding seven or eight new Cubas at her 
back door”.162 He also told Peterson that without association “unemployment would get out of 
hand and they might become economic slums in the backyard of the United States”.163 The 
meetings, which left the issue unresolved, showed short term strain on Anglo-American trading 
relations.  
However, on 26 April 1971 Samuels visited the UK and informed Rippon that “much 
thought had recently been given” to Rippon’s recent visit and the issue of the Caribbean 
Commonwealth. While the US administration “did not like reverse preferences in any shape or 
form”, the US “did not want any arrangement which would leave them with the responsibility of 
picking up the bill”.164 Thus the US dropped their opposition to Commonwealth association 
during the period of the EC enlargement negotiations. The Nixon-Heath meeting in Bermuda on 
20 December 1971 emphasised that political and defence factors were paramount in the US 
decision on association. Nixon told Heath that “he hoped that the British government would 
maintain in the Caribbean area an effective presence in both political and economic terms”. 
Although he was “aware of the problem of reverse preferences”, the US government thought 
that “a group of black republics in the Caribbean area would be very dangerous; one only had to 
consider Haiti as an example”.165 In fact, Nixon had initiated an NSC study into the Caribbean 
area on 16 February 1971 to investigate “increased Soviet military activities in the region”, the 
growth of “black nationalism” and the threat of the Caribbean territories “regularizing trade and 
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/ or diplomatic relations with Cuba”.166 Therefore the political and defence cooperation between 
Britain and the US in the Caribbean region took priority over the EC’s trade problems.      
 While the US dropped their opposition to Commonwealth association, the UK still 
needed to reach a final agreement with the EC for the Caribbean sugar producing territories. On 
10 May 1970, the French led the Council of Ministers into offering various forms of association 
to the Caribbean Commonwealth (as outlined above). The minimalist statement committed the 
EC to “safeguard” the economies dependent “on the export of primary produce, in particular 
sugar”.167 A key meeting between Heath and Pompidou in Paris from 20-21 May 1971 aimed to 
resolve in principle the main political, economic, and defence aspects of the accession.  On the 
Yaoundé Convention, Pompidou said that the French considered it important to “protect the 
interests of all the underdeveloped countries, whether in Africa, in the West Indies or 
elsewhere”, while Heath said that “it should be possible to deal with this problem within the 
system of preferences and aid”.168 The Anglo-French joint communiqué confirmed their views 
in public.
169
 They agreed on the Caribbean sugar question because of the desire to help the less 
developed countries. Moreover, the full range of commodities from the Commonwealth 
countries, not just sugar, could benefit the EC in the long term.  
The UK government also managed to secure the agreement of the Commonwealth 
territories and the UK Parliament, a necessary step. This showed the importance of UK 
domestic politics and Commonwealth relations in the passing of the European Communities 
Bill. While the Commonwealth dependent territories were offered direct association to the EC 
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, the independent Commonwealth sugar producing 
countries only received a paper pledge from the EC to take part in the 1973 renegotiation of the 
Yaoundé Convention and that sugar exports would be protected. Rippon told the House of 
Commons on 17 May 1971 that “this text amounts to more than a declaration of intention. It is 
both a specific and moral commitment”.170 Heath also reassured the House of Commons on 24 
May 1971 on his return from Paris that the EC agreement on sugar association would be firm.
171
 
Thus the government attached their weight to the EC declaration and signalled that they would 
fulfil the obligation. 
Initially, pressure groups and Commonwealth countries were sceptical of the 
declaration of intent, but the government convinced domestic opinion makers, which in turn led 
to the legislative success. On 19 May 1971, Rippon met with Lord Campbell and Tate & Lyle to 
build support for the sugar agreement. Although Campbell had been “encouraged” by Rippon’s 
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statement in the House, he believed that it would be difficult “negotiating in the face of a big 
beet surplus. The French would find great difficulty in persuading their producers”, and thus he 
wanted a more comprehensive agreement in the Treaty of Accession. John Lyle also expressed 
concern about an increase in EC beet production, just as Tate & Lyle were embarking on a 
refining investment programme. Rippon said that it was “a most bankable assurance” and that if 
problems developed in the Yaoundé renegotiation then “we would have to turn nasty”, which 
once again indicated the government’s commitment to the sugar exporters.172  
At Lancaster House in London on 2 and 3 of June 1971 Rippon held negotiations with 
the Commonwealth sugar producers, with the backing of Tate & Lyle and Lord Campbell, who 
“accepted this settlement as satisfactory and constructive for the developing countries”, a key 
intervention. Speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Commonwealth, Robert Lightbourne 
(Jamaican Minister of Trade and Industry) strongly demanded a clarification of the EC 
declaration of intent. They distrusted the French and believed that the EC could back out of the 
unspecific formula offered to the UK. The conference resulted in a communiqué, which stated 
that the UK government and Commonwealth countries regarded the EC offer “as a firm 
assurance of a secure and continuing market in the enlarged community on fair terms for the 
quantities of sugar covered by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement in respect of...all 
developing member countries” – it then listed the countries involved.173 The UK government 
deposited the communiqué with the EC Commission and circulated a paper on sugar 
association, to make clear the UK government’s intentions.174  
Nevertheless, those in the UK parliament opposed to EC membership attacked the EC 
Bill for not taking care of the Caribbean Commonwealth. Moreover, the official Labour Party 
leadership adopted the slogan “no entry on Tory terms”. At the first reading of the accession 
terms on 28 October 1971 – a declaratory motion on the principle of entry – Wilson accused 
Heath of showing “his total unconcern, his contempt even, for the modern Commonwealth”. He 
went on to state that “I regard the government’s deal over sugar a betrayal”.175 The Haslemere 
Declaration Group, a pressure group against exploitation in the developing world, circulated a 
pamphlet on the sell-out over Commonwealth sugar, while the New Statesman released its own 
version of the EC Bill, stating that the EC sugar formula “was not the ‘bankable assurance’ for 
which Mr. Rippon has asked”, which added to domestic opposition to the government’s terms 
of entry.
176
 However, with the backing of Lord Campbell, the sugar industry, and the 
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Commonwealth countries, and the desire to take Britain into the EC, Heath won the vote by 112 
(356-244), while he narrowly carried the final bill on 13 July 1972 (301-284).               
The nine members of the enlarged EC and fifty-five ACP states started negotiations on 
the renewal of Yaoundé in July 1973, and signed the Lomé Convention 18 months later on 28 
February 1975 in Togo.
177
 The protection of the Commonwealth sugar exporters in the Lomé 
Convention actually conflicted with the EC sugar beet regime established in 1968. It was more 
in the interest of the developing countries than the EC countries, and thus represented a major 
breakthrough in trade relations between the developed and less developed economies.
178
 Lomé 
also abolished EC reverse preferences, thus reducing conflict in Anglo-American and EC trade 
relations in the built up to the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations (1973-1979). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Anglo-American trade relations frequently became dominated by US-EC trade issues 
during Britain’s EC application negotiations and subsequent membership. While it can be seen 
that the long-term importance of political and defence relations in the context of the Cold War 
and the Atlantic Alliance overrode the short-term EC enlargement problems of agricultural 
support and Commonwealth association, this chapter shows that British membership of the EC 
created a new dimension in Anglo-American trade relations.     
The Mills Bill and other Congressional protectionist legislation on the US domestic 
scene failed to pass into law but it indicated serious problems in the international trading and 
monetary system, representing a component of the developing US-EC trade clash. The 
dwindling US trade surplus and the development of an overall balance of payments deficit 
created a fundamental disequilibrium in the international economy, which led towards the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system, as seen in the next chapter. Both the US and EC had 
unfair trading practices which threatened the pursuit of free trade. In the US this resulted in the 
Williams Commission’s investigation into long term trade affairs, as well highlighting the issue 
to EC countries and the UK, which helped in the movement towards the Tokyo Round of GATT 
negotiations. In Anglo-American trade relations Congressional protectionism provided a major 
source of tension.   
The negotiations over the UK’s introduction of agricultural levies were largely a 
medium-term problem in Anglo-American relations, during late 1970 and early 1971, while the 
UK negotiated its entry into the EC. The trade dispute was driven by the Heath government’s 
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desire to join the EC and general economic policy, and the domestic pressure placed on the US 
administration from the Congress and farming groups to protect US agriculture. Economically 
the UK switch in agricultural support would have little immediate impact on US trade figures. 
However, the US viewed this as a component of the UK joining the EC’s agricultural 
protectionist system, which brought the UK into the long-term US-EC trade disagreements on 
agriculture. Moreover, the discussions were protracted and acrimonious, which harmed relations 
between Britain and the US during the EC enlargement negotiations.  
Meanwhile Commonwealth association to the EC created a new long term conflict in 
US-EC trade relations, by quadrupling the number of developing territories with special EC 
trading agreements, to the disadvantage of US exporters. This grew out of the UK’s long 
standing political and economic ties to the Commonwealth territories which ensured that it 
played a key role in the Heath government’s move towards EC membership. Moreover, UK 
domestic support for association threatened the passing of the EC Bill, Heath’s ultimate aim in 
government. Just like agricultural levies, it caused a medium-term rift in Heath-Nixon economic 
relations. It also led to the direct US intervention in an EC negotiations issue. Eventually the US 
administration accepted it as a necessary part in the process of the UK joining the EC, which 
they believed would lead to a more Atlantic, outward looking, organisation.   
But in the future the system of preferences for third countries would be major issue in 
US-EC trade negotiations. Moreover, other trade problems existed beyond agriculture which 
would develop in the long-term – industrial preferences, technological collaboration, 
standardisation, and ‘buy European’ procurement policies. Moreover, there was the question of 
the future relationship of the EFTA neutrals and the EC, which requires further historical 
investigation. While these were not directly part of the UK’s negotiations to join the EC, it 
provides an example of Anglo-American relations becoming involved in wider EC trade issues. 
The trade negotiations analysed in this chapter represented a more obvious way in 
which British membership of the EC altered Anglo-American economic relations. However, 
economic “Europeanisation” of Anglo-American trade relations did not mean a fundamental 
shift had taken place in economic, political, and defence relations and policy, which continued 
to be important in bilateral relations. It represented a more subtle shift and adjustment to 
international changes. 
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Chapter 5: 
Anglo-American Economic Relations: 
Part II - Monetary Affairs and the EC Enlargement (1969-1974) 
 
This chapter looks at the impact of the EC enlargement and the unravelling of the 
Bretton Woods system on Anglo-American monetary affairs. It also reveals the connection 
between economics and international political power, the contradictions between national and 
international economic objectives, and government management of financial crisis.  
The chapter firstly argues that Britain’s negotiations and entry into the EC altered the 
status of sterling and thus the Anglo-American monetary relationship, which subsequently 
became influenced by wider US-EC monetary relations. In the Bretton Woods monetary system 
1945-1971, both UK sterling and the US dollar held an international currency role. However, 
the international role of sterling, and its connection to the dollar, directly conflicted with the EC 
objective of currency integration and equality amongst the EC members. The EC took major 
steps towards the development of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 1969-1970. 
During the negotiation period, the UK made a commitment to run-down the sterling balances 
and terminate its international role, a key issue in gaining French support for British 
membership. However, in the long term, Britain continued to use sterling after the adoption of 
the European single currency in 1999, retaining a degree of separation from the EC monetary 
system, and thus the position of sterling remains important in Britain’s external relations, 
including the Anglo-American alliance.    
The second part of this chapter argues that Nixon’s New Economic Policy (NEP) and 
the monetary crisis of August 1971 caused major friction in Anglo-American and Atlantic 
cooperation. Tough negotiations and bargaining took place between Britain, the US, the EC, 
Japan, and other major economies between August and December 1971 to resolve the crisis. 
This marked one of the low points in the Heath-Nixon relationship, yet both sides revived 
Anglo-American cooperation because of the long term political, defence, and economic 
importance that each side attached to the alliance in the context of the Cold War. While the 
collapse of Bretton Woods paved the way for the growing importance of European and Asian 
currencies, the EC’s first substantial steps towards the creation of EMU in 1970 were seriously 
obstructed and delayed by the fluctuations of currencies and monetary instability caused by the 
NEP, and ultimately the US dollar remained the dominant force in international monetary 
relations, just as sterling significantly declined in status. 
There are a growing number of recent studies touching on monetary and economic 
relations during the Nixon era. Niklas Rossbach’s recent study of the Heath-Nixon era argued 
that the monetary crisis of 1971 marked “the end of the economic special relationship”.1 The 
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collapse of Bretton Woods and Britain’s entry into the EC actually led to a gradual change in 
the nature of the traditional economic relationship, both in monetary and trade affairs, rather 
than a dramatic break from the past. Political and defence relations also naturally evolved 
through this period of change but there continued to be a strong Anglo-American alliance, 
independently from the EC. This chapter supplements the growing debate on 1970s monetary 
relations, specifically looking at the Anglo-American and EC enlargement aspects.
2
  
 
____________________ 
   
The Bretton Woods Monetary System, 1945-1971 
 
 The post-war monetary system of the Western economic powers, worked out at Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire in 1944, featured a gold-exchange standard and fixed exchange rate. 
Bretton Woods sought to establish collective inter-governmental management of the monetary 
system and to prevent national, unilateral currency actions, perceived by Anglo-American 
policy makers to be a potential threat to free trade and growth as witnessed in the inter-war, 
Great Depression era. The system formed a key component of US, Western European, and 
Anglo-American cooperation, and thus a major aspect of the Cold War, facilitated by the 
institutions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), and GATT.   
In the Bretton Woods creation the convertibility of the US dollar into gold at the price 
of $35 an ounce provided the basis of the fixed exchange rate system. Thus the system had two 
international acceptable assets to sell and buy currency at a guaranteed value – gold, and as a 
convertible substitute, the US dollar. The British pound sterling also operated as a reserve 
currency through the Sterling Area, consisting of mainly Commonwealth and British dependant 
territories that either used sterling or pegged their currencies to sterling, and retained reserves / 
balances of sterling, although it was not backed by gold, but valued against the dollar. This 
system lasted until Nixon’s NEP on 15 August 1971, which suspended the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold. Although known as the “Nixon shock” – and the unilateral and far-reaching 
nature of the announcement was a surprise – Bretton Woods had fundamental flaws, with 
recurring monetary crises since its creation. The disintegration of Bretton Woods was not a 
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sudden reversal of US foreign economic policy, nor an inevitable outcome, but the result of a 
gradual erosion of transatlantic confidence in the system and government policies to change the 
system.    
The two structural flaws in the system were liquidity and adjustment. Bretton Woods 
depended on the supply of gold (liquidity) matching the growth of world demand for it. If gold 
reserves were deficient or excessive, there would be disequilibrium in the system by having an 
either overvalued or undervalued fixed exchange rate. The failure to adjust or correct the 
disequilibrium caused instability. After the war, the US had large supplies of gold which 
guaranteed and provided confidence in the US dollar’s convertibility. In 1950, of the 31,096 
metric tonnes of fine gold in the world, the US possessed 20,279, 65% of world supplies.
3
 
However, the US surplus of gold and a positive trade balance meant a deficit and lack of 
liquidity elsewhere in the world, preventing growth, which became known as the “dollar gap”. 
The US embarked on a program of fuelling the world economy with dollars in the 1950s, a 
continuation of the 1947-1951 Marshall Plan, which saw an outflow of US dollars (and in turn, 
gold). This led to the rapid expansion of trade, production, and world growth, which in turn 
required an expansion of monetary reserves. But the mining of gold could not keep pace with 
world growth, resulting in a world gold shortage by 1960. On top of this, US holdings of gold 
also fell throughout the 1960s, from 65% of world supplies in 1950, to just 27% in 1968.
4
 As a 
substitute central banks used the US dollar as a reserve asset, or in other words the dollar was 
considered to be “as good as gold”. In order for a national currency to act as an international 
reserve currency, that country must run a liquidity balance of payments deficit in order to 
supply monetary demands. Thus the 1950s “dollar gap” became the 1960s “dollar glut” – the 
accumulation of dollars outside of the US.
 5
               
 The US liquidity balance of payments deficit revealed a fundamental flaw in the Bretton 
Woods system, known as the “Triffin Dilemma”. Robert Triffin, a Yale University economist, 
and a former member of the Federal Reserve (1942-1946) and IMF (1946-1948), argued before 
the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on 28 October 1960 that the functioning of the 
Bretton Woods system “requires an expanding pool of world monetary reserves and 
international liquidity”. However, this situation “is bound to undermine, more and more 
dangerously as time goes on, the international liquidity position of the currencies used as 
reserves by other countries”, which will result in “increasing vulnerability to the world 
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monetary superstructure”.6 Thus, the US needed to supply the world with liquidity in order to 
support growth, resulting in a liquidity balance of payments deficit. But in the long term the 
deficit and over supply of US dollars would undermine the value of the US dollar and fixed 
exchange rates, and it would cease to be accepted as a reserve currency. 
 The 1960s “dollar glut” and the gold shortage resulted in an overvalued fixed exchange 
rate, whereby the price of gold in the London and Zurich free markets was higher than the $35 
an ounce established at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, which thus required an adjustment. 
There were several possible solutions to this problem: (1) the creation of a world currency or 
alternative reserve currencies; (2) an adjustment of parities, through devaluation and 
revaluation; (3) a reduction in US spending; (4) gold price regulation.  
On the first point, John Maynard Keynes, leader of the British delegation at Bretton 
Woods in 1944, originally proposed the creation of a world currency, called the Bancor. 
However, this was overruled by the US government in favour of a US dollar and gold system 
because it provided them with monetary and political power. In 1969 the IMF created an 
international exchange reserve called Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to help relieve pressure 
on the dollar and gold price. However, implemented too late, this failed to eradicate the liquidity 
and adjustment problem.   
Secondly, the US could devalue the dollar. But this would undermine the view that the 
dollar was “as good as gold”, and could thus cause a run on the dollar and lead to the collapse of 
the system. At the opposite end, the surplus countries, such as Germany and Japan, could 
revalue their currencies towards the dollar to correct the disequilibrium, but this would hurt their 
competitive export advantage, and so they were reluctant to adjust their parities.  
Thirdly, the US could reduce government expenditure at home and abroad, increase 
taxes, reduce income and employment, and implement other deflationary polices in order to 
improve its balance of payments position. But these politically unpopular policies on the US 
domestic front failed to materialise on a substantial level. Furthermore, a US liquidity surplus 
would prevent world growth as outlined in the “Triffin Dilemma”.  
Fourthly, gold price regulation was in fact established. On 1 November 1961, the US 
and seven European Central Banks – the UK, West Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland – founded the Gold Pool, in which targeted selling and buying of 
gold sought to maintain the price of $35 an ounce, which collapsed in March 1968 due to 
insufficient supplies of gold and currency speculation. As a replacement the US government 
separated the private gold market from the Central Bank gold market in March 1968, which 
maintained the price of $35 an ounce between governments only. Thus, despite the structural 
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flaws, the international community sought to uphold the Bretton Woods fixed exchange 
system.
7
   
 
Sterling, EMU, and Anglo-American Relations 1970-1973  
 
Between 1969 and 1970 the EC took major steps in developing the idea of a single 
European currency which altered EC politics, EC-American relations, and the UK’s application 
to enter the EC. In the historiography of Britain and European integration monetary issues have 
received less attention compared to the political aspects. Catherine Schenk argued that the 
weakness of sterling led to France’s rejection of Britain’s applications to join the EEC in 1963 
and 1967, while many historians take the view that politics trumped monetary factors.
8
 This 
chapter argues that the ending of sterling’s role as a reserve currency proved to be a key issue 
determining the success of the Heath government’s application to join the EC, not on the 
political problem of appearing as an Atlantic ‘Trojan horse’ in the EC. John Young’s study on 
Britain and the EC argued that the Heath-Pompidou summit on 20-21 May 1971 was a key step 
in sorting out Anglo-French issues on sterling and the Commonwealth, but that “many details 
remain unclear”. Documents relating to this meeting have now been released and are discussed 
here.
9
    
The first major attempt to create EMU started in February 1969 with the “Barre report” 
of the European Commission, the EC’s executive body.10 It argued that the “Community cannot 
stop at the point which it has now reached” with a customs union, the CAP, and the free 
movement of goods and services, which were all strongly influenced by external factors, such as 
the international monetary system and national economic policies. It called for the 
“coordination” of “economic policies” between the member states and the development of 
“Community machinery for monetary cooperation” in order to avoid “serious instability” and 
undermine the European integration project.
11
 At the Hague Summit on 2 December 1969 the 
EC adopted the Barre report, as well as opening the door to the enlargement of the EC.
12
 Thus, 
the EC classified monetary union as a major objective and vital for the progress of European 
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integration, while stating its intent to increase the size of the EC and its economic power in the 
monetary system.   
 In 1970 the EC set out a major plan for EMU and opened enlargement negotiations with 
the UK, the Republic of Ireland, and Denmark, which pushed forward the European integration 
project. On 4 March 1970 the Commission released its “Second Barre Plan”, arguing for three 
stages in the development of EMU, firstly concentrating on preliminaries (1970-1971), then 
preparation (1972-1975), followed by the definitive establishment of EMU (1976-1978). 
Importantly, the first stage focussed on aligning currency rates. The report stated that “the 
principle of flexible exchange rates must...be ruled out; what is needed is a system of stable 
rates”, which thus fitted in with the Bretton Woods system of fixed rates, although the EC 
currencies would still need to be brought closer together in some form of “tunnel” – a 
mechanism to narrow currency fluctuations within specific margins.
13
 These initial plans were 
then worked on by the Werner Group – named after the chairman, the Luxembourg Prime 
Minister Pierre Werner – which produced the Werner Plan on 8 October 1970, the first agreed 
blue print for EMU. It also proposed a series of gradual stages, possibly resulting in a single 
currency by 1978-1980.
14
 These steps on EMU and the enlargement reignited the EC integration 
movement and the new EC monetary identity introduced a new dimension to EC-American 
relations.  
 The international reserve role of sterling gave the UK a special position in the global 
monetary system. It contradicted the idea of EMU and thus the EC’s pursuit of monetary union 
had an influence on the UK’s membership application. The development of an international 
sterling system originated in the 19
th
 century amongst mainly British colonial territories which 
either used local versions of sterling currency, traded in sterling, or invested their surplus 
liquidity and raised capital in London using sterling. In 1931 the UK abandoned the gold 
standard which led a large number of countries, and most of the Commonwealth, to peg their 
own currencies to sterling. Then at the beginning of the Second World War the UK introduced 
exchange controls to protect the external value of sterling, thus creating the “Sterling Area” (or 
Sterling bloc).
15
 Due to these historical and economic reasons, foreign independent countries or 
colonies started to accumulate sterling as a foreign exchange reserve. These became known as 
the ‘sterling balances’. Therefore, in the post-war Bretton Woods system, sterling also operated 
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alongside the US dollar as an international reserve asset, which gave it special status and 
threatened Britain’s attempts to join the EC in the 1960s and during the Heath government.16  
The combination of the sterling balances and a weak UK economy created currency 
instability which also undermined Britain’s application to join the EC. The sterling balances, 
held by private foreign banks, central banks, and governments, could be exchanged for other 
currencies and assets, such as the dollar and gold, which would alter the value of sterling. 
Moreover, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the UK ran frequent balance of payment deficits, 
depleting Britain’s foreign exchange reserves. The sterling balances started to exceed the UK’s 
reserves. This created a ‘sterling balances problem’. The ‘sterling balances problem’, balance of 
payments deficits, and economic weakness put pressure on the value of sterling and rendered 
Britain vulnerable to currency crises, as seen with the 1967 devaluation.
17
 In 1968 the Bank for 
International Settlements and twelve non-sterling countries – the US, Canada, Japan, and major 
Western European countries, excluding France – established the Basle Agreement, a $2 billion 
exchange fund available to Britain to protect the sterling balances. This was essentially a dollar 
guarantee of the balances, with 40% of the facility funded by the US, thus making sterling 
dependent on the dollar and creating a special sterling-dollar link.  
While the Treaty of Rome did not deal with monetary union it included a section on 
economic policy and the balance of payments.
18
 Under these regulations member states were 
required to seek a balance of payment equilibrium. If a member state was “seriously threatened” 
by currency instability or disequilibrium in its balance of payments then the EC might have to 
provide “mutual assistance” to support that country.19 On 29 September 1967 the EC 
Commission delivered an opinion on the UK’s second membership application which stated that 
fluctuations in the sterling balances and the reserve role of sterling constituted a significant 
obstacle to the EC’s objective of economic convergence and that the “problem of sterling 
balances goes beyond the financial possibilities of the Community countries alone”.20 Therefore, 
the role of sterling and the balances threatened Britain’s application to join EC, which became a 
major issue in Anglo-French relations. 
In light of the steps taking place in Brussels to seek an enlargement of the EC and 
pursue EMU, the White House launched a major investigation into US policy on the EC in 
October 1969 (as discussed in chapter 2), which looked into the “problem of the UK’s external 
indebtedness”. It showed concern from within Washington about the political and economic 
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changes taking place in Western Europe.
21
 However, the group failed to reach an agreement. 
The State Department strongly supported the expansion of the EC as a key part of the Western 
alliance. But the economic departments – the Treasury Department, Department of Commerce, 
and the Department of Agriculture (USDA) - were sceptical of the EC expansion and EMU, 
which they viewed as a threat to the US economy.     
The State Department report expressed some limited anxiety about the impact of EMU 
in the long term, but ultimately supported the expansion of the EC and movement towards 
greater integration. It also viewed the movement toward EMU as an opportunity to reduce the 
economic burden of supporting sterling. The report noted that EC monetary integration was 
“tending to reduce their interest in flexibility” in international monetary relations. However, 
progress in EMU “in a meaningful way at the present time...is limited”, and thus a long term 
project. The main concern for the US government was the short term cost of UK entry which 
could potentially cause financial problems which “will inevitably also involve the United 
States”. The report observed that the sterling “balances will undoubtedly be a factor to be 
reckoned with in the negotiations” and suggested that the “US may choose to avail itself of the 
opportunity to reduce its role as a supporter of sterling” with the EC picking-up the extension of 
the Basle Agreement under the EC’s mutual assistance facilities. Thus, State sought to 
disentangle US financial backing for sterling and supported greater EC integration.
22
   
The economic departments wrote a joint statement to Kissinger and Nixon opposing 
State’s position on the grounds that the enlargement and EMU endangered the US economy and 
financial power. They argued that the “geographical broadening of the European community 
and its movement toward full economic and monetary union will result in a fundamental change 
in the basic world balance of international economic and financial power”, having a negative 
impact on US industrial and agricultural trade. The Treasury, Commerce, and the USDA thus 
sought a reappraisal of US European policy.
23
 However, Nixon had already adopted a “hands-
off” approach to the UK’s EC application so as not to harm the negotiations.24 Nixon also 
declared in his February 1970 Foreign Policy Report to Congress that the integration of Western 
Europe was a fundamental component of the Atlantic Alliance, important to US political and 
defence policy.
25
 Therefore, Nixon’s directive on the EC enlargement supported expansion and 
the movement towards EMU. In order to appease the economic departments, the directive also 
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set out to defend US economic interests in specific agricultural and industrial areas through 
negotiation, without jeopardising the UK’s application.26   
 The Heath government’s official negotiating position on monetary matters, from June 
1970 to March 1971, showed support for the long term objective of European monetary 
integration, but at the same time not making any commitment on the future of sterling. The 
Official Committee on the Approach to Europe sub-committee on financial and monetary 
matters investigated the role of sterling, EC monetary harmonisation, and the EC enlargement - 
prepared under the Wilson government and used by Heath. The committee report, produced by 
the Treasury, noted the EC’s 1967 opinion of sterling. But the EC Commission had also 
identified topics for the enlargement negotiations which did not included monetary matters. The 
key negotiation issues would be on the CAP, Commonwealth relations, budget contributions, 
and the transitional implementation of EC legislation and practices. The committee believed that 
“it seems likely that the EEC as a whole are less worried about sterling than they were in 1967”. 
The committee also thought that the “relative importance of sterling as a reserve currency will 
progressively decline” as a result of the introduction of SDRs (in 1969) and a future single 
currency. The Treasury officials recommended that the government explain to the EC that “we 
are in no way attached” to maintaining the reserve role of sterling, either for “prestige” or for 
“questionable privileges”.27 Therefore, if pressed by the EC, the UK should commit itself in the 
long term to complete monetary union as a “logical development of the Common Market” and 
that the UK would have no problem in “moving as fast down this road as the Six collectively 
agree”.28 Ministers, considering these issues in October 1970, believed that while the French 
might actually “attach great importance” to making “rapid progress” on EMU, it would not 
feature in the official negotiations, and so they adopted the report’s recommendations.29 This 
reveals that officials and ministers underestimated the important connection between the role of 
sterling and the major developments taking place on EMU in Brussels.  
However, domestic politics, which took a central role in determining Britain’s entry into 
the EC, also influenced Heath’s early strategy on sterling and EMU. As discussed in chapter 1, 
the survival of the Heath government depended on the passing of his EC legislation through the 
parliament. Specifically on the sterling balances, Heath faced only limited opposition. However, 
the replacement of sterling with a European single currency fitted into the larger debate on 
sovereignty. Heath’s slim majority of thirty in the House of Commons strengthened the party 
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fringes. Many Conservative MPs were sceptical and fundamentally opposed to joining the EC 
because of the constitutional implications of relinquishing power to the EC. Enoch Powell, a 
leading opponent of British membership, argued that Heath’s policy would result in full 
“economic, monetary, and political unification”, significantly reducing the UK’s sovereignty.30 
This cost Heath votes and threatened his legislation, even though sterling did not feature in the 
official terms of entry. Although the Heath government avoided the sterling topic in the early 
negotiation stages, Heath eventually ignored his party fringes and displayed his total support for 
EMU, telling the House of Commons on 24 May 1971 on his return to London after the Paris 
summit with Pompidou that “Britain looked forward wholeheartedly to joining in the economic 
and monetary development of the community”.31 Heath needed to make a commitment to EMU 
in order to join the EC, despite parliamentary opposition.  
 The Labour Party supported a run-down of the sterling balances, but they put pressure 
on the Heath government to move faster on the issue. The Shadow Minister for Common 
Market Affairs Harold Lever argued in January 1971 that “we will not be accepted as a member 
of the Community” if the UK maintained the reserve currency, and thus “I believe that we ought 
to...end this system”.32 Following the Heath-Pompidou summit, Lever pressured Heath to clarify 
his “oblique reference” and state his “intentions on sterling”, a topic sensitive with Tory MPs 
unsure of the constitutional aspects of the accession. Heath ignored the question.
33
 But Wilson’s 
parliamentary opposition on the EC focussed on the cost and terms of entry, such as on the 
Commonwealth association and UK’ budget contribution to the EC, not on the position of 
sterling and sovereignty. In principle Wilson supported entry into the EC and the consequences 
of EMU.
34
  Following a meeting with the EC in Luxembourg on 9 June 1971 Geoffrey Rippon, 
the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (CDL) told the House of Commons that the 
government envisaged “an orderly and gradual run-down of official sterling balances after our 
accession”.35 Wilson expressed concern about the “heavy burden on our balance of payments”, 
but on the whole the specific issue of sterling did not cause Heath any major domestic trouble 
with the Labour Party.
36
    
 Understanding UK public opinion on this issue is difficult because the major pollsters 
did not directly address the issue of sterling and EMU during the Heath period. In 1957, when 
Gallup asked people whether joining the Common Market would take away Britain’s control of 
her own economy, 48% did not know, 28% agreed, and 24% disagreed.
37
 In 1967, 18% felt that 
joining the EC would reduce Parliament’s power and 22% thought that the EC would take away 
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Britain’s political independence.38 But, by October 1971, only 9% of those polled feared a loss 
of political identity.
39
 It is clear from the polls that the major concern of the public was focused 
on the cost of living, not on the sovereignty question. In 1967 Gallup recorded 76% support for 
the view that food prices would rise.
40
 In October 1970, 73% thought that prices would increase 
a lot; 19% thought that prices would increase a little.
41
 Another interesting poll, conducted by 
the Social and Community Planning Research institution, looked at the influence of the City in 
financial matters. 49% agreed that “London will become even more the financial centre of 
Europe” as a result of British membership; 32% disagreed.42 But there are no direct polls to 
establish either the level of support or the level of public knowledge on EMU and sterling 
during the Heath government. The major domestic factor holding the government back from 
serious public discussion on sterling and EMU were the Conservative Party MPs and the 
political need to avoid the sovereignty issue.       
  As previously discussed, a key aspect of the Heath government’s strategy for gaining 
entry into the EC was to improve political relations with France.  Heath and the FCO perceived 
that the UK must not appear as a ‘Trojan horse’, intent on promoting US interest in the EC.43 
The FCO noted in September 1970 French fears that the UK might “provide an entry for 
increased American influence in Europe”. While it mentioned that France supported the move 
towards a single currency, it did not foresee any problems and it did not mention sterling. It 
concluded that the UK government must “take account of French suspicions” and highlight the 
“European-ness of our foreign policy aims”.44 Heath supported the report and said that “it 
should be read and absorbed and acted upon by all Whitehall”.45 Therefore, British policy 
focussed on improving political relations with France which the government believed would 
lead to a successful outcome on the specific negotiations issues. The government overlooked 
sterling and EMU.   
Early Anglo-American discussions during the Heath-Nixon period did not deal with 
sterling and EMU, but focussed on the importance of establishing close relations and on the 
political importance of the EC enlargement. Just prior to Heath’s election victory, in March 
1970, Abe Katz, a key State Department official dealing with Atlantic political and economic 
affairs, warned the British Embassy in Washington that the Secretaries of Commerce, 
Agriculture, and the Treasury were pushing the White House to revise US European policy 
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because of the “economic price” of the enlargement and EMU.46 The FCO thought that the 
“president and White House will stay sound, and that a lot of this is blowing off steam”.47 Later, 
in May 1970, Katz also advised the FCO that the success of the UK’s negotiations “depended to 
a considerable extent” on the UK’s “response to the project for monetary and economic union”, 
although this advice seems to have been ignored by UK officials.
48
 At the first face-to-face 
Anglo-American discussions of the Heath government between Douglas-Home and Rogers, in 
July 1970, the US backed the UK’s EC application and pledged to take a backseat, “hands-off” 
approach to the negotiations.
49
 At Chequers in October 1970, Nixon and Heath established close 
communication and exchanged ideas on international relations.
50
 While both governments 
expressed concern about growing US-EC trade friction, the issue of sterling and EMU did not 
arise.  
By the time of the Washington and Camp David summit in December 1970, tension had 
grown in Anglo-American relations over the Mills Bill, agricultural levies, Commonwealth 
association, and general EC trade policies. Yet Nixon continued to back the expansion of the 
EC. He told Heath that “a division of world authority between two great power blocs would be 
unhealthy”. Nixon called for “the creation of a strong political and economic entity in Europe” 
in order to achieve “a proper concept of the balance of power”.51 Therefore, the US and the UK 
found common ground on the EC integration movement. However, Nathaniel Samuels, the 
Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (1969-1972), informed Douglas-Home 
that “monetary union discussions were particularly important to the United States”. Douglas-
Home replied that it was not an immediate issue and that “from the point of view of 
sterling...things would move very slowly over a long period”.52 No further discussion took 
place, which showed that the UK considered the question of EMU to be a long term project, 
stretching over a decade, and hence not a key matter for current Anglo-American relations. 
  In February 1971, the US Treasury sought to abandon its support of sterling, with the 
EC stepping in as a substitute guarantor. This indicated that to an extent the US would welcome 
greater monetary participation from the EC in international affairs, in order to relieve pressure 
on the dollar. With the 1968 Basle Agreement due to expire in September, an extension of the 
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facility would need to be negotiated. Following internal discussions at the Treasury, Paul 
Volcker, the Treasury Under-Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs (1969-1974), 
informed the State Department that he was “inclined not to extend the Basle facility and that the 
Community should pick up the ball with respect to the sterling guarantee”. Although Volcker 
had “made up his mind”, Samuels managed to convince him that this could destabilise the UK’s 
entry negotiations.
53
 The US Embassy in London welcomed Volcker’s decision to drop the idea, 
which would have “thrown the fat in the fire” of the UK-EC negotiations. Therefore State 
sought to maintain their hands-off posture.
54
        
 During Rippon’s visit to Washington in March 1971 EMU and sterling took a more 
prominent role than in previous ministerial discussions. The Anglo-American confrontation 
over Commonwealth association and agricultural levies also heated up during these meetings. 
Clarence Palmby, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs (1969-1972), 
pushed for clarification on the future of EC monetary affairs. Rippon assured him that EMU 
“need cause no difficulty”. It might involve a run-down of the sterling balances, thus helping to 
“take pressure off the reserve role of the dollar”. Rippon thought that this should be “welcomed 
in America”.55 In Rippon’s talks with the State Department, Samuels once again raised 
monetary affairs. Rippon said that it “was not a matter for the negotiations” and that EMU was 
“a very long time ahead”.56 Kissinger told Rippon at his meeting in the White House that Nixon 
strongly supported the UK application and that the US would “stay aside” during the process.57 
Although the question of EMU arose during Rippon’s visit to Washington, they were not 
lengthy or substantial discussions. The UK thought that it was not a major issue, while the US 
administration largely focussed on Anglo-American trade difficulties.      
However, in March 1971 the issue of sterling entered into the forefront of Britain’s 
application to join the EC. This posed a threat to the negotiations and ultimately pushed Britain 
into a commitment to run down the sterling balances, ending its international reserve role. On 
17 March 1971 at the EC Committee of Permanent Representatives, the French government 
circulated a memorandum that warned Britain that “there is a contradiction between its 
membership of the Community (which is moving towards an economic and monetary union) 
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and the administration of an international reserve currency” which would turn Britain “into the 
centre of an extra-European zone”.58 A few days later on 25 March 1971 Maurice Schumann, 
the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (1969-1973), clarified the memorandum, saying that the 
problem of sterling should not be viewed as a barrier to entry but that Britain must accept the 
rules if she wants to join the EC.
59
 UK officials running the negotiations were surprised by the 
French intervention on the issue of sterling.
60
 Soon after this Pompidou signalled to Heath, 
through secret talks between the British Ambassador in Paris Christopher Soames and the 
Secretary-General at the Élysée Palace Michel Jobert, that he wanted a bilateral meeting in 
order to resolve the outstanding issues on British accession.
61
 In planning for the meeting Heath 
finally noted that the French “appeared to regard maintenance of the sterling area in some way 
incompatible with British membership of the Community”. He believed that they were partly 
influenced by “the feeling of inferiority” at sterling’s international status and the “possible 
burdens to the Community” under the Treaty of Rome’s mutual assistance clause.62 Although 
not part of the negotiations, it appeared that the role and problem of sterling became important 
to gaining French support for UK entry into the EC.               
 At the Heath-Pompidou summit in Paris on 20-21 May 1971 Britain and France 
resolved the remaining core issues on the enlargement of the EC. This resulted in Heath’s 
commitment to run down the sterling balances, to remove the dollar guarantee of the sterling 
balances, and to accept the principle of EMU. At the first meeting, on 20 May, Pompidou told 
Heath that a basic principle of the EC was that each member’s currency had equal status. The 
sterling balances placed pressure on the value of the pound and made Britain dependent on the 
US dollar, through the Basle Agreement. He argued that the political power of the US, as a 
result of its monetary status, must be reduced. Heath assured Pompidou that the “government 
did not regard sterling as an instrument of prestige nor did they feel sentimental about it”. Heath 
accepted that the status of sterling should be equal to that of the other members. However, there 
would need to be a gradual transition and stabilising of the balances to prevent a monetary crisis 
amongst the Sterling Area countries.
63
  
The next day, on 21 May, Pompidou told Heath that he was not yet satisfied with his 
assurances on sterling. Pompidou was “not wedded to the concept of figures; what mattered was 
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the question of principle”. He told Heath that the reserve status of sterling “was a relic of the 
British empire...incompatible with the British decision to become a member of the European 
community”. Heath confirmed that the government “accepted the principle of stabilisation”. 
Heath then asked Pompidou that if “sterling was standing on its own feet” without a “dollar 
connection” would there no longer be a sterling problem. Pompidou reflected on the point for 
twenty seconds or so, and replied “I see none”, indicating that the sterling-dollar connection was 
a greater obstacle than the existence of international sterling reserves.
 64
 On this basis, France 
would participate in the renewed Basle facility while the balances were progressively run down. 
The Anglo-French joint communiqué expressed to the public that Britain and France would 
cooperate on European economic and monetary matters.
65
 Nevertheless, Heath felt the need to 
write to Nixon about the Pompidou talks, expressing the importance of “our relations with you 
across the Atlantic”.66  
From June 1970 to March 1971, the UK sought to exclude the issue of sterling and 
EMU from the EC enlargement negotiations. But this changed between March and May 1971. 
Solving the problem of sterling played an important part in the success of Britain’s application 
to join the EC. Adding the UK economy and sterling to the EMU project represented a major 
step in the economic integration of the EC. However, throughout May 1971 and onwards a 
major monetary crisis started to brew. The West German mark floated on 10 May 1971 and the 
US liquidity balance of payments, which had undermined confidence in the dollar, was leading 
towards Nixon’s attempt to reform the Bretton Woods system. This severely disrupted the 
movement towards EMU and shifted international monetary relations.                 
 
Nixon’s New Economic Policy 1971 
 
 Throughout 1969-1971 the US balance of payments problem and state of the economy 
were key topics in US government circles. The administration faced Congressional pressure, 
with hundreds of protectionist measures circulating in the House of Representatives and Senate, 
including the Mills Bill (see chapter 4), which sought to protect the US trade position and 
improve the overall balance of payments. Moreover, with the upcoming 1972 presidential 
election, Nixon sought to improve and protect the US economy. Therefore, Nixon introduced 
the “New Economic Policy” on 15 August 1971, which broke the dollar’s convertibility into 
gold, imposed a wage and price freeze, and established international trade barriers. This led to 
four months of negotiations between the US and the major economies of the Western alliance, 
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re-establishing monetary cooperation and contributing towards the creation of a new monetary 
system. 
In the many studies on the Nixon administration historians have considered the detail 
and motivations behind the NEP. The orthodox histories tended to focus on Watergate and 
foreign policy and so reform of the Bretton Woods system received less attention. Stephen 
Ambrose’s brief narrative account of Nixon’s NEP argued that “he did what he did with the 
1972 re-election campaign in mind”.67 The void in detailed analysis of economic policy in early 
Nixon studies has been filled by Nixon revisionists, making use of Nixon papers released in the 
1990s and 2000s.
68
 Yet they took a similar position to Ambrose. Allen Matusow’s study 
concluded that “Nixon had no firm convictions on economic policy except that prosperity was 
essential for winning elections...Politics, therefore, was the one constant”.69 This chapter 
supports the view that politics and the election cycle played an important role in the formation 
of economic policy. However, the need to correct the fundamental economic flaws in the system 
proved to be the central motivating factor in the dismantling of Bretton Woods.  
Nixon’s key economic advisors, and the architects of the NEP, known as the 
“Quadriad”, included the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) Arthur Burns (1970-
1978), the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) Paul McCracken (1969-
1971), who had also served on the council when Nixon was vice-president, the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) George Shultz (1970-1972), and the Secretary of the 
Treasury John Connally (1971-1972), who were all present at the 13-14 August 1971 weekend 
at Camp David for the finalising of the NEP.
70
 Also important in this area (and present at Camp 
David) were Herbert Stein, a Republican economist appointed by Nixon to sit on the CEA 
(Member 1969-1971, Chairman 1972-1974), and Paul Volker.  
Stein, McCracken, and Shultz were all influenced by Milton Friedman’s theories on 
monetarism, in particular on the importance of a constant rate of growth of the money supply in 
stabilising the economy.
71
 These “conservative” free-market economists were opposed to wage 
and price controls, and also supported floating exchange rates, a growing trend amongst 
academic economists in the late 1960s.
72
 Connally particularly took a leading role on the 
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political side of the NEP. Nixon told Kissinger on 16 August 1971 that “On the economic 
announcement, Connally was the big wheel on this. He did a hell of a job. We pulled it off 
together”. Also taking a central role on the political side was Haldeman, the White House Chief 
of Staff. Kissinger, usually at the centre of major policy decisions, told Nixon that “I don’t 
know anything about these things”, and thus found himself on the sidelines in the development 
of monetary policy options.
73
 In the built-up to the August 1971 announcement, Kissinger and 
the State Department were unaware of the impending changes, and did not take part in the 
Camp David weekend.
74
  
The State Department’s lack of participation became apparent to the British government 
shortly after the NEP announcement. Following early discussions between British and 
American officials on 17 August 1971, the British Embassy in Washington reported back to the 
FCO that the “State Department...appears to have had little, if any, part in the final process of 
decision-making” and that they were unable to provide basic information on US monetary 
policy, thus indicating that the State Department was out of the loop.
75
 Later, in November 
1971, Cromer reported on the “emergence of Connally as the effective overlord in the economic 
and monetary field”. Moreover, Rogers “has no direct line to the president”, while State 
Department officials “often do not know what is going on, even as well as we do, and are 
increasingly disloyal about the White House”.76 The divide between the White House and the 
government departments filtered into Anglo-American diplomatic circles.       
Throughout the 1960s the US ran a federal budget deficit, one of the key contributing 
factors to the US liquidity deficit, undermining the Bretton Woods system. In table 8, column B, 
below, is displayed the federal budget deficit / surplus, and column C shows the breakdown of 
government expenditure in the two largest groups – national defence and human resources 
(comprising mainly of education services, social security, and since 1967, Medicare). Large 
budget deficits often occurred during periods of war. The US budget deficit grew from $1.4 
billion in 1965 to $23 billion in 1971. This can firstly be accounted for by the Vietnam War 
years of escalation 1965-1968, when defence expenditure went from 42.8% to 46% of the 
budget. Moreover, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the US had large numbers of troops 
stationed in Europe, the cornerstone of Nixon’s Cold War policy. However, the Nixon doctrine 
and the pursuit of détente had reduced military spending to 31.2% of the budget by 1973, a 15% 
decrease.  
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The second reason for the massive rise in the budget deficit can be accounted for by the 
Great Society programs of the Johnson administration, and continued under Nixon, which 
implemented programs for education and health improvement, including health insurance 
through Medicare and Medicaid. Expenditure in this area went from $1.8 billion (2.0% of 
expenditure) in 1945 to $119.5 billion (48.6% of expenditure) in 1973, a massive increase.  
 
Table 8: US Budget and Balance of Payments
77
 
 
Column 
A 
Column B Column C Column D Column E 
Year 
Federal Budget 
Surplus / 
Deficit 
(billions US $) 
US Government Expenditure 
(billions of US $ and % of total 
budget) 
Balance of 
Trade and 
Services 
(billions US $) 
Foreign Official 
Assets in the US 
(billions US $) National 
Defence 
Human Resources 
(Social Security) 
1945 - 47.6 83.0   (89.5%) 1.9     (2.0%) n.a. n.a. 
1948 + 11.8 9.1     (30.6%) 9.9     (33.2%) n.a. n.a. 
1953 - 6.5 52.8   (69.4%) 11.8     (15.6%) n.a. n.a. 
1965 - 1.4 50.6  (42.8 %) 36.6     (30.9 %) + 4.7 + 0.1 
1966 - 3.7 58.1  (43.2 %) 43.3     (32.2 %) + 2.9 - 0.7 
1967 - 8.6 71.4  (45.4 %) 51.3     (32.6 %) + 2.6 + 3.5 
1968 - 25.2 81.9  (46.0 %) 59.4     (33.3 %) + 0.3 - 0.8 
1969 + 3.2 82.5  (44.9 %) 66.4     (36.2 %) + 0.09 - 1.3 
1970 - 2.8 81.7  (41.8 %) 75.3     (38.5 %) + 2.3 + 7.8 
1971 - 23.0 78.8  (37.5 %) 91.9     (43.7 %) - 1.3 + 27.6 
1972 - 23.0 79.2  (34.3 %) 107.2     (46.5 %) - 5.4 + 11.2 
1973 - 15.0 76.7  (31.2 %) 119.5     (48.6 %) + 1.9 + 6.0 
 
 
In order for the US government to fund the persistent federal budget deficits throughout 
the 1960s, government borrowing went up, particularly through foreign purchases of 
government and Treasury securities (debt), as displayed in column E of table 8 – foreign official 
assets in the US. This increased between 1965 and 1971 from $100 million to $27.6 billion. One 
effect of high government expenditure and foreign borrowing was inflation because of the 
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increased supply of US dollars, thus also making US exports more expensive.
78
 As shown in 
column D of table 8, the US balance of trade and services remained in surplus throughout the 
1960s – the US exported more than it imported, which supported the overall economy despite 
liquidity deficits. However, the trade surplus steadily decreased due to competition from the EC 
and Asia, and a rise in US prices. The key year was 1971. The US recorded a deficit in its trade 
and services balance (for the first time since 1893) of $1.3 billion, the budget deficit grew from 
$2.8 billion in 1970 to $23 billion in 1971 and foreign holdings of US official securities more 
than tripled to $27.6 billion between 1970 and 1971. This deficit on three fronts contributed 
towards a lack of confidence in the dollar as an international reserve currency, a major factor in 
the monetary crisis of 1971.
79
 
The Nixon administration considered the reform and dismantling of the Bretton Woods 
system over a long period of time, and thus it was not a sudden policy based solely on short-
term economic and political strains, but on the long-term US balance of payments problem and 
fundamental flaws in the monetary system. On entering office, Nixon received a transitional 
task force report on the balance of payments, which noted its “precarious” position and that 
protective measures were needed, such as the “pursuit of disinflationary economic policies 
domestically”. It also called for international measures – the US needed to seek “a significant 
realignment of parities” of currencies, as well as “wider trading bands for currencies” above the 
1% band in which currencies could fluctuate under the Bretton Woods agreement. Finally, the 
report pointed out that such reform would not solve the issue of “the present de facto 
inconvertibility of the dollar into gold”. It warned and advised that if “a gold rush develops, the 
United States should suspend gold convertibility”.80 Therefore the idea of major reform of the 
international monetary system, through currency realignments and the abandonment of the gold 
exchange standard, had been seriously considered under the Johnson administration and at the 
very beginning of Nixon’s first term in office.      
  Highly developed contingency plans on the reform of the international monetary 
system, shaped by Nixon’s key economic advisers at a top-secret level in order to avoid market 
instability, continued from 1969 until the August 1971 announcement. On his first day in office, 
Nixon established a permanent working group, known as the Volcker Group after its Chairman 
Paul Volcker, which dealt with policy alternatives with regards to the balance of payments and 
the functioning of Bretton Woods, thus an acknowledgement of the growing instability in the 
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world economy and the need for reform.
81
 A central finding of the Volcker Group’s first study 
was that the gold convertibility link threatened stability in the monetary system, and so the 
government needed to address the problem of “how to move out of this commitment in a 
graceful manner without causing undue disturbance to the monetary system”.82 The Volcker 
Group supported an evolutionary approach to change through international cooperation, and 
leaned towards the adoption of limited flexible exchange rates and an increase in the amount of 
SDRs to provide liquidity. This approach gained the support of the CEA, especially on the 
“merits of limited exchange rate flexibility”.83 From September 1969 and throughout 1970 the 
US pressed ahead in discussing with the key economic powers, through the Group of 10 (G-10), 
the World Bank, and the IMF, the reform of the international monetary system.
84
 The US 
initiative met with divided and uncertain opinion from the UK, France, Germany, Japan, and 
other developed countries, and so the international community made little progress in reaching 
agreement in adjusting the Bretton Woods system.
85
          
 However, volatile foreign exchange markets in May 1971 and a growing US balance of 
payments deficit spurred on the Nixon administration to take drastic unilateral action. The US 
Treasury prepared a contingency paper, in which it backed the suspension of gold convertibility 
and the imposition of trade restrictions. While it noted that the foreign response would be to 
blame the US for the crisis, these were “necessary” measures to use “as negotiating leverage” 
and that “only in an atmosphere of crisis and disturbance” could change come about. 
Importantly, the paper argued that the specific objectives of the US ought to be “a significant 
revaluation of the currencies of major European countries and Japan”, “greater rate flexibility” 
and the “phasing out of gold”. Thus, the Treasury opposed a devaluation of the US dollar 
against the price of gold and the re-establishment of Bretton Woods, but drove the case for the 
long-term abandonment of a gold exchange standard and fixed exchange rate, and forcing other 
countries to revalue against the dollar. The paper noted that the EC would oppose such action in 
light of “their hopes for establishing monetary unity” and that France would want to “reduce US 
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hegemony”. Thus, the paper anticipated a period of tough international negotiations in the 
monetary field.
 86
        
  The US Treasury paper also called for expenditure cuts, particularly in defence, arguing 
for “a fairer sharing of the balance of payments and budgetary costs of the military burden”.87 
This fitted in with the administration’s policy review of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance 1969-
1970, which supported a greater burden sharing effort from the European powers for the 
security of Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
88
 This view also carried the 
backing of the Congress. Senate leader Mike Mansfield, who believed that the US military role 
in Europe harmed the value of the dollar and caused monetary crises, wanted to take the more 
extreme action of cutting US troop levels in Europe by half, a measure which the administration 
strongly opposed.
89
 Two days after the preparation of the Treasury’s contingency paper, on 10 
May 1971, West Germany allowed the Deutschmark to float, which put more pressure on the 
dollar.       
Nixon essentially agreed to the Treasury’s contingency measures at a meeting with 
Connally on 2 August 1971. Haldeman noted in his diary “a huge economic breakthrough based 
on the international monetary situation which would provide for closing the gold window, the 
floating of the dollar, a wage and price freeze...and the imposition of a 10% import tax quota”.90 
These four measures formed the NEP. At Camp David, 13-14 August 1971, Nixon’s key 
economic advisers finalised the details of the NEP and its political presentation.
91
 On Sunday 15 
August 1971 Nixon announced the measures on television.
92
 It attempted to deal with three 
economic problems. Firstly, the wage and price freeze aimed to curb inflation, and thus improve 
the US trade position. Secondly, the closing of the gold window and a floating dollar would 
force multilateral reform and an adjustment / revaluation of world currencies and exchange 
rates, restoring international monetary confidence. Thirdly, the 10% surcharge on imports into 
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the US would seek to improve the US trade balance, while forcing trade negotiations with 
Europe and Japan. This move represented US national and unilateral action to improve the US 
domestic and international economic position.     
 Another major factor influencing Nixon’s economic policy, the upcoming 1972 
presidential election, showed the importance of politics in the administration’s policymaking. 
Nixon implemented measures which inflated the economy and pushed for growth, despite a 
liquidity balance of payments deficit and an overvalued dollar, in order to gain support for the 
election from key sectors of the economy. Nixon displayed the strong political motivations 
behind the 15 August 1971 announcement in a conversation with Kissinger the next day, telling 
him that “we stirred them up a little...So many have said that it was like the China news. It 
reminds people of that again”. Kissinger responded with “you scored another coup...It was 
absolutely spectacular...you never make little news, it is always big news”.93 This showed the 
concern of Nixon and Kissinger for the publicity side of the announcement, which, like the 
opening of China, projected an image of strong leadership and bold policies.
94
       
Many historians have focussed attention on whether or not Nixon applied pressure on 
the Fed Chairman Arthur Burns to implement economic policies that would suit the election 
cycle.
95
 In the build up to the 1972 election, the Fed pursued an expansive monetary policy and 
established easy credit conditions. By increasing the money supply and lowering interest rates 
the Fed helped to fuel growth, but this created a US domestic bubble and caused inflation. This 
happened despite Burns believing that the economy needed deflation, tax increases, government 
expenditure cuts, and wage and price control policies. Burns noted in his diary on 23 November 
1970 that “what the boys that swarm around the White House fail to see is that the country now 
faces an entirely new problem – namely, a sizable inflation in the midst of recession” and that 
the “more rapid expansion of the money supply cannot be the answer”.96 Yet the money supply 
increased vastly from 1970 to 1972. The M1 measurement – liquid forms of money, such as 
currency and travellers cheques – went from 4.51% in 1970 to 7.56% in 1972. The M2 
measurement – M1 plus savings accounts under $100,000 and fixed term deposits – increased 
from 7.36% to 11.65%, between 1970 and 1972.
97
 The annual average Federal Reserve discount 
rate – the interest rate it charged banks that borrowed reserves – fell from 5.95% in 1970 to 
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4.5% in 1972.
98
 The increased money supply added to the problem of an overvalued fixed 
exchange rate system at $35 an ounce of gold, while the lower interest rates also led to an 
outflow of capital from the US, in search of higher returns, both of which undermined the 
Bretton Woods system.  
He implemented this policy despite wanting to preserve the Bretton Woods system. 
Burns noted the pressure he came under from the administration in a meeting with Nixon on 5 
March 1971, saying that:  
 
The president looked wild; talked like a desperate man; fulminated with hatred....I am convinced 
that the president will do anything to be re-elected....The harassing of the Fed by the president 
and his pusillanimous staff will continue and may even intensify.
99
        
 
John Ehrlichman believed that “Nixon was determined to control the Fed” and that Nixon often 
went about “lecturing – even scolding Arthur Burns about what the Fed must do to free up the 
money supply”.100 Nixon put pressure on Burns to implement monetary policies that would 
support the expansion of the economy and help in his election campaign. However, these 
policies also harmed the Bretton Woods system, contributing towards the economic crisis of 
August 1971. At the 13-14 August 1971 Camp David meeting on the NEP, Burns believed that 
“there was little room for doubt...that he [Nixon] was governed mainly, if not entirely, by a 
political motive...for the campaign of 1972”.101 This contributes towards revealing the political 
nature of Nixon’s economic policies and the state of relations between the Fed and the White 
House.  
 
Anglo-American Relations and the Disintegration of Bretton Woods, August-December 1971 
 
Nixon’s unilateral action on monetary reform caused a crisis in Anglo-American 
relations and represented a breakdown in communication between the two allies. Throughout 
late 1970 and early 1971, the US and UK had faced tough trade negotiations over 
Commonwealth association, agricultural levies, and Congressional protectionism, which had 
created serious tension in Anglo-American relations. Then one month before the NEP 
announcement, on 15 July 1971, came the first “Nixon shock” – his abrupt announcement on 
the opening of China, made without consultation with the UK. Belatedly, Nixon sent a lengthy 
                                                 
98
  “Average Discount Rate on Loans to Member Banks, 1956-2002”, The Federal Reserve System  
[online]: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
99
  Ferrell, ed., The Secret Diary of Arthur Burns, 37-38. 
100
  Ehrilchman, Witness to Power, 244. Assistant to the President for Domestic Affair, 1969-1973. 
101
  Ibid., 53. 
- 181 - 
 
message to Heath “in the spirit of our frequent consultations”.102 Privately, the Heath 
government were disappointed with the lack of consultation, which Kissinger acknowledged.
103
   
Then on 15 August 1971 came the second “Nixon shock”, and once again the UK 
government were not informed beforehand. Nixon told Heath that the measures were “necessary 
to preserve confidence in the dollar” and maintain monetary stability.104 The UK government’s 
immediate reaction displayed anger at the US measures. A draft letter from Heath to Nixon on 
18 August 1971 threatened to take retaliatory action, arguing that the US “can have no justified 
complaint of unfairness” against the UK and that “the United Kingdom will have to consider 
any necessary measure to counter its effect”.105 Both the FCO and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) insisted on the removal of the threat from the letter because it would “provoke a 
hardening of attitudes and lead to the trade war which we all fear”.106 Lord Cromer advised the 
FCO from Washington that it “would be a mistake to react too tragically to the lack of prior 
consultation”. But he also noted that the episode revealed that “the Americans no longer 
consider it necessary to consult with the UK as an imperial or world power. They consult us 
when it is useful...not because they have to”. Heath scribbled on the letter “a lot of sense in 
this”.107 Heath contacted the French President Pompidou and the German Chancellor Brandt 
expressing his view that Nixon’s actions had “destroyed...exchange rates, erected new barriers 
to trade...and undermined the foundation of the system...established in 1946”.108 Moreover, he 
“deplored the imposition of a surcharge on imports”, a barrier to free trade.109 Thus the 
unilateral and far-reaching action created an immediate crisis in Anglo-American relations and 
represented a breakdown of communications and cooperation.  
 Heath met with the Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber and Treasury officials 
on 16 August 1971 to set out their key objectives. The NEP had led to the closing of exchange 
markets in Western Europe and Japan, which added to the atmosphere of monetary crisis. They 
decided that “in the long term” the UK government would “try to remould” the international 
monetary system “into a new system which was not dependent on the United States”. This had 
been an earlier concern of Heath’s in a 1969 Foreign Affairs article, when he asked the question 
“can the European countries agree on a viable alternative to American domination of the 
international monetary system?” 110 In terms of short-term tactics, the government decided that 
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in order to improve the UK’s competitive position it would be better for other currencies to be 
re-valued in terms of the dollar, while convincing the “Americans and Europeans of the 
economic case for our not re-valuing in terms of the dollar”. Finally, the government wanted to 
“insist that the surcharge should be removed as soon as the re-alignment of parities took 
effect”.111   
 Initial discussions between the UK and US revealed major differences on the substance 
of the NEP, as well as tension over the unilateral and sudden nature of the announcement. Paul 
Volcker arrived in London on 16 August 1971 for major talks with the UK government and the 
Bank of England, and later with officials from France, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Barber said 
that the US had “created a very difficult situation”. He argued that the dollar was out of line and 
therefore the US should make a moderate increase in the price of gold, a devaluation of the 
dollar. The Governor of the Bank of England Sir Leslie O’Brien wondered why “everyone else 
had to accept a dollar world” and why the US administration “were not willing to make any 
change as regard their parity”? Volcker defended the US position, saying that the decision, 
taken “reluctantly”, was justified in terms of the need to improve the US balance of payments. 
Moreover, the US Congress would not accept a rise in the price of gold, and that the “whole 
system had to be reshaped”. This displayed US power in the monetary system, as the chief 
source of an international reserve currency.  
Barber and O’Brien also complained about the import surcharge. Volcker said that he 
“did not like the measure at all” and that he hoped that the White House would remove it after 
an agreement on a general realignment of currencies and trade liberalisation. This initial 
meeting indicated major differences on how to solve the monetary crisis and that the US would 
take a strong line to protect the value of the dollar in forthcoming negotiations. At the end of the 
meeting, Barber and O’Brien spoke to Volcker privately, assuring him that although the UK 
were “compelled to take a strong line to protect our interests”, this did not “denote 
unfriendliness towards the US” or a “lack of understanding of their problem”. Thus despite the 
major policy differences, and tension over the manner of the announcement, the UK sought to 
protect the overall close Anglo-American relationship.
112
       
 Following the Volcker discussions, Heath met with Barber and O’Brien, where he 
indicated that the EC countries should seek to work together on monetary policy. They agreed 
that if possible the UK should “reach agreement with the Six by the weekend on a new pattern 
of parities among the European countries”. Moreover, if they failed to reach agreement by the 
weekend then the London market would have to be re-opened by Monday 23 August 1971. In 
which case, the UK government hoped for “the European countries to float as a bloc against the 
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dollar”. The UK government wanted to work with the EC and other European countries in 
responding to the crisis.
113
  
Meetings between Barber and the EC ministers in Brussels from 19 to 21 August 1971 
failed to reach a common plan, which contributed towards prolonging the monetary instability 
and rupturing the movement towards EMU. Barber noted the “friendly atmosphere” and that the 
UK’s discussions with the Six displayed “an interchange of views among equals”. Barber 
expressed the UK’s desire to work with the EC on a solution to the monetary crisis. However, 
the Six failed to agree amongst themselves because “of the difficulty of agreeing on the degree 
of anti America-ness which should be adopted”.114 On Monday 23 August the Western 
European exchange markets re-opened after one week. The Bank of England and the Treasury 
announced that the parity of sterling remained unchanged at $2.40 to £1. However, they set no 
upper limit and the parity adjusted according to the market and government intervention 
(seeking to keep it below $2.50). By 27 August, the sterling-dollar parity had risen to $2.47. 
France and Belgium established a “double exchange market”, one commercial (for trade), and 
the other for finance and capital, an attempt at major currency control to protect the exchange 
rate from monetary flows. Meanwhile Japan, which had tried to maintain the parity of ¥360 to 
$1, allowed the yen to provisionally float on 27 August.
115
 This effectively brought in a 4 month 
period of “dirty” floating exchange rates - whereby governments and central banks occasionally 
intervened to change the direction in the value of their currencies – until the Smithsonian 
Agreement at the G-10 meeting on 18 December 1971, which realigned currencies and re-
established a fixed exchange rate.           
On 24 August 1971 Heath asked the DTI to put together contingency plans for 
retaliatory action against the US import surcharge, indicating that he still supported the 
possibility of strong action against the US. That same day the GATT established a working 
party to investigate the measures.
116
 Heath also showed concern about an investment tax credit, 
also announced by Nixon in the NEP, which sought to promote US machinery and equipment 
companies.
117
 The subsequent DTI report noted that the US measures would reduce UK exports 
to the US by £180 million, or 14%, in one full year (by August 1972). The DTI concluded that 
the only effective retaliation “would be a similar action against US exports to the UK”. 
However, the report noted that the “EEC...did not intend to take retaliatory action at present for 
fear of aggravating the problems”, which was an important warning because Heath wanted to 
work closely with the EC in responding to the NEP. Nevertheless, Heath believed that “we must 
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be prepared” and that “it gives us a bargaining position with the US”. 118 The UK government’s 
consideration of retaliation against the US displayed the breakdown in Anglo-American 
economic cooperation. 
Following on from the first week of the monetary crisis, Whitehall launched a major 
investigation and policy review into the measures. Two key personal advisers to Heath on the 
monetary crisis were Lord Cromer and Brian Redding. Lord Cromer had also experienced a 
long banking career in the City, followed by a stint as Governor of the Bank of England, 1961-
1966. His initial reaction to the NEP was that “the old concept that the dollar and sterling should 
stand together as the two major trading currencies is now obsolete. Sterling is not of the 
importance that it used to be; the dollar alone really matters”. As a solution he argued for “a 
European monetary bloc of a scale that signifies”, which Heath supported as a long term plan. 
This showed the beginning in a change of attitude towards the traditional Anglo-American 
monetary relationship.
119
  
Brian Redding, based in the Cabinet Office (1966-1972), advised Heath on economic 
matters. His first report to Heath also supported working with Europe on forming a common 
position. Redding called for “the creation of a truly international reserve system which winds up 
the use of sterling and dollars in international trade”.120 Heath commented that it was “an 
impressive analysis” and wanted to know “how does our strategy line up with this?”121 Redding 
then investigated the issue further, concluding that “the system to be aimed at is therefore the 
same as Keynes originally proposed” at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944. He urged the 
government to take the initiative and push the agenda of developing a world currency, like the 
Bancor (as proposed by Keynes) or the increased use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
122
 This 
would help fulfil Heath’s commitment to Pompidou in May 1971 to run down the sterling 
balances. Heath considered it “a powerful piece” and that “it is just possible that this is a 
moment in history when this could be achieved”.123 Robert Armstrong, Heath’s Principal 
Private Secretary, was sceptical as to whether it “would be much easier now then it was in 1945 
to accept a real international central bank”. He also warned that the UK would “be jumping well 
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ahead of our European partners”.124 Nevertheless, Heath had the reports sent to the Treasury and 
wanted Redding’s view taken into account.   
The G-10 meeting in London on 16 September 1971 to resolve the international 
monetary crisis ended in deadlock and created further strain between the rich economies. On the 
same day the GATT Council declared that the US temporary surcharge was “inappropriate” and 
incompatible with GATT.
125
 This placed pressure on the US to announce a timetable for its 
removal. But the G-10 countries could only agree on the very basics of the crisis, that the US 
had a serious balance of payments problem which needed correcting, and that a realignment of 
currencies would be part of the solution. Barber, summing up in his role as chair of the meeting, 
declared that no solution could be found at present because of (a) the lack of clarification on the 
temporary nature of the US import surcharge and (b) the US failure to show its willingness to 
contemplate a marginal devaluation in the dollar price of gold.
126
  
The US and UK also held frank bilateral talks during the G-10 meetings. Barber pushed 
Connolly on the need for a “neutral asset” and that the “SDR might be the new reserve”, in 
seeking to find a replacement for the sterling balances. Connolly said that the US could not put 
forward a plan themselves because they “had been attacked by others for trying to dictate”. 
Barber replied that he felt “disheartened that the US could feel that Britain would attack the 
US”.127 
At first the Nixon administration resisted the GATT and G-10 charge against the import 
surcharge, with Nixon saying in a press conference in Detroit on 23 September that the US 
would not give it up to placate her friends. But by time of the annual IMF meeting in 
Washington on 26 September, in the face of massive criticism, Connally stressed the temporary 
nature of the surcharge, to be removed once a realignment of currencies took place.
128
 This put 
aside the possibility of any immediate retaliatory action.  
Speaking at the IMF annual meeting on 28 September 1971, Barber publicly argued for 
a “move away from the use of national currencies as reserve assets” and that the “way forward 
lies in the development of the SDR”.129 But the UK initiative failed to take off as other 
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countries, such as Japan and the EC, were focused on establishing a realignment of currencies. 
The G-10 failure, the lack of progress at the annual IMF meeting, and the wide gap between the 
US and the other countries on the levels of realignment showed that the international economy 
faced a prolonged period of ‘dirty’ floating currencies. 
 In November 1971, both the UK and the US attempted to re-ignite Anglo-American 
cooperation, which displayed the commitment of both Heath and Nixon to the alliance. Deep 
concern had grown in London throughout September and October 1971 over the state of Anglo-
American relations. The FCO warned that “we should not permit differences with the US over 
economic measures to impede cooperation with the US government in other areas not directly 
related to the present controversy”.130 Heath directed the FCO to look into the broad question of 
the UK’s future relations with the US “in light of current developments”.131 The FCO produced 
a report which set out two key objectives. Firstly, it argued that the EC should move towards 
greater unity “while remaining in close partnership with the US”. Secondly, while pursuing its 
European commitments, the UK must “maintain as much influence in Washington as we can” 
and that it remained vital “to retain special links in the nuclear and intelligence fields”.132 The 
FCO Permanent Under-Secretary of State Denis Greenhill then sent out a reminder to all heads 
of missions and head of departments in the FCO that “relations between Britain, Europe, and the 
US are inevitably central to our foreign policy”.133 Whitehall launched a major effort seeking to 
repair any damage caused in Atlantic relations as a result of the international monetary crisis.   
Meanwhile, to solve the monetary crisis, and to rebuild Anglo-American and Atlantic 
cooperation, the Nixon administration proposed to hold a ‘heads of state’ summit with the major 
European powers.
134
 Heath and Douglas-Home initially thought there were “considerable 
dangers” to such a high profile meeting without serious groundwork behind the scenes.135 They 
also feared appearing as a Trojan horse during a period of economic and political crisis in 
Atlantic relations.
136
 Kissinger took Heath’s reply as a negative, and called Nixon on the 
telephone, telling him “they are not eager for that meeting...to put it mildly. They are playing 
the Gaullist line”. Yet Nixon replied “that’s fine, just an offer...I understand the British. They 
want to play their own line. But that’s alright, they have their own interests. I understand. Don’t 
you? I don’t think we ought to appear anxious with the British”. Kissinger quickly corrected his 
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negative interpretation, responding with “Oh, yes! Of course”, although adding the qualification 
that “the big mistake was made by Kennedy in pushing them so hard on the Common 
Market”.137 However, this key exchange illustrates a fundamental constant in Nixon’s policy 
1969-1973 - his commitment to the Anglo-American political and defence relationship. Despite 
scepticism towards the enlargement of the EC from within the US administration and federal 
government departments, Nixon supported the maintenance of close relations with Heath and 
their gaining entry into the EC.   
The US dropped the idea of a heads of state meeting, and sought to set up a series of 
key bilateral meetings with France, Britain, and Japan in late December before and after the G-
10 meeting on 17-18 December 1971, a move to push forward with reform of the international 
monetary system and to re-build cooperation in the Atlantic Alliance. Kissinger met with 
Cromer on 12 November 1971 to arrange a bilateral meeting in Bermuda. Despite the telephone 
call above, Kissinger told Cromer that Heath’s reply to the heads of state meeting had “been ill 
received by the President” and that a meeting between Heath and Nixon was essential if “cordial 
relations...were to be revived”. Cromer reported back to London that “the clearing of the air has 
been useful”, but that the impression had grown amongst Nixon and his advisers “that we have 
drifted away from the United States into the European enclave”.138 Greenhill at the FCO advised 
10 Downing Street that “we should not allow ourselves to be over-inhibited by fears of ‘Trojan 
horse’ accusations”.139 Heath then decided that he “did not see the developing of closer relations 
with the Community as affecting in any way his own close relations with President Nixon”.140 
Heath pushed ahead, writing to Nixon on 24 November 1971 in an attempt to restore close 
communications and to hurry along attempts at monetary reform at the upcoming G-10 meeting. 
He thanked Nixon for his “consistent and tactful support” for the UK’s application to join the 
EC and that a “united Europe will be beneficial for the Western Alliance”. On the monetary 
situation, Heath urged Nixon “to give, at least privately, some indication of the pattern of 
realignment that you would be prepared to see” and that there must be “some change in the 
price of gold”. He concluded by observing that “our habit of working together, which has stood 
the test so well in both good times and bad, will prove of particular value at this period of 
adaptation”.141 This strongly displayed the desire of the Heath government to maintain close 
Anglo-American relations and to cooperate on monetary reform.                
In fact, the key moment resolving the deadlock came just prior to the G-10 meeting, in 
the summit between Nixon and Pompidou in the Azores on 14 December 1971. At the meeting 
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Nixon agreed to devalue the dollar and remove the surcharge, on the basis that the yen and 
deutschmark would be re-valued, which paved the way for international agreement.
142
  
The G-10 meeting on 17 December 1971 in Washington, D.C. officially resolved the 
immediate monetary crisis through the Smithsonian Agreement, the results of which showed the 
continuing power of the US in the international economy. This involved a major revaluation of 
currencies against the dollar (an increase of 13.57% for the deutschmark, 16.9% for the yen, and 
8.57% for sterling and the franc), and a minor devaluation of the dollar-gold rate, from $35 to 
$38 an ounce (an 8.5% decrease). Sterling thus went from $2.40 to $2.60 per £1. Smithsonian 
removed the 10% import surcharge, but the dollar remained inconvertible to gold. The US 
achieved its main objective of forcing the other currencies to make major revaluations towards 
the dollar. Despite a small devaluation of the dollar the US remained the key economic power in 
the monetary system.   
The agreement also widened the band in which currencies could fluctuate, from 1% to 
2.25% each way, known as the “tunnel”.143 If one currency started at -2.25% to the dollar and 
appreciated up to + 2.25% and another currency did the reverse at the same time, each currency 
would have fluctuated by 4.5%, while the maximum change between those two currencies 
would actually be 9%. The EC and the three candidate countries (the UK, the Republic of 
Ireland, and Denmark) considered this fluctuation band too large in the context of their attempt 
to establish European monetary integration. On 24 April 1972 they created the “snake in the 
tunnel”, the first form of European monetary cooperation, which permitted only half the 
fluctuation margin against the dollar as authorised under Smithsonian.  
 At the Heath-Nixon summit in Bermuda on 20-21 December 1971, the two leaders re-
established the close relations built-up before the monetary crisis and showed the importance of 
the alliance to both countries. Nixon reasserted his support for British membership of the EC 
because “it must comprise at least one member who was capable of taking a world view of 
events”. He told Heath that Britain contrasted with France, “whose understanding of world 
affairs was even less than that of the Japanese”, and reported that in the Azores “he had been 
struck by President Pompidou’s relative lack of vision”. Kissinger jumped in and said that 
“President Pompidou had a keener grasp of financial questions than of the great problems of 
world politics”.144 Thus Nixon and Kissinger urged Heath to take a leading role in developing 
an outward-looking, Atlantic EC. Moving onto economic policy, Heath argued that the US and 
the enlarged EC needed to tackle long term monetary and trade problems. According to Nixon, 
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differences in Anglo-American policy were only “tactical”.145 Heath and Nixon continued to 
discuss a range of issues on China, the Soviet Union, the Indo-Pakistan conflict, and the Middle 
East, as the two countries re-established close cooperation in foreign policy.      
 
The Flotation of Sterling and the Collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement, 1972-1975 
 
 The flotation of sterling on 23 June 1972 started the move towards a flexible, floating 
international exchange rate system and the full unravelling of Bretton Woods. The lack of an 
international monetary crisis signalled the declining importance of sterling. It also showed that 
the US administration had little interest in defending the Smithsonian Agreement. On 24 April 
1972, the UK entered the EC “snake in the tunnel” mechanism. However, speculation grew 
against sterling around 16 June 1972, considered to be overvalued by the markets at $2.60. 
Penned into the narrow snake margins, sterling had little room to adjust. The Governor of the 
Bank of England Sir Lesley O’Brien believed that excessive inflation, poor trade figures, and 
the prolonged industrial relations dispute on the UK domestic scene had scared the market. 
Moreover, he blamed Barber for careless statements in his budget speech on 21 March 1972 on 
the importance of flexibility in monetary policy.
146
 Barber had argued that “it is neither 
necessary nor desirable to distort domestic economies to an unacceptable extent in order to 
maintain unrealistic exchange rates, whether they are too high or too low”, thus suggesting that 
the UK would leave the Smithsonian parities when needed.
147
 Significantly, Barber’s statement 
represents the change in thought that had occurred since August 1971. Throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s the governments and central banks of the major economies had made a huge effort to 
preserve the parities of Bretton Woods. But the period of “dirty” floating between August and 
December 1971 had altered perceptions on the ability of the world economy to adapt to new 
systems and work without fixed currency rates. The US had lifted the bar on free market 
floating and currency adjustment for national needs. 
 On 21 June 1972 Heath met with Barber and officials from the Treasury and the Bank 
of England to discuss options available to deal with the exchange market volatility against 
sterling that had grown since 16 June. The main decision taken was to raise the bank rate from 
5% to 6% in order to attract capital. Barber also raised the issue of possibly abandoning the 
Smithsonian sterling-dollar parity of $2.60, either through devaluation or flotation, telling Heath 
that he was “in favour of temporarily floating rather than devaluing” because the free market 
mechanism would have a greater effect. It is also the case that devaluation was considered by a 
significant proportion of the electorate to be a sign of weakness and economic incompetence, 
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while Heath himself considered the 1967 devaluation a defeat for Britain.
148
 The Treasury had 
in fact developed contingency plans for floating after the 1967 devaluation.
149
 But Barber 
expressed concern that it “would be contrary to the Community arrangements for narrow 
margins” and that it would be difficult to return to the “snake in the tunnel” by the 1 January 
1973 accession.
150
 However, by the afternoon of the next day, 22 June 1972, the outflow of 
capital had been so high that the Chancellor concluded that “the government had no option but 
to abandon the present fixed parity”. 151 It thus became an option of either devaluing to a $2.40 
fixed rate or floating. Heath approved a float for the next day, having been reassured by Barber 
that the EC were prepared to accept the “temporary” measure.  
Later that day in the Prime Minister’s room at the House of Commons Heath also 
signed off on exchange controls for the Sterling Area in order to halt the capital outflow. It 
redefined the sterling territories as the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, 
and the Republic of Ireland, essentially cutting out the other countries and abolishing the 
sterling area.
 152
 Robert Armstrong pointed out that “this was the end of a long song”. Usually 
such economic instruments would be dealt with by two junior Lord Commissioners of the 
Treasury. But “on this occasion” Barber suggested that the First and Second Lords (the Prime 
Minister and the Chancellor) should sign the instrument and “the Prime Minister accordingly 
signed”. 153 It marked a major show of intent to fully participate in EC economic integration. 
Ironically by 26 June 1972 sterling had drifted out of the EC “snake”, floating around $2.42 to 
$2.44 throughout the summer, thus undermining monetary union. This sequence of events 
showed that national needs overruled international currency relations.   
The Nixon administration displayed understanding toward the UK government’s 
economic difficulties and the decision to float the pound, and thus it caused no major problem in 
Anglo-American relations. Heath wrote a short letter to Nixon on 24 June 1972 to explain the 
“movement against sterling” and that the UK would “return to a fixed exchange rate as soon as 
conditions permit”, thus suggesting the temporary nature of the float.154 Heath followed this up 
two days later with a lengthy letter on the need for “radical changes” within a “shorter time-
scale”. He also told Nixon that such a change “will require a new political impetus from the top, 
in the United States”.155 Nixon, advised by the US Treasury, accepted the float of sterling and 
welcomed the chance to discuss reform, but rejected the idea of a US initiative and push for 
                                                 
148
  King, British Political Opinion, 330. 754 H.C. Deb. 1314, 22 November 1967. 
149
  Oliver & Hamilton, “Downhill from devaluation”, 486-512.   
150
  Note; “Note for the Record”; 21 June 1972; PREM 15/813; NAUK. 
151
  Note; “Note for the Record”; 22 June 1972; PREM 15/813; NAUK.  
152
  Minutes; “Note of a Meeting Held in Two Parts in the Prime Minister’s Room at the House of  
Commons”; 22 June 1972; PREM 15/813; NAUK. 
153
  For the full chain of events see Note; Robert Armstrong; “Note for the Record: Floating the  
Pound”; ND; PREM 15/813; NAUK.    
154
  Letter; Heath to Nixon; 24 June 1972; Box 3; Under Secretary: Country Files: UK; RG 56;  
NARA II. 
155
  Letter; Heath to Nixon; 26 June 1972; Box 3; Under Secretary: Country Files: UK; RG 56;  
NARA II. 
- 191 - 
 
reform (as seen following the economic crisis in August 1971), telling Heath that “we have not 
felt it useful to press for a specific single American plan”, thus displaying acceptance of the 
sterling flotation.
156
  
Actually Nixon’s acceptance of the sterling flotation can be accounted for by the strong 
support for free market policies from key members of the administration and Nixon’s 
preoccupation with the Watergate scandal and the upcoming presidential election. The US and 
UK had already discussed the issue of floating exchange rates. At the Bermuda summit in 
December 1971 Connally had told Barber that “he would himself have preferred to allow the 
dollar to float” but that the “pressure from other countries” had led to the fixed parity settlement 
at the Smithsonian.
157
 Internally, Nixon’s main economic advisers had supported floating 
exchange rates in line with the theories of Milton Friedman, as discussed above. The new 
Treasury Secretary George Shultz (from 12 June 1972) firmly supported free market monetary 
policies.
158
 Shultz wrote to Nixon pointing out that economically “this turmoil is of limited 
significance”, although he proposed some limited intervention to protect the dollar parity. This 
would make the US look “cooperative and constructive” with little cost, which would be useful 
if “Smithsonian rates break down anyway”.159 At the IMF annual conference in Washington on 
24 September 1972 Shultz told Barber that “the British were smart in the manner in which they 
floated” and that “it is fair to say that academic economists in the US and probably worldwide 
are enamoured of floating”, thus suggesting that the administration had no problem with the 
float.
160
  
The records also show an administration totally occupied with the upcoming November 
1972 presidential election and the Watergate scandal, reported in the press on 18 June 1972, five 
days before the sterling floatation.
161
 Nixon spent the morning of the sterling float, on 23 June, 
discussing with Haldeman the “Democratic break-in thing” and how best to control the FBI 
investigation.
162
 It would appear that the bulk of Anglo-American communications over the 
sterling floatation was under the direction of Kissinger and the Treasury Department, while 
Nixon focussed on domestic political issues.  
 Following on from the re-establishment of close Anglo-American relations at the 
Bermuda meeting in December 1971, Heath and Nixon held their last bilateral summit in 
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Washington on 1 and 2 February 1973, a high point in their relationship. Taking place only one 
month after the UK’s accession to the EC, Heath was the first leader invited to visit Nixon in 
Washington after his re-election. In December 1972 Nixon had implemented his third major air 
offensive of the year against North Vietnam - “Linebacker II”, dubbed the “Christmas 
Bombings”. European governments strongly criticised Nixon for the air campaign, apart from 
Heath. In the eyes of Nixon, Britain became the most important ally of the US. Nixon was 
“outraged...coldly furious” and felt “betrayed” by all European governments except by Heath, to 
whom he expressed deep “appreciation” and “gratitude”.163  
Throughout January the money markets had been volatile. Nixon pondered whether “we 
were heading for a new monetary crisis?” Shultz believed that “the Smithsonian Agreement was 
unravelling...one European currency after another was beginning to float”. He said that he “had 
been greatly impressed by the speed and decisiveness” of the UK government in their decision 
to float and “there was less and less to be said in favour of fixed rates”, thus indicating that the 
US government would not protect Smithsonian. On trade matters, the two countries pledged to 
cooperate in the attempt to establish a new round of GATT negotiations, with Heath telling 
Nixon that “there should be no difficulty between Britain and the United States on this score”.164 
Heath even held a meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to seek “a generous 
mandate” for the “president to negotiate on trade matters”.165 Despite Britain’s new status as a 
member of the EC, strong working Anglo-American relations were retained.           
The lack of an international monetary crisis following the flotation of Britain’s currency 
showed the declining importance of sterling as an international reserve currency, although it 
actually started the process towards the collapse of the Smithsonian Agreement and the final 
disintegration of Bretton Woods. Lord Cromer noticed what had occurred on 23 June 1972, 
telling Heath that “I never expected Bretton Woods to be felled by the denizens of Great George 
Street”.166 In early 1973 high US inflation and the removal of wage and price controls 
contributed to a run on the dollar, which was devalued in February by 10%, from $38 to $42.22 
per ounce of gold. On 12 March the EC currencies floated together (“snake without the tunnel”). 
At the end of March 1973 all the G-10 countries were floating.
167
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Nixon had praised the Smithsonian Agreement at the G-10 on 18 December 1971 as 
“the most significant monetary agreement in the history of the world”.168 However this turned 
out to be a massive overstatement. By the time that sterling floated in June 1972 Nixon had told 
Heath that “we need to go beyond a simple patching up of the Bretton Woods system”, an 
acknowledgement of what Smithsonian represented.
169
 The Smithsonian Agreement failed to 
address the fundamental structural flaws in the Bretton Woods system that existed before the 
NEP - the level of liquidity, adjusting disequilibrium, and the contradiction of a national 
currency operating as an international reserve currency. The US dollar continued to be the major 
reserve currency while also having a balance of payments deficit. Between June 1972 and 1975, 
most major currencies floated, unravelling Bretton Woods and Smithsonian, and bringing in a 
truly new monetary system of floating exchange rates, confirmed by the 1976 Jamaica 
Agreement.   
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The chapter has argued that Britain’s entry into the EC altered the status of sterling and 
therefore an adjustment took place in Anglo-American monetary relations. The EC took major 
steps towards EMU 1969-1970. Nevertheless, the Heath government sought to avoid monetary 
matters in the EC enlargement negotiations. But then from March-May 1971 it became clear 
that the French president wanted Heath to commit the UK to a run-down of the sterling balances 
and termination of its connection to the dollar. This displayed an obvious way in which the UK 
application and membership of the EC altered Anglo-American relations. However, this did not 
represent a major re-orientation. In fact, in the future the well-connected financial centres of 
London and New York would grow even closer, while the UK would remain out of the EC 
single currency zone. As the US remained the dominant reserve currency from 1970 up to 2011, 
the UK operated in between the EC and US currency blocks, influenced by both.   
 Between August and December 1971, a major communication breakdown occurred in 
Anglo-American relations, created by Nixon’s NEP. A close look at bilateral Anglo-American 
consultation revealed tensions over the substance of the NEP and in the manner of its unilateral 
announcement. Nevertheless, the two sides worked together to re-establish monetary order 
during the crisis, and reignited close Anglo-American cooperation at Bermuda (December 1971) 
and in Washington (February 1973). International monetary relations were transformed as a 
result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the EC movement toward monetary 
integration. The ‘dirty’ floating seen in the international economy after Nixon’s NEP have 
similar characteristics to the currency wars of the 2007-2011 economic crisis. This chapter 
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increases our understanding of both the beginning of flexible, floating exchange rates post-
1971, the development of EMU, and Anglo-American monetary relations during the first EC 
enlargement. 
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Chapter 6: 
Anglo-American Defence Relations and the EC Enlargement (1969-1974) 
 
 This chapter argues that the maintenance and strengthening of Anglo-American defence 
collaboration during the Heath-Nixon period showed that Britain’s entry into the EC did not 
weaken the alliance. Defence issues did not feature in the official EC enlargement negotiations. 
Nevertheless the French and Heath governments discussed the feasibility of future Anglo-
French nuclear cooperation. Heath gave serious consideration to this, and felt the need to 
display the UK’s commitment to European defence cooperation while negotiating entry into the 
EC. However, the incompatibility of the UK and French nuclear forces meant that no concrete 
steps were taken. Moreover, the MOD and defence establishment strongly opposed moving 
away from US-UK nuclear collaboration. Meanwhile, the Heath government embarked on a 
major project to upgrade the Polaris nuclear missile system, approved by the US. The 
relationship remained a key Cold War alliance, despite Britain’s entry into the EC. Furthermore, 
throughout the Heath-Nixon period, the two countries continued to share military facilities. The 
UK’s decision to retain a limited presence East of Suez also strengthened the Anglo-American 
relationship, both politically and militarily, and showed that the UK still intended to retain a 
limited though global role in foreign affairs.  
 Substantial scholarly attention has focussed on Anglo-American defence and nuclear 
cooperation, largely considered to be the cornerstone of the ‘special’ relationship by historians 
looking at the functional aspects of the alliance.
1
 The historiography of Heath-Nixon nuclear 
relations is not fully developed, mainly because the government sources are only just being 
released. Helen Parr looked at Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and concluded that it failed 
because of French opposition, it never really developed into a ‘policy’ throughout Whitehall, 
and it was considered only in the context of Anglo-American nuclear cooperation.
2
 Thomas 
Robb argued that US-UK political difficulties over the Year of Europe had a major influence on 
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the Heath government’s decision on how to upgrade the Polaris system.3 The inner workings of 
the French government and the other five countries of the EC requires further historical 
research. This is a new field, to which this chapter contributes, by looking at the balance 
between Anglo-French and Anglo-American collaboration from the US and UK perspectives, 
within the context of the EC enlargement. It shows that Anglo-American defence collaboration 
actually increased under Heath and Nixon. 
 While NATO defence issues are important, this has been considered in the context of 
foreign policy priorities in chapter 2, and thus excluded here. As previously discussed, US 
domestic pressure grew over alliance burden sharing and on the level of US troops in Europe.  
But both the US and UK were strongly committed to NATO, as a key component of the Atlantic 
Alliance and overall Cold War strategy. This chapter starts by looking at Anglo-American 
military cooperation at Diego Garcia and at Singapore/Malaysia, East of Suez. It then considers 
the relationship between Anglo-French nuclear collaboration and the Anglo-American nuclear 
relationship. 
________________ 
 
Military Facilities 
 
Diego Garcia, 1970 
 
 Anglo-American mutual facilities in the defence and intelligence field composed a 
significant part of the relationship during the Heath-Nixon years, displaying the importance of 
the alliance during Britain’s negotiations to join the EC. These facilities were important for 
operations, training, communications, and intelligence. The large number of UK island 
dependencies around the world which the US could use for its defence strategy was unmatched 
by any other country. Meanwhile, the US could provide the funds to actually build and maintain 
these facilities, thus proving mutually beneficial. The agreement on the Diego Garcia facilities 
displayed the continuation of this relationship. 
On 8 September 1970 Heath requested that Douglas-Home review the extent of US-UK 
cooperation in using military installations, which revealed the major integration of Anglo-
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American contingency, communication, and intelligence bases around the world.
4
 In the UK, 
the US had airfields (and access to RAF bases, such as at Lossiemouth), a base for their US 
Polaris nuclear submarines at Holy Loch (from 1962-1992), and a US Ballistic Missile Early 
Warning System installation (and space surveillance) at RAF Fylingdales. Moreover, the US 
made regular use of the UK’s bases in Gibraltar and Malta, and at certain times the UK’s 
Cyprus base, Akrotiri. These formed a significant component of Anglo-American intelligence 
sharing, and were important for the US nuclear presence in Europe. 
 Beyond Europe, the US built an airfield on the UK’s Ascension Island in the South 
Atlantic Ocean and used the UK’s facilities in Hong Kong and Singapore in the Far East. In the 
Caribbean, the US and UK had joint underwater test facilities, five joint airfields in the 
Bahamas, shared communications facilities in Bermuda, and the UK gave the US access to 
missile and space tracking, navigation, and other facilities in Bermuda, the Bahamas, the Turks 
and Caicos Islands, Antigua, and Barbados. The UK used US facilities in Puerto Rico. As well 
as sharing military and communications facilities, the US and UK exchanged intelligence and 
defence research and development information. Finally, a US-UK Planning Group in London, 
established in 1968, coordinated US and UK military planning.
5
 Douglas-Home commented that 
the “complexity and breadth of these exchanges is impressive”, which signalled that the UK 
would seek to continue this relationship and not focus primarily on a European defence 
position.
6
            
 From the mid-1960s and into the 1970s Anglo-American concern grew over the 
increasing Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, which led to major defence cooperation on the 
UK-controlled island Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). On 30 
December 1966, a US-UK exchange of diplomatic notes established the basis of cooperation in 
the region for an initial period of 50 years, in which the UK would retain complete sovereignty 
over the BIOT, while the US could build military installations. On 3 September 1968 the UK 
approved in principal the construction of a Diego Garcia facility, providing for communications, 
petroleum storage, and an airfield with an 8,000 foot runway, anchorage dredging, and facilities 
for around 270 personnel.
7
 At Chequers on 3 October 1970 Heath raised with Nixon the issue of 
Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean, suggesting that they were starting to pose a political 
threat which in time could disrupt sea and air routes for the alliance. Due to this, Heath said that 
“we would be willing to cooperate with the American project at Diego Garcia”. The US and UK 
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decided to embark on a joint review of the Indian Ocean which showed continuing cooperation 
in this region.
8
 
At the meeting Heath also suggested arming South Africa, which created some political 
difficulties in Anglo-American relations. Heath believed that the Soviet military presence 
growing around the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Agulhas, at the point where the Indian Ocean 
met the Atlantic Ocean, by South Africa, posed a major threat to sea routes vital to the UK. 
Heath wanted to supply the South African government with arms, frigates, and helicopters. But 
the US had a substantial African-American population, which would oppose any moves to sell 
arms to South Africa, an apartheid state. Nevertheless, Nixon said that the US “would not do 
anything to embarrass the British” on the issue. Both Heath and Nixon agreed that the apartheid 
state would soon break down for economic reasons, but in the meantime it would be important 
to protect the state from external threats. Nixon said that “it was fashionable to condemn 
apartheid and to oppose South Africa”, but that the US and the UK should “not go along with 
fashion if it was against their national interests”.9 Despite major domestic difficulties for Nixon, 
from the Congress, public opinion, the media, and within his administration, he accepted the 
UK’s position on arming South Africa.     
 In early December 1970 the joint US-UK discussions on the Indian Ocean took place, 
which revealed the importance of increasing their political and military presence in the region. 
Both the US and UK reported two to four ships in a Soviet combatant force (destroyers and a 
guided missile cruiser), with six support ships operating in the Indian Ocean. This did not 
constitute a major military threat to the countries in the region, or the shipping lanes up to 1975. 
The US, the UK, and Australian combined naval presence equalled the Soviets, and in terms of 
ship days and port stops, far exceeded the Soviets. However, both the US and UK intelligence 
services expected an increase in activities from 1975 onwards, including the development of a 
naval logistic base East of Suez. Both sides agreed on the importance of establishing the 
communication and refuelling base at Diego Garcia, in order to support their Cold War 
policies.
10
 On 15 December 1970 came the formal announcement of the Anglo-American 
agreement on the Diego Garcia development.
11
      
 In 1971 the US government considered an enlargement of the Diego Garcia facility into 
to a full naval and air facility in order to deter the Soviet Union in the region. The DOD 
considered Diego Garcia, in the centre of the Indian Ocean, “invulnerable to the whims of host 
governments”, an “attractive” option for a major upgrade to provide major support for US and 
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allied forces. The administration delayed the decision until the initial facilities under the US-UK 
agreement were completed in March 1973. But this reflected a growing fear in the 
administration towards a possible power vacuum in the region as a result of a major UK 
withdrawal from East of Suez, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.     
 
East of Suez, 1970-1971 
 
The Heath government’s decision to maintain a limited military and political role in 
South East Asia showed that the government sought to retain a world role, rather than just 
focusing on regional, European matters, as argued by some historians.
12
 This strengthened 
Anglo-American cooperation in Cold War policy under Heath and Nixon. The key factors 
influencing Heath were (a) domestic politics and (b) the Anglo-American relationship and the 
Atlantic Alliance. The significance in the force lay in retaining a limited military base in the 
region for the use of the Atlantic Alliance and aiming to contribute towards stability, acting as a 
political deterrent in the Cold War. However, while Heath retained a presence in 
Singapore/Malaysia, the UK continued to withdraw from its position in the Middle East and 
Gulf region, which marked a major shift in the Middle East.
13
         
A domestic political debate over the level of Britain’s ‘East of Suez’ commitment had 
begun in Whitehall and amongst ministers during the Macmillan Government.
14
 Soon after the 
Labour Party came into government in October 1964, Harold Wilson outlined government 
policy on Britain’s global defence strategy during a House of Commons debate on foreign 
affairs on 16 December 1964: “I want to make it quite clear that whatever we may do in the 
field of cost effectiveness…we cannot afford to relinquish…our ‘east of Suez’ role.”15 This 
entailed a network of military outposts stretching eastward from the Suez Canal in the Middle 
East through the Indian Ocean and on to Singapore and Hong Kong in the Far East. With 55,000 
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British troops stationed East of Suez, costing around £317 million a year by 1966, this 
constituted a major defence commitment.
16
 Moreover, British army, navy, and air forces 
worldwide numbered more than 400,000, requiring that 7% of Gross National Product be spent 
on defence.
17
  
Britain’s world-wide system of bases and forces East of Suez became increasingly 
important to US Cold War policy in the 1960s during the Johnson administration.
18
 The US had 
made large political, economic and military commitments in South Vietnam (see chapter 2). The 
Johnson administration feared that a British withdrawal from East of Suez would create a power 
vacuum and threaten US interests in the region. However, Wilson had inherited an £800 million 
balance of payments deficit, which posed a long-term threat to sterling, British defence, and the 
US dollar. Whitehall had already begun an assessment of defence priorities, and Wilson 
subsequently initiated a series of ministerial defence reviews from November 1964 onwards.
19
 
On 18 July 1967, a ‘Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy’ declared: “We plan to 
withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the middle 1970s”, a U-turn 
on defence policy. Meanwhile, the Wilson government applied for membership of the EC. This 
seemed to indicate a shift away from Britain’s global role to a more regional foreign and 
defence policy.
20
 
Heath opposed the position of the Wilson government on ‘East of Suez’, which created 
a domestic political dimension to his decision to retain an East of Suez presence. Heath said that 
Labour had adopted an irresponsible defence position which undermined the UK’s world 
influence, stability in South East Asia, and the Anglo-American relationship.21 The 1970 
election manifesto declared that “by unilaterally deciding to withdraw our forces from these 
areas by the end of 1971, the Labour Government have broken their promises”. He proposed 
developing a five-power defence force – the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and 
Singapore - to help maintain stability in South East Asia. Therefore Heath had politically 
committed himself to some form of reversal on East of Suez policy before entering 
government.
22
  
As well as domestic political factors, the government also made a connection between 
keeping troops East of Suez and maintaining close Anglo-American relations, particularly in the 
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nuclear and intelligence field. The Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend advised Heath on 30 June 
1970 that “the more closely we cooperate with Europe, the more reluctant the Americans will be 
(despite their professed support for Western European integration) to share their secrets with 
us.”23 Trend believed that the Nixon administration would no longer separate economic, 
political, and defence issues. If the interests of the UK and US conflicted in trade policy, then 
there could be repercussions in the level of Anglo-American nuclear relations. At the Defence 
and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) on 1 July 1970, ministers observed that special nuclear 
and intelligence cooperation with the US “depended on our continuing to have something to 
offer the United States.”24 Ministers then undertook in principle to maintain a political and 
defence commitment in South East Asia.
25
 The Heath government sought to strengthen 
cooperation with the Americans in the defence field, which they thought would counterbalance 
any negative economic effects as a result of Britain joining the EC.     
Heath also perceived that the UK and the US had similar interests in South East Asia. 
The two countries both sought to contain Chinese influence in the region and prevent the spread 
of communism. Moreover, the US position in Vietnam and the UK’s in Malaysia were mutually 
supporting each other’s Cold War objectives. Heath wanted to retain troops in South East Asia, 
independently of the American position, because he believed in a world role for Britain, but his 
view of the Anglo-American relationship reinforced his support for retaining British troops East 
of Suez.
26
  
However, Heath had warned his party leadership to avoid making any links between the 
Vietnam War and their East of Suez policy. Speaking at the Selsdon Park Hotel in February 
1970 just prior to the election, Heath said, with regards to South East Asia, that “we are not 
there to carry out war.”27 Wilson had told voters to watch out for Tory military policies which 
would get Britain involved in a Vietnam War situation.
28
 British public opinions also suggested 
strong opposition to any involvement with Vietnam.
29
 So, on the domestic front, the 
Conservatives wanted to play down any connection between maintaining a presence East of 
Suez and their support for US policies in the region, which could be linked to Vietnam by the 
press and opposition parties in the House of Commons. To the British general public, Heath 
presented his East of Suez policy as necessary in providing stability in Malaysia and 
Singapore.
30
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During the Wilson run-down of forces East of Suez, the Nixon administration looked 
into the impact of the move on US interests, the results of which displayed the importance that 
the administration attached to retaining some form of presence in the region.
31
 The primary 
interests of the US in Malaysia/Singapore derived from its strategic location and for the 
production of raw materials. Strategically, the US wanted to ensure the continuation of Allied 
control of the military facilities, protecting the international sea and air corridors in the region 
and allowing for US access to logistical support facilities for contingency use, particularly in 
light of the increased Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean. On the economic side, the US wanted 
a favourable political and security climate for trade and investment for US business interests. 
Therefore, a key objective of the Nixon administration in Malaysia/Singapore focussed on the 
maintenance of economic, political, and military stability as a part of their Cold War defence 
strategy.
32
    
The FCO, aware of Heath’s position, advised the new government to not reverse the 
East of Suez withdrawal because of the EC application. Sir Denis Greenhill, the FCO 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, argued that the UK would be able to maximise its 
influence by concentrating on the EC and European defence.33 The FCO and Heath agreed on 
the importance of gaining entry into the EC, but differences emerged on the FCO assessment of 
Britain’s role in South East Asia. On 21 July 1970, Douglas-Home’s memorandum on foreign 
policy priorities ranked South East Asia as the least important region to British political, 
economic, and defence interests, which included Singapore/Malaysia, where Heath wished to 
retain a role. According to the memorandum Britain would “not seek to play a dominant role in 
the area”.34 Trend commented to Heath that “the emphasis which the memorandum places on 
the priority to be given to our European and Atlantic interests is a clear warning against 
premature commitments elsewhere in the world.”35 However, the Conservative election 
manifesto had already committed the government to stop the run-down of British forces East of 
Suez.  Heath overruled scepticism from the FCO, which displayed his desire to retain a world 
role and protect Anglo-American security cooperation.  
The government debated the exact nature of Britain’s East of Suez commitment at the 
DOP on 22 July 1970, focussing on Singapore and Malaysia, rather than the Middle East. On 
the political side, the committee decided to replace the bilateral Anglo-Malaysian Defence 
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Agreement with a multilateral agreement between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, 
and Malaysia.
36
 The government preferred a multilateral agreement to a bilateral one because 
they did not want Britain to play a predominant role, but a function equal to that of New 
Zealand and Australia, with the purpose of “contributing to stability in the area by acting as a 
deterrent” against external threats.37 The government examined Britain’s position in South East 
Asia through the lens of the Cold War, in which Chinese influence in the area had to be checked 
and American efforts in the region supported. 
Carrington and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) compiled a report on the exact number 
and cost of British forces East of Suez. The objective was to balance a commitment to ‘East of 
Suez’ with Britain’s top defence priority, NATO. Therefore, Carrington and the MOD 
supported the smallest force which would be “militarily viable and meet the political need”, 
highlighting the major political aspect to this policy.
38
 Force and personnel levels in South East 
Asia (still remaining in 1970 under the Wilson government’s run-down plan) were around 
42,000, which included sixteen Royal Navy ships, fifty-two Royal Air Force aircraft, and six 
army contingents. Carrington and the MOD wanted to reduce the force to five ships 
(frigates/destroyers), one battalion with an air platoon, one artillery battery, up to four Nimrod 
(reconnaissance) aircraft, six whirlwind helicopters, and logistical and engineer personnel, 
which they judged to be a credible conventional force to maintain a base presence without large 
economic costs. One submarine (without nuclear weapons) could also be provided if 
consultations with the other parties required a stronger UK commitment. The lack of any 
permanent nuclear presence undermined the military importance of this force.
39
 Carrington 
expected the cost to be roughly £2-5 million per annum, not including full support services. For 
Carrington and the MOD, the importance of the force lay in the need for a strong enough 
conventional deterrent in the region to fulfil the government’s political objectives – both 
domestic and international. The DOP supported this view and on 23 July 1970, the Cabinet 
endorsed the conclusion of the DOP to maintain troops East of Suez.
40
    
The Treasury expressed some opposition to Heath’s South East Asia policy. The 
Treasury had warned Heath not to commit the UK to South East Asia because of the possibility 
that externally promoted insurgency in Malaysia could draw the government into counter-
insurgency operations. The Treasury had assessed the military commitment in the context of 
overall public expenditure, and therefore the department felt that Britain could not afford a 
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prolonged conflict. The Treasury also questioned whether Carrington and the MOD really 
offered the minimum UK military contribution necessary to provide the multilateral pact with 
conventional force credibility. The Treasury warned Heath that “…we need to avoid piecemeal 
decisions about defence expenditure.”41 Trend picked up on this point and advised Heath: 
“There is a considerable risk that, by tackling the problem of defence policy piecemeal in this 
way, we shall lose sight of the wood for the trees”. The government also needed to consider 
upgrading the UK’s nuclear weapons system at a major cost, discussed below.42      
Nevertheless, the MOD and Heath overruled opposition from the FCO and the Treasury 
for retaining a limited East of Suez presence. Heath had already attached political importance to 
South East Asia and wanted a world role for Britain, as analysed above. Thus, Heath partly 
reversed the decision of the Wilson government, overruling the long-term positions of officials 
at the FCO and the Treasury. Heath and the MOD were in line on their South East Asia 
policies.
43
  
Carrington made a Far Eastern tour in July and August 1970, visiting Malaysia, 
Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand to negotiate the new defence arrangements for East of 
Suez. Britain’s force contributions remained as set out by Carrington at the DOP, with a (non 
nuclear) Oberon submarine stationed in Sydney, Australia. The total number of personnel would 
be 4,000, a significant run-down from the 1970 force level of 42,000. The MOD estimated the 
full cost to be between £5-10 million a year.
44
 This did not represent a major military presence 
in overall defence strategy. As Carrington later wrote, its importance at the time was as “a signal 
that we in Britain had not shrunk to sole and solitary preoccupation with our own home 
concerns and domestic security”, and therefore it displayed a political commitment to retain an 
interest in world affairs, rather than on just regional, European issues as a result of seeking 
membership of the EC.
45
 
At Chequers on 3 October 1970 Nixon welcomed Heath’s decision to retain a 
commitment to Singapore/Malaysia, telling him that “it was the political and diplomatic aspect 
of this presence which mattered more than its military content”. Heath replied that the new 
arrangements would “bring stability to the area”. He also believed that the proposed five power 
defence arrangements helped to increase the role of Australia in maintaining security in the 
region.
46
 The US had large numbers of troops committed to Europe and Asia, and therefore 
Heath played on the US desire for help from allies with the defence burden in maintaining its 
world-wide deterrence policy. On 28 October 1970, the government released its Defence White 
                                                 
41
  Memo; “UK Military Presence in South East Asia: A Memorandum by the Chief Secretary of  
the Treasury”; 21 July 1970; CAB 148/101, DOP (70) 12; NAUK.  
42
  Memo; Trend to Heath; 21 July 1970; PREM 15/1376; NAUK.  
43
  Minutes; 22 July 1970; CAB 148/101 DOP (70) 4
th
 Meeting; NAUK. 
44
  Memo; “UK Military Presence in South East Asia After 1971: A Memorandum by the Secretary  
of State for Defence”; 1 October 1971; CAB 148/102, DOP (70) 26; NAUK. 
45
  Carrington, Reflect on Things Past, 218-220. Heath, The Course, 481. 
46
  Minutes; “Record of Meeting held at Chequers”; 3 October 1970, 11.40 a.m.; PREM 15/714;  
NAUK.  
- 205 - 
 
Paper. While NATO remained the first priority of the UK’s defence posture, the White Paper 
expressed the government’s “determination that Britain should also play her part in countering 
threats to stability outside the NATO area”, thus showing that foreign and defence policy 
stretched beyond the European scope.
47
        
Internally, some US federal government departments expressed frustration with Heath’s 
Defence White Paper. The Department of Defence (DOD) noted “some disappointment” with 
the size of the British measures East of Suez and in NATO. The State Department thought that 
the low level of the UK’s military commitment will “have killed off any chance” that some 
other European countries would increase their contributions to the defence burden.
48
 Kissinger 
referred to it as Heath’s “token presence East of Suez”. Nevertheless, Kissinger advised Nixon 
that the contents of the White Paper “mark the reversal of the declining trend in the UK’s 
NATO contribution”, and that in fact it could have “some psychological importance” in 
encouraging other NATO partners to increase their forces. He also believed that the “British 
have probably done about as much as they can”.49 Nixon subsequently issued a directive to the 
State Department and the DOD to “take a positive attitude towards the British decisions”.50 
The Defence Ministers of the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia 
met in London and concluded the agreement on 16 April 1971. In September of that year, an 
Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was established for Malaysia and Singapore under the 
agreements, and British forces, placed under the command umbrella of ANZUK, created a 
tripartite force of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. While the administration welcomed the 
UK’s decision in Singapore/Malaysia, the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf region left a 
power gap.
51
 The administration adopted a policy to increase the US political presence in the 
region, marking a shift from the UK to the US.
52
    
 Heath chose to maintain limited troops in South East Asia for two main reasons. 
Firstly, on the domestic front, the Five Power Defence arrangements fulfilled an election pledge 
to reverse the East of Suez run-down, without a serious economic and military commitment. 
Heath made the pledge because he wanted to retain a world role rather than just focussing on 
European defence matters and as a method of opposing the Wilson government’s military 
credentials. Secondly, Heath shared America’s Cold War strategy in the region, which sought to 
contain the spread of communist influence. Meanwhile, the US government supported Heath’s 
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decision on East of Suez because it stopped the trend of the UK reducing its contribution to 
world-wide defence. Moreover, it provided the necessary military presence to protect the sea 
and air lanes in the region. In fact, during the Yom Kippur War, the UK supplied the US navy 
with over 17,000 tons of fuel from their bases in Singapore and the Indian Ocean, which 
showed the importance of Anglo-American defence cooperation.
53
   
 
Nuclear Relations 
 
Anglo-French Nuclear Collaboration, 1970-1971 
 
In the 1960s and 1970s a debate grew in Anglo-French diplomatic circles on the 
possibility of a long term nuclear cooperation project.
54
 Realistically this seemed remote in the 
1960s under de Gaulle because he wanted to develop an independent nuclear force for France.
55
 
Moreover, in 1966, de Gaulle had withdrawn France from the military part of NATO, and 
turned down the proposal of a shared nuclear force with Britain and the US. But in 1969, the 
new French President, Pompidou, took a more sympathetic view of Britain joining the EC, and 
had called for greater defence integration.
56
 Heath had backed the idea of Anglo-French nuclear 
collaboration as Leader of the Opposition in the late 1960s.
57 
The opening of Britain’s 
negotiations to join the EC revived interest in the idea.
58
    
The possibility of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation seemed to challenge the nature of 
the US-UK nuclear relationship. Between 1958 and 1964, Britain and the US had reached 
agreements on the exchange of information about the design and production of nuclear 
warheads and delivery system and on the transfer of materials, culminating in the Nassau 
Agreement, in which US President Kennedy sold Britain the Polaris missile delivery system.
59
 
The UK built the submarines and warheads. This transatlantic nuclear collaboration formed a 
central part of the ‘special’ Anglo-American relationship. The UK’s strategic force, assigned to 
NATO, strengthened the Atlantic Alliance and the security of Western Europe (although the UK 
maintained independent strike control). Another aspect of the Anglo-American defence 
relationship, the sharing of military facilities in the UK, formed a part of the US nuclear 
                                                 
53
  Memo; Sir John A. Thomson (FCO Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Defence/International  
Security Affairs); “Fuel for the US Navy”; 13 December 1973; FCO 46/962.    
54
  Report; “Anglo-French Relations”; September 1970; PREM 15/1560; NAUK. 
55
  Samuel Wells, “The United States, Britain, and the Defence of Europe”, in The Special  
Relationship, eds., Bull & Louis, 132.     
56
  Telegram; Christopher Soames (British Ambassador in Paris) to FCO; Diplomatic Report No.  
192/70; 5 March 1970; FCO 33/985; NAUK. 
57
  Heath, Old World, New Horizons, 4. 
58
  804 H.C. Deb. 235-238, 21 July 1970. 
59
  Middeke, “Anglo-American Nuclear Weapons”, 69-96. The key agreements were the 1958  
“Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes” and 
the 1963 “Polaris Sales Agreement”.   
- 207 - 
 
presence in Europe.
60
 Under the Nassau arrangements, Britain would not pass on US atomic 
information to other countries without US consent, and so any Anglo-French cooperation would 
require US approval. Anglo-French nuclear cooperation implied a potential shift in Britain’s 
nuclear relations from the US to France and the EC, and questioned the future nature of 
European defence.   
Douglas-Home and the French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann discussed the 
principal of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in Paris on 15 July 1970. Douglas-Home said 
that “there should be no taboo” in broaching the question of future nuclear relations with the 
UK government. Moreover, he argued that as the US progressively withdrew from Europe over 
the next few decades, greater responsibilities would fall on the two European nuclear powers 
and thus there might be scope for a “kind of Franco-British force”. Schumann said that no taboo 
existed on the French side, but that “nuclear cooperation would have to be outside NATO”. In 
principle this challenged the traditional US-UK nuclear relationship, the UK’s position on 
NATO, and France’s independent stance on nuclear policy. But this exchange lacked real 
substance.
61
   
In October 1970 a paper prepared by the MOD and the FCO recommended that the 
government avoid any initiative on Anglo-French collaboration so as to not disrupt the US-UK 
nuclear relationship. The departments argued that over the decades EC integration in the 
defence field would probably grow. However in the immediate term no form of technical 
cooperation with France could remotely compare in value to the nuclear relationship with the 
US. The UK’s dependence on US technology thus undermined the argument for cooperating 
with the French. The paper also thought that “there is little likelihood” that the US government 
would support Anglo-French collaboration both politically and in terms of technological 
transfer. 
Throughout 1970 and 1971 the Heath government believed that they needed to convince 
the French that the UK was committed to the European integration project in all fields, 
including defence, which in theory would help them gain entry into the EC. But regarding the 
UK’s application to join the EC the FCO/MOD report concluded that the “value of an offer of 
cooperation as a card of entry to the Communities is...at best limited”. This strongly backed the 
continuation of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship and expressed scepticism at the 
prospect of cooperation with the French.
62
  
However, some members of the Heath government and officials strongly disagreed with 
this assessment, which displayed uncertainty over the UK’s future nuclear relations. The 
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Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (CDL) Geoffrey Rippon considered it “negative and 
shaky” and that the US might actually welcome a greater European role in nuclear research.63 
Solly Zuckerman (Chief Scientific Adviser, 1964-1971) told Heath that the FCO’s political 
views had clearly been overridden by MOD technical experts, thus distorting the paper.
64
 The 
Cabinet Secretary Sir Burke Trend also found the paper “negative”. This represented a dilemma 
in government over the balance to be sought between maintaining the Anglo-American nuclear 
relationship and pursuing future Anglo-French collaboration. 
Indeed, over the coming months a major divide emerged between the MOD and the 
FCO. The MOD did not believe that an effective force could be realistically created with the 
French before the mid-1980s, by which time the UK’s Polaris missile system would be obsolete, 
and thus in the intervening time the UK needed to work with the US. This could be jeopardised 
if the UK pursued nuclear collaboration with the French too quickly and too prominently. On 
the other hand, the FCO took the view that in order to bring France back into a collective 
Europe or Atlantic defence organisation the UK must offer France the opportunity for 
collaboration, rather than keeping nuclear cooperation exclusively with the US. Trend warned 
Heath that “it would be fatal to sacrifice the substance for the shadow” and that Anglo-French 
nuclear cooperation “may prove to be merely an illusion”.65 Even so, this should not prevent the 
UK approaching the issue in the FCO’s “spirit of initiative” rather than the MOD’s “spirit of 
gradualism”.66      
On 18 November 1970 Heath held a top secret meeting with Douglas-Home and the 
Secretary of Defence Lord Carrington on the opportunities for Anglo-French nuclear 
collaboration. Despite the MOD/FCO paper, Heath believed that defence issues might be 
significant in gaining French support for the UK’s entry into the EC. He wanted a positive 
position established in time for a possible meeting with the French President Pompidou in May 
or June 1971 which could help in the “striking of a final bargain on the terms of entry”. 
Carrington recognised both the organisational and technical difficulties of working with 
France.
67
 Organisationally, the UK’s nuclear deterrent functioned as part of NATO and the 
Atlantic Alliance, while the French nuclear force operated independently. Similarly, on the 
technical front the UK worked with the US, in contrast to France which developed their nuclear 
capability nationally. This underlined the obstacles to any Anglo-French nuclear force 1970-
1974 and was the foundation of the MOD’s scepticism. Nevertheless, Heath decided (in 
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agreement with the FCO) to make an approach to the US administration on the issue of Anglo-
French nuclear cooperation. 
But first Carrington sought clarification from the French Defence Minister, Michel 
Debré, on the possibility of nuclear cooperation, important in light of the need to decide on the 
nature of the UK’s Polaris missile system upgrade (discussed below). Meeting in London on 20 
November 1970, Debré said that France’s defence system needed to be independent and that 
their government did “not favour a multilateral approach”. Moreover, the French believed that 
the UK’s nuclear relationship with the US prevented any major Anglo-French cooperation in the 
foreseeable future. This supported the argument for building closer US-UK nuclear relations.
68
    
 At the December 1970 Washington summit Heath and Nixon viewed Anglo-French 
nuclear cooperation as a beneficial component of the Atlantic Alliance, and thus they reached an 
Anglo-American understanding on the issue. In arranging the meeting, Heath specifically asked 
for a private conversation with Nixon which the administration arranged to take place at Camp 
David.
69
 Heath informed Nixon that the French might be interested in collaborating in the 
defence field which might create the opportunity to bring France closer to NATO and perhaps 
even back into the organisation. Nixon strongly supported any move to bring France back into 
NATO, telling Heath that “you should feel that you have a great deal of running room on 
this....I would tend to be quite outgoing”. Kissinger warned that this was domestically a “very 
sensitive issue”. The administration already faced pressure over the level of US troops in 
Europe, which would come under further strain in light of Anglo-French cooperation. It could 
also undermine Congressional support for the US-UK nuclear relationship. Kissinger requested 
that the UK refrain from discussing the issue with the State Department and the DOD, and deal 
directly with himself and the president.
70
 Nixon and Heath kept in close personal contact on this 
issue.
71
    
 The Washington summit also showed that the MOD had underestimated the willingness 
of the US to contemplate Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. In fact, the US themselves 
embarked on a move towards working with the French in this field. On 28 April 1971 Kissinger 
informed Cromer, for the “eyes of [the] Prime Minister only”, that the US would soon approach 
the French on an interchange of information on building a safer nuclear weapon, which could in 
the long-term open the door to a triangular US-UK-French nuclear relationship.
72
 Heath reacted 
to this with the concern that the French might assume that the US move had been inspired by 
the UK, creating a political problem in the EC negotiations, while the FCO thought that this 
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initiative would cut out the UK.
73
 But the administration reassured the UK that US information 
would only help the French develop a safer weapon, not a stronger weapon, and thus it only 
represented a basic level of cooperation.
74
    
 In January 1971 Jean-François Deniau, the French EC Commissioner in charge of the 
enlargement negotiations, advised Heath that a British initiative on Anglo-French nuclear 
relations would have little influence on the outcome of the UK’s application.75 Yet Heath still 
believed that defence issues would be a key factor in displaying the UK’s commitment to the 
European project.
76
 The British Ambassador in Paris, Christopher Soames, also advised Heath 
that the “long term desirability of a European defence potential...will be the key element”.77  
On 20 May 1971 Heath met Pompidou in Paris to settle the final EC negotiation issues. Heath 
explained that the UK government did not want an exclusive partnership with the US. While the 
US “nuclear umbrella” provided an important security for Europe, the EC should also develop 
its defence role. However, Pompidou felt that “some kind of Anglo-French nuclear entente was 
not for the present”, reflecting the major difference in the nature of their two nuclear 
capabilities.
78
  Heath then wrote to Nixon, reporting that “I did not discuss defence questions at 
any length” and that “we did not go into nuclear matters”.79 This meeting indicated Heath’s 
strong desire to secure France’s definite support for UK membership of the community. It also 
showed that while raising the possibility of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration, Heath still held 
on to the importance of the US nuclear ‘guarantee’ in Europe and Anglo-American cooperation 
in the defence field.  
 The Heath government seriously considered the possibility of building closer nuclear 
relations with France during the UK’s negotiations to join the EC and in the long term as a 
member. The French independent stance on nuclear policy and the UK’s nuclear dependence on 
the US created major obstacles to any concrete developments on this issue 1970-1974. The US 
and the UK came to an early understanding on increased nuclear cooperation with France in the 
context of the Atlantic Alliance and Cold War. But complications grew over the need for the 
UK to update its nuclear system.   
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UK Polaris Upgrade and Anglo-American Relations - Research Stage, 1970-1972 
 
 The Heath government’s security policy, centred on US-UK nuclear collaboration, 
faced uncertainty in the early 1970s because of the growing sophistication of nuclear 
technology, arms limitation talks, and a possible movement towards Anglo-French nuclear 
collaboration for the defence of Europe. From 1970-1972, the UK government, at the top secret 
level, embarked on a ‘project definition stage’, which would conduct research into the 
improvement of the Polaris missile system. This phase displayed that the UK chose to extend 
Anglo-American defence cooperation rather than seeking a Europe-centred nuclear policy.  
SALT created a problem in Anglo-American nuclear relations under Heath and Nixon. 
The UK focussed on two major issues. Firstly, the UK wanted a reduction of Anti-Ballistic 
Missiles (ABMs) in Europe in order “to maintain the effectiveness of the British deterrent at the 
lowest possible cost”, while at the same time not leaving Europe exposed. Secondly, the Soviet 
Union wanted a SALT agreement to forbid the transfer of strategic nuclear arms and technology 
to third parties, which would thus include the UK’s Polaris system, dependent on the US. In 
light of SALT, a degree of UK anxiety existed on the issue of protecting the UK’s nuclear 
deterrent and NATO’s defence position in Europe.80  
The US and the UK kept in close contact throughout SALT. On 12 July 1970 Rogers 
promised to periodically brief the British Embassy in Washington. He also acknowledged the 
concerns of the UK government regarding the ‘no transfer’ issue and the level of ABMs.81 
Nixon also made an effort to keep Heath up-to-date with personal letters on the state of the 
SALT negotiations, especially in the build-up to the Nixon-Brezhnev meeting, explaining that 
SALT would be founded on “Western cohesion and the Atlantic Alliance”.82 On Kissinger’s trip 
to London in June 1971 he told British officials that “the no transfer issue at SALT appeared to 
be dormant”, although this fell short of a full confirmation that it would be left out of an 
agreement. Moreover, it seemed likely that the level of ABM systems permitted under SALT 
meant that the UK needed to either upgrade or replace their Polaris system in order for it to 
remain effective. Therefore, UK anxieties on this issue continued throughout both SALT I 
(1969-1972) and in the build-up to SALT II.
83
  
 On Heath’s entry into government in June 1970 the MOD pushed for an improvement 
to the Polaris missiles. The UK force consisted of four submarines with Polaris A-3 missiles, 
with at least one Polaris submarine on patrol at all times. Each submarine could potentially 
carry sixteen missiles with four warheads each, making a maximum of sixty-four warheads per 
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submarine.
84
 But intelligence sources suggested that the Soviet construction of complex Russian 
ABM systems around Moscow and the major cities of Western Russia, which included two 
large early warning radars, a large fire control radar (to calculate and track the path of 
warheads), and at least sixty-four missile launch sites, undermined the UK’s nuclear deterrent 
credibility. Carrington warned Heath that Polaris must be hardened, with special decoys added 
to confuse the Russian ABM defence system or the UK’s nuclear capability “will be virtually 
eliminated by the mid 1970s”. The MOD requested an immediate start to the project definition 
stage, with an initial research cost of £4 million over two years. After the first stage the actual 
Polaris improvement programme would cost an estimated £85 million over seven years.
85
 This 
project was known as Super Antelope.
86
 
 Some officials and members of the Heath government expressed scepticism at seeking a 
Polaris improvement because of détente and Britain’s application to join the EC. Solly 
Zuckerman wrote to Heath that the MOD’s plans were the start of a “slippery slope” towards a 
“further phase of an arms race”. Zuckerman criticised the MOD’s intelligence assumption that 
the Russians had an effective ABM system. He thought that the government should wait until 
after the SALT negotiations, which could possibly result in the complete abandonment of 
ABMs anyway.
87
 Robert Armstrong (Heath’s Principal Private Secretary) advised that the 
MOD’s upgrade plans involved going to the US for help which “would make it more difficult 
for us to make a deal with the French on nuclear policy”.88 The Ministerial Committee on 
Nuclear Policy convened on 20 July 1970 to discuss the MOD’s paper.89 Heath decided to delay 
any decision until September 1970 due to doubts over the progress of SALT, financial 
pressures, and the uncertainty over the future of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation.
90
                
On 21 October 1970 the MOD once again pushed for the launching of a project 
definition study into the improvement of the Polaris missile system. Carrington said that, 
according to the US, the prospect of a complete ABM ban in Europe under SALT seemed 
remote. He argued that the UK must act urgently “for us to bid for our requirements within the 
US planning schedule...at relatively little cost”. Otherwise the UK’s own experiments “would 
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be ten times more expensive”.91 Moreover, as discussed above, little progress had been made in 
discussing nuclear cooperation with the French. Heath subsequently agreed on 26 October 1970 
to the immediate start of the Super Antelope research project, to be completed by approximately 
1972, and that Carrington should inform the US Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.
92
  
Carrington and officials travelled to Washington on 23 November 1970, informing the 
US of the Polaris upgrade study. The British Ambassador in Washington, John Freeman, noted 
that “there was a good deal of understanding of our position” in a “relaxed and informal 
atmosphere”.93 From November 1970 and throughout 1971, the US supplied the UK with 
technical information on hardening modifications and provided the UK with space in their 
underground nuclear testing sites. But the US made no firm commitment beyond the project 
definition stage, and none of the previous Anglo-American nuclear agreements committed the 
US to assist in strengthening Polaris. If Nixon decided to back Super Antelope then the 1958 
agreement for atomic cooperation was broad enough to include such assistance. In fact, the US 
had already offered the UK the original US Antelope modifications, but Wilson turned it down 
in search of a stronger alternative.
94
 This early stage of the project development displayed the 
continuation of Anglo-American nuclear and defence cooperation during the UK’s negotiations 
to join the EC.  
On 17 April 1971 Nixon ordered an NSC examination into nuclear cooperation with 
Britain, taking into account the long term strategic and political implications of an improved 
Polaris system.
95
 Strategically, the NSC believed that the UK nuclear force “makes a relatively 
small contribution to US strategic objectives”, contributing about 7% of NATO’s total 
coverage. Moreover, the Polaris improvement focussed on UK national needs. This contradicted 
US nuclear doctrine of seeking central command over the nuclear forces of the alliance, 
although it noted that this “is no longer possible anyway” and that “the UK (and also the 
French) nuclear force could assume increasing importance” which could benefit the US. Neither 
French nor UK nuclear forces were capable against Russia without a US nuclear guarantee. But 
overall the NSC believed that strategically the UK nuclear force contributed to deterring a 
Soviet attack against Western Europe.
96
 
Politically, the Super Antelope projected partly conflicted with US détente policy. If 
US-UK collaboration on the project became known in Moscow, it might be viewed as 
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“circumventing” SALT and “aiding a third country” in the arms race.97 The US Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) wanted US support for Super Antelope to be on a case-by-
case basis with no long-term commitment because of the SALT negotiations and possible 
follow-on.
98
 The State Department also thought that the program “would be ill-timed and have 
adverse political impact during the forthcoming period” of détente.99 But the NSC decided that 
the upgrade “would not be likely to jeopardize our objective in SALT”.100  
In terms of Anglo-American and European relations, the NSC noted that “a positive 
response would be consistent with the overall political relationship which the President wants to 
maintain with the Heath government”. But the NSC thought that the UK Polaris upgrade 
affected “our entire European nuclear policy”. It could limit US flexibility on the possibility of 
future cooperation and movement towards a European nuclear force and discourage Anglo-
French collaboration. Furthermore, it “could jeopardize ratification of British accession, 
especially in France”.101 The CIA particularly focussed on this point, arguing that “US relations 
with the French could be adversely affected in the future”. It could also lead to “a fresh round of 
suspicion with regard to British intentions” in joining the EC, displaying concern for the ‘Trojan 
horse’ issue.102 However, the NSC report concluded that “the moment is not at hand to 
encourage UK-French nuclear cooperation”. The report demonstrated political and strategic 
support for the US-UK special nuclear relationship.
103
 
Most of the relevant heads of agencies and government departments largely agreed with 
the findings of the NSC report. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which had actively 
worked with the UK on the design and development of nuclear weapons for many years, wanted 
to continue the relationship for the benefit to both countries.
104
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff also 
welcomed the strengthening of the Polaris system, which supported their overall strategic 
position in Europe.
105
 The DOD thought that if the US terminated assistance it would 
fundamentally harm the US-UK political relationship. Moreover, it could “create problems 
concerning US base rights in the UK and its territories”, which indicated the importance of the 
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alliance to US security needs.
106
 Finally, Kissinger backed the UK’s plans “since the UK 
nuclear force contributes to western deterrence strength” and hence “it is in our interest to assist 
the British”.107 Nixon issued a directive on 29 July 1971 which approved US backing for the 
Super Antelope research project. But this directive did not commit the US to continued support 
for the actual development of the system – a presidential decision still needed to be made on a 
future UK nuclear deterrent.
108
 Nevertheless, this showed the continuation of the close Anglo-
American nuclear relationship for both political and strategic reasons during the research stage 
of the Polaris upgrade.                     
 In May 1972 the results of SALT I, which Heath and the FCO considered a major 
achievement, did not include a ‘no transfer’ clause.109 But another issue turned up in the SALT 
negotiations. The Soviet Union said that any rise in the combined number of ballistic missile 
submarines of the US, the UK, and France, would give the Soviet Union the right to increase 
their ceiling. But Nixon “firmly rejected” that third party nuclear weapons could be taken into 
account.
110
 Heath and UK officials soon turned their attention to SALT II and the importance of 
preserving the US commitment to the UK nuclear deterrent. Heath wrote to Nixon in June 1972, 
pleading for the US to avoid any ‘no transfer’ provisions in future US-Soviet bilateral arms 
agreements. Heath also thought that the Soviet Union were likely to raise the issue of UK and 
French nuclear capabilities in SALT II, and link it to US weapons as a whole, and therefore UK 
anxiety continued over arms negotiations and détente.
111
   
More importantly in terms of Super Antelope, the ABM Treaty permitted Russia to 
deploy one hundred ABM launchers around Moscow and to widen their radar arcs over the 
North Atlantic. The UK Polaris submarines contained insufficient fire power and strength to 
penetrate such a defence system, likely to be in place by 1975 according to British intelligence 
assessments. Therefore the UK Chiefs of Staff advised Heath that Britain “needs a new system” 
if the government wanted to retain a nuclear deterrent force.
112
  
The MOD reported to Heath on 6 November 1972 regarding the two year Super 
Antelope research project. It advocated and showed the continuation of the special Anglo-
American nuclear relationship. Throughout 1972 the original estimated cost of the study had 
steadily risen, from £4 million in 1970 to £7.5 million in February 1972, reaching £9 million by 
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April 1972.
113
 The Treasury accepted this, as an “integral part of our defence policies”, although 
it needed to come out of the MOD budget rather than a special fund.
114
 Heath also consented to 
the added cost, despite financial pressures, which pointed to the government’s commitment to 
an independent nuclear deterrent.
115
    
With the SALT issues temporarily out of the way until the end of the decade, the British 
dilemma centred on two issues. Firstly, to what degree should the UK pursue continued 
cooperation with the US, in relation to the degree of possible cooperation with the French, for 
both the life-time of the Polaris and its replacement into the 1990s and the 21
st
 century? By 
November 1972 the state of play indicated that Anglo-French collaboration, in the immediate 
term and up to the 1980s, would be of little significance, focussing on just the sharing of safety 
information and the coordination of nuclear targeting and deployment.
116
 The French 
government had adopted a non-committal stance. If France and Britain entered into an 
association for the creation of a European nuclear force, it raised questions regarding the level 
of German participation. The French had indicated to the UK government that they would not 
accept any German nuclear role.
117
 In order for the UK to have a credible nuclear deterrent for 
the rest of the 1970s and 1980s, the Heath government needed to deepen its nuclear relations 
with the US for the hardening of the Polaris, rather than wait for an EC defence posture to 
develop. Secondly, while the Conservative government politically backed the maintenance of a 
nuclear deterrent, and independence in the sense of deployment control, what degree of 
independence should the UK seek in terms of development and production? Under Nassau, the 
UK purchased US missiles, but built the submarines and nuclear warheads to preserve research 
knowledge and nuclear capability for the future.
118
 Therefore, the UK government needed to 
determine the level and type of Anglo-American collaboration.     
As a result of the project definition, the MOD recommended to Heath three options on 
maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrence: (1) Super Antelope; (2) Poseidon; (3) Hybrid/Stag. 
Discussions also took place on just building a fifth Polaris submarine without upgrading the 
missile or warhead capabilities, but in terms of cost and effectiveness, the MOD disregarded 
this option.
119
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Firstly, the Super Antelope option would have the penetration capability, could be 
developed in less than 10 years at a reasonable cost (£149 million), and protect UK nuclear 
expertise. As an upgrade to the Polaris missile, it would become obsolete after the US Navy 
took it out of service (around 1985) thus creating long-term uncertainty. But it would leave open 
the option of working with the French from the mid-1980s onwards for a replacement.  
The next option considered the purchasing of the US Poseidon – the second generation 
US Navy ballistic missile system which succeeded the Polaris from March 1971. A far superior 
system to the Polaris, it included the newly designed multiple independently targetable re-entry 
vehicle (MIRV) which allowed for 3-14 nuclear warheads on a single C3 missile, and it greatly 
improved accuracy and range. Thus, a single UK submarine could potentially launch 224 
warheads, compared to the 64 on a Polaris submarine, enhancing the UK’s deterrence 
capability. While the UK could retain its British-built warheads, the Poseidon would replace the 
UK’s own re-entry vehicle, increasing their dependence on US technology, and undermining 
future Anglo-French collaboration. Politically the US administration expressed reluctance to 
transfer the Poseidon MIRV technology to the UK because of Congressional limitations. 
Moreover, it had the highest cost of all the options. 
The third option, known as the Hybrid/Stag, examined the feasibility of combining a US 
Poseidon C3 missile (without the US designed MIRV) with an improved British warhead and 
re-entry vehicle, similar to the Super Antelope hardened weapon. At £146 million, it cost 
slightly less than the Super Antelope. This had the benefit of adding the next generation of 
missile to the UK fleet, with a far more accurate and larger load of weapons. It had a longer life 
than the Super Antelope, lasting into approximately the mid-1990s, and it matched technical 
developments in the US, thus making it easier for future upgrades. It also retained significant 
UK nuclear technology and expertise. By maintaining UK independence for future weapon 
development, it would help in Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. But at the same time, the 
Poseidon element of the Hybrid would make the UK force far superior to the French capability, 
creating an imbalance with the French, and requiring the transfer of US technical knowledge in 
any Anglo-French project. This would be a political problem for the US administration and the 
French government.
120
                
On 15 November 1972, Heath endorsed the “maintenance of our independent British 
strategic nuclear capability”. As a first step he would speak to Nixon at the upcoming meeting 
in Washington on examining the upgrade and improvement options, with preference for the 
Hybrid/Stag because of the retention of UK technology while adding the most sophisticated 
missiles. Heath also wanted to keep in mind the possibility of future Anglo-French nuclear 
collaboration in deciding which system to eventually adopt.
121
 This revealed that the UK 
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strongly support the continuation of US-UK nuclear relations in upgrading Polaris while also 
showing the Heath government’s long term consideration for future European defence 
cooperation. 
    
UK Polaris Upgrade and Anglo-American Relations – Decision Stage, 1973-1974 
 
At the Heath-Nixon meeting in Washington D.C in February 1973 Heath sought a firm 
US endorsement of the UK nuclear deterrent. As discussed previously, this meeting marked the 
high point of the Heath-Nixon relationship due to the UK’s continued support for Nixon’s 
Vietnam War policy. Coming one month after the UK’s EC accession, Nixon and Heath agreed 
on the need for a change in US-European trade and monetary relations, part of the build-up 
towards the ‘Year of Europe’. Nixon said that “he did not expect Britain to be the United States 
stooge in Europe”. This partly displayed recognition of the UK’s new role as a member of the 
EC. But it also hinted at previous Anglo-American discussions since 1970, in which the Heath 
government assured Nixon that the UK would seek to promote an Atlantic, outward looking EC.  
The discussion turned to nuclear relations. Heath handed Nixon an aide memoire, called 
“Improvement of British Strategic Submarine Deterrent Force”, submitted to the US 
administration on 18 January 1973, which set out the three options for the Polaris upgrade, 
indicating the UK government’s preference for the Hybrid/Stag solution. Heath said that he 
could not get an answer from the NSC on the political feasibility of the US selling the UK the 
Poseidon missiles system. Kissinger interjected: “this was because they were basically opposed 
to it”. Nixon said that he “was sympathetically disposed towards the idea of continuing 
collaboration with the United Kingdom on the deterrent” despite problems with the US 
Congress and with the Soviet Union during SALT II, and, subject to these obstacles, he would 
sell Poseidon if the UK wanted it.
122
 Nixon assigned James Schlesinger and Kissinger as the 
points of contact for future discussion, in order to prevent leaks from the DOD and military 
services.
123
 This meeting showed Anglo-American cooperation in defence and arms matters, and 
in some ways it represented the UK’s dependence on US nuclear research.     
Shortly after, on 1 March 1973, Kissinger met with the British Ambassador Lord 
Cromer in Washington and informed him that the US vetoed the Hybrid/Stag option due to 
technical difficulties. But Kissinger made a firm offer of a Poseidon missile system, a major 
move by the Nixon administration showing their commitment to support the continuation of the 
UK nuclear deterrent.
124
 Known as “Option M”, this offer included the Poseidon missile with a 
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Mark III re-entry warhead, without the MIRV technology. Although a US design, it could be 
built in Britain within three years. Option M offered a superior military system to the Super 
Antelope project, with up to ten warheads on the limited range missiles. Moreover, the Poseidon 
submarine tube would be compatible with the next generation missile system under 
development, called Trident. However, Option M would mean the abandonment of the UK’s 
current nuclear programs, resulting in a reduction in expertise and leading to greater dependence 
on US technology, which would also undermine any future European defence force.
125
 This 
created a dilemma for the UK government. The MOD advised Heath to go for Option M 
because of the “greater military advantages”, thus focussing on UK national interests.126 Trend 
told Heath that “the balance inclines rather more towards Option M”. Trend believed that 
Anglo-French collaboration seemed a distant and unlikely prospect and the UK’s dependence 
on the US would inevitably grow with the third generation of missiles in the 1990s, unless the 
UK decided to embark on a multi-billion pound project of nuclear research and development.
127
 
On 10 May 1973 Kissinger spoke to Trend, travelling through London to discuss the Year of 
Europe, saying that Option M would be the “sensible” choice for the UK  because it would 
mean “less work...in the United States uniquely for British purposes”, which added weight to 
the argument for adopting Poseidon.
128
  
On 15 June 1973 the UK pushed for the full Poseidon system, including the MIRV 
technology (excluded from Option M).
129
 Kissinger and Schlesinger told Trend on 1 July that 
they strongly opposed such a move. The Mark III re-entry warhead had the sufficient capability 
to beat Soviet ABMs and that MIRV “would cause major problems with Congress”. Legally, it 
came down to a presidential decision and if Heath “made a personal appeal” to Nixon then 
“there might be a 50/50 chance...despite Congressional problems”. Nevertheless, Kissinger 
suggested that “the president would be mightily relieved” if the UK “did not press the MIRV 
question”.130 Trend advised Heath that the chance of receiving a full MIRV Poseidon system 
seemed slim.
131
  
Meanwhile, Anglo-American tension had grown over Kissinger’s Year of Europe in 
July and August 1973, as discussed in chapter 3. Following a meeting of the nine members of 
the EC in Copenhagen on 23 July, Heath informed Nixon that the EC countries had decided to 
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share information on bilateral conversations with the US.
132
 Nixon expressed grave concern at 
this development.
133
 Then on 9 August, Kissinger spoke to Nixon on the telephone, declaring 
that “I’m cutting them off from intelligence special information...we can’t trust them for special 
relationship”. Nixon replied: “Sure. No special relations. Correct. They’ll have the relations 
with the French”, although they both suggested that this was just a tactic to encourage 
movement on the Year of Europe.
134
 On 31 August Trend told Heath that “we are now 
beginning to strain United States patience quite hard” on the nuclear options, especially in light 
of disagreements over the Year of Europe.
135
 Then on 3 October 1973 the Yom Kippur War 
broke out, which caused Anglo-American tension over Middle Eastern policy and the sharing of 
military facilities. The Heath government subsequently dropped the full Poseidon MIRV idea, 
thus leaving a choice between Option M and Super Antelope. 
On 30 October 1973 Heath held a meeting at 10 Downing Street with Douglas-Home, 
Barber and Carrington, which resulted in the firm decision to continue with the Super Antelope 
upgrade project. Heath believed that Super Antelope, although technically inferior to Option M, 
provided an adequate deterrent at a lower expenditure. The Treasury put up strong resistance to 
the more expensive Option M, which could result in a reduction of the UK’s conventional 
NATO forces in order to keep within the reduced 1976-1977 defence budget. Super Antelope 
would also preserve UK nuclear expertise and allow for Anglo-French nuclear collaboration in 
the 1980s.
136
 Nevertheless, it still constituted a major US-UK joint nuclear development project. 
The new Cabinet Secretary John Hunt strongly advised not informing the US until after the New 
Year due to the problems over the Middle East and the Year of Europe. As Kissinger and the 
administration preferred Option M, Hunt thought that “in the present climate their immediate 
reaction might be that we have once again failed to follow their advice”, which Heath 
supported.
137
 
On 2 January 1974 Heath wrote to Nixon expressing the importance of improving the 
UK’s strategic forces and requesting cooperation with the Super Antelope project. He suggested 
that the key factor centred on the slightly reduced cost of the Super Antelope over Option M. 
This would allow the UK to maintain its NATO conventional forces, as well as its military 
bases around the world within its limited defence budget.
138
 On 9 January Cromer informally 
spoke to Kissinger who “was quite certain” that Nixon would approve the UK’s request. 
However, the “defense people” wanted to link nuclear cooperation with a US request to build 
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new facilities on the British Indian Ocean base Diego Garcia and that UK assurance on this 
“would be very welcome”.139 The MOD viewed the expansion as “safeguarding Western 
interests” against Soviet expansion in the Indian Ocean and that the UK would have access to 
the new facilities. They feared that the “Arabs might act against our oil interests” for helping the 
Americans in the region. But in light of the Polaris upgrade the MOD backed a positive 
response.
140
 Douglas-Home swiftly replied, on 12 January, that UK ministers agreed to the US 
Diego Garcia request.
141
 Subsequently, Comer met with Nixon on 17 January who said that on 
Super Antelope the UK “could take it as agreed”.142 Nixon formally wrote to Heath on 19 
January approving the continuation of US-UK nuclear cooperation and supporting the 
maintenance of the UK’s NATO conventional capabilities.143 In March 1974 the UK renamed 
the Super Antelope project “Chevaline”.     
The level of assistance that the UK would need under this program represented a major 
step up from previous cooperation. Previously the UK purchased the necessary items developed 
by the US, such as with the Polaris missiles, and then built their own supplementary hardware. 
However, under Super Antelope / Chevaline the US would need to provide facilities, 
manpower, and technical assistance on the design and system integration, amounting to a major 
modification specifically for the UK Polaris.
144
 This displayed the continuation of high level 
Anglo-American cooperation in nuclear affairs while the UK joined the EC.   
  
Conclusion 
 
On East of Suez, the Heath government believed that a limited political and military 
role in Southeast Asia would support the Atlantic Alliance and help maintain close cooperation 
with the US while seeking entry into the EC. Domestically, retaining a presence East of Suez 
also provided a method of opposing the Labour Party in the defence field. The US welcomed 
the Heath government’s decision as a reversal of the current trend of the UK reducing its world-
wide presence, which could possibly leave a power vacuum in the Middle East and Indian 
Ocean. However, the administration recognised that the Heath government’s move did not 
amount to a significant reversal, and that the US might need to increase its role in the region, 
particularly in the Persian Gulf. The initial establishment of limited facilities at Diego Garcia 
1970-1973, and the subsequent decision to upgrade the base in January 1974, reflected the US 
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and UK fears of increasing Soviet activities in the region. It also showed the continuation of 
close Anglo-American cooperation over world-wide military facilities.      
 In nuclear relations the UK gave serious consideration to the possibility of building a 
European nuclear defence force through Anglo-French collaboration, which challenged Anglo-
American nuclear cooperation, one of the cornerstones and the special relationship. However, 
the incompatibility of the UK and French nuclear forces prevented any major initiative of 
substance. Meanwhile, the UK negotiated with the US the upgrade of the Polaris system. This 
chapter has argued that Britain’s entry into the EC did not weaken the core of the Anglo-
American partnership. Close defence and intelligence cooperation continued into the future and 
up to the present.    
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Conclusion 
 
 This study has looked at the impact of Britain’s application to join the EC on Anglo-
American relations under Heath and Nixon, within the context of overall foreign policy. It has 
contributed towards the historiographical discussion with a revised interpretation of this subject 
and by using new sources. Firstly, it has analysed the degree of ‘Europeanisation’ in Anglo-
American relations in a more detailed, nuanced way than in previous studies of the Heath-Nixon 
partnership. Secondly, it has closely examined the key political, economic, and defence issues 
that arose as a result of Britain’s application and membership of the EC, 1970-1974. This 
enhances and supplements our previous understanding of the subject, which in turn can be built 
on by other historians in the future. The results are discussed below in greater detail. 
This thesis has taken into account the formal constitutional structures, actual political 
power, and the political conditions of 1970-1974, which are all important factors in diplomatic 
history (see chapter 1). This has included an investigation of the (a) party system and elections, 
(b) the executive office, and (c) the legislative/executive balance of power. It has also 
considered the role of pressure groups, media, and public opinion, and the various methods of 
policy making which shaped the Heath government and the Nixon administration. In the US and 
the UK the balance of power in the domestic political system and the method of policy making 
selected by the executive influenced foreign affairs.  
In the US in the early 1970s the Congress, controlled by the Democratic Party, sought 
to reassert its role in the making of foreign policy and control over budgets and domestic 
projects. This clashed with the Republican Party-controlled White House, creating a period of 
increased legislative-executive tension. This can be seen in the legislative ping-pong between 
the White House and Congress over trade policy and in the debate over the number of US troops 
stationed abroad. Of course, the free trade/protectionist dispute and domestic conflict over 
foreign policy had deeper roots, such as the US budget and liquidity deficit, but the balance of 
power exacerbated these issues. Two other domestic factors greatly influenced the conduct of 
Nixon’s foreign policy. Firstly, the success of his “Southern Strategy” during the presidential 
elections of 1968 and 1972 depended on the support of rural America, the heartland and 
southern states, who broadly backed Nixon’s Vietnam War policy and had strong ties to farming 
lobby groups in Washington, thus having an influence on foreign economic and Cold War 
policy. Secondly, Nixon implemented reforms to centralise foreign policy making in the White 
House, through the NSC, which increased internal friction. Party differences and branch 
rivalries both contributed towards domestic political conflict.    
A special note needs to be made on the Nixon-Kissinger method of policy making. On 
the process of détente, rapprochement with China, and the ending of the Vietnam War,  Nixon 
and Kissinger operated both under the formal structures of the NSC as well as in secrecy, 
excluding federal government departments and agencies, and the Congress. In one revealing 
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telephone conversation, Nixon reassured Kissinger that his secret “trip to Moscow was 
indispensable. Gee, State and those people just haven’t the slightest. That was the key to the 
whole thing”.1 Moreover, Nixon claimed that Rogers “had nothing to do with it”.2 Nixon noted 
just a few days before the signing of SALT that “I know Rogers will be smart enough to know 
that Brezhnev and I didn’t sit down and concoct the whole thing” i.e. that Kissinger had taken 
on the role often filled by the Secretary of State.
3
 Yet complicated arms control negotiations,  
the opening of China, and Vietnam peace negotiations could not possibly be conducted alone, 
and thus discussions took places within the formal structures, while Kissinger and Nixon dealt 
with the key negotiations and decisions. Meanwhile, the development of US policy on Britain 
and the EC enlargement took place through NSC committees in which the State Department, the 
Treasury, and the USDA took a leading role. They also conducted the trade negotiations with 
the UK, while Kissinger and Nixon determined the broader political strategy of US European 
policy. But when it came to the NEP, Kissinger and the State Department were out of the loop, 
while Nixon formed the policy with a group of three or four key economic advisers. This shows 
the varied nature of policy-making methods.  
In the UK, Heath had only a small majority of thirty in the House of Commons, reduced 
to seventeen by 1974, which strengthened the party fringes in the parliament. EC policy divided 
opinion on all political sides in the UK and thus Heath encountered a tough legislative battle on 
European policy. The survival of the government depended on the passing of the European 
Communities Bill, which influenced the terms of entry, such as seeking an acceptable deal for 
the Commonwealth. Heath also took steps to increase the power of the Prime Minister’s Office, 
although this failed to break Whitehall departmentalism. Therefore the FCO, the MOD, and the 
Treasury all played a key role in forming policy. While the cabinet contained influential 
members of the government, Heath frequently turned to an inner-circle of advisers, especially in 
dealing with the Bretton Woods monetary crisis, the decision to float the pound, and on the 
Polaris upgrade. The cabinet committees handled the detailed consideration of the EC 
negotiation strategy, such as the Ministerial Committee on the Approach to Europe and the 
Ministerial Committee on Agricultural Policy. The UK’s application to join the EC involved 
constitutional change and challenged traditional views on UK foreign policy, and thus the 
unions and businesses, public opinion, and parliamentary politics featured prominently on the 
domestic scene. These domestic issues filtered through to Anglo-American relations, therefore 
showing the interaction between international relations and the domestic environment.   
Chapter two adds to the historical debate by providing a finer and more distinct 
understanding of the EC enlargement in the overall foreign policies of the Heath and Nixon 
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governments.  In the US, the Nixon administration primarily focused on relations with Russia, 
China, and Vietnam. Important to this strategy was the strength and credibility of NATO and 
the Atlantic Alliance, of which European integration played a part. Three important influences 
on US policy were rough arms parity, the Sino-Soviet split, and economic problems. The State 
Department and the White House largely supported the enlargement of the EC for political 
reasons and indicated that they were willing for the US to pay in the economic sphere in order 
to support the stability of Western Europe which would benefit their Cold War strategy. 
However, the USDA, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Commerce, along with 
major sections of the Democratic Party-controlled Congress, called for a major re-adjustment of 
US policy.  They wanted the US to take a more active role in safeguarding US agricultural and 
industrial trade from unfair EC trading practices, through bilateral and multilateral trade 
negotiations or retaliatory protectionist measures. This put pressure on Nixon to confront the EC 
and potentially cause tension in the Anglo-American relationship during Britain’s EC 
negotiations. However, while Nixon’s early policy on the EC gave greater consideration to US 
trade interests, he maintained a commitment to the enlargement and integration of the EC, with 
Britain as a member. It also indicated that Nixon and the State Department believed that Britain 
would have a liberalising impact on the EC which would benefit the US and that British 
accession would not jeopardise the Anglo-American relationship. The administration therefore 
adopted a ‘hands-off’ posture to the negotiations.       
Long term economic, political and strategic changes took place in British policy 
between 1945 and 1970, from a focus on empire and the Commonwealth to European 
integration. This can be particularly seen in the trade field, although the Commonwealth still 
remained a key trading partner, while the US was the most important single country to the UK 
economy. Since the creation of the European integration movement in the 1950s Heath had 
strongly supported British participation and the ideal of European unity. He also believed that 
membership of the EC would increase Britain’s world influence and re-invigorate the economy.  
FCO policy in 1970 flowed from the Wilson government’s decision to withdraw from East of 
Suez and to concentrate on the European field. The FCO strongly viewed membership of the EC 
as a means of increasing world influence and maintaining a strong relationship with the US, 
especially in the intelligence and nuclear field. The Heath government adopted a similar view, 
in which their two key priorities were gaining entry into the EC and protecting the close Anglo-
American relationship. However, in the short term, the government signalled the primacy of the 
EC application. The government also wanted to focus on improving relations with France and 
removing political ‘Trojan horse’ suspicions. Thus, the Heath government sought to balance 
relations between the EC members and the Anglo-American relationship.   
In early Anglo-American political relations (chapter 3), 1970-1971, a fine balancing and 
subtle adjustment took place in light of the UK’s application to join the EC and subsequent 
membership. Immediately, Anglo-American discussions displayed a tension between the two 
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strands of preserving US-UK cooperation and not sending the wrong signals to France. This 
meant that the Heath government’s policy towards France played an essential part in the 
development of the Anglo-American alliance during the EC enlargement process. Heath tried to 
strike a balance between reassuring France of the UK’s commitment to the European integration 
project, while also maintaining a close Anglo-American relationship under the radar so as not to 
jeopardise the membership application. The Nixon Administration understood this policy and 
adopted a “hands-off” approach to the EC enlargement, which revealed a high level of 
understanding. Trouble soon developed over China policy in May 1971 because of a lack of 
communication and a long term policy divide over Chinese representation at the UN. This had 
nothing to do with European integration, and, ultimately, both sides wanted to improve relations 
with China, and so it did not cause a major rift.  
In Britain’s first year of EC membership two major incidents occurred: the Year of 
Europe and the Yom Kippur War, both usually presented by historians as examples of Heath’s 
Europeanism and as a fundamental shift in the alliance. However, the ‘rift’ has been overstated 
and close cooperation continued. On the Year of Europe, from April 1973, institutional and 
policy-making methods caused significant problems. Heath had sought to respond positively to 
the Atlantic initiative, but he, and the US, encountered an unwieldy EC that found it difficult to 
form a common political position in a short period of time. Moreover, the secretive nature of the 
Nixon-Kissinger policy machine contributed towards a lack of communication and the creation 
of unrealistic expectations. At this point Kissinger declared to Nixon that he was cutting the UK 
off from special relations because Heath wanted to share information on US-UK bilateral 
discussions with his EC partners. Meanwhile, the Yom Kippur war broke out in October 1973, 
causing further strain in the Anglo-American relationship. The key factor in this was diverging 
interests and long term disagreement over Middle Eastern policy, rather than specifically related 
to the UK’s membership of the EC. During this crisis, major consultation and intelligence 
sharing took place, and a few months later Nixon approved the upgrade of the UK’s nuclear 
system, therefore showing that the administration had not really terminated the close Anglo-
American relationship.         
Chapter 4 revealed the specific details of Anglo-American trade relations and the EC 
enlargement, adding to our understanding of the 1970-72 EC negotiations and the Heath-Nixon 
relationship. The Nixon administration’s failure to pass a trade bill from 1969-1974 and 
Congressional protectionist rhetoric, as represented through the Mills Bill (1969-1971), caused 
tension and problems in international trade affairs and Anglo-American economic relations. 
However, it also provided a bargaining chip for Nixon to use during the EC enlargement 
negotiations; in seeking to have US interests taken into account, Nixon warned the UK that 
continued unfair EC trading practises would lead to Congressional retaliation. Likewise, Heath 
and the EC were able to use the Mills Bill in defending their trade practices. 
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The UK sought to introduce agricultural levies, a system similar to the CAP, while also 
seeking to protect UK-Commonwealth trading links as part of their application to join the EC, 
from 1970-1971. The USDA pushed the UK to moderate their agricultural policies and 
questioned the assumption that the UK may have a liberalising effect on the EC. Once again, the 
UK government feared that they might appear as an Atlantic ‘Trojan horse’ if trade concession 
were made under US pressure, and therefore Anglo-American trade tensions grew. The UK 
eventually dropped their levy price levels, with the presentation geared towards helping Nixon’s 
domestic problems, while avoiding any suggestion that the UK would seek to modify the EC’s 
agricultural prices as a member. On the Commonwealth, the UK had a long standing political 
and economic commitment to the territories, which ensured that Commonwealth relations 
played an important role in the UK’s application to join the EC. This led to the direct US 
intervention in the negotiations. But eventually the US accepted Commonwealth association as 
a necessary part of the UK’s attempt to join the EC, which the Nixon administration supported. 
These trade negotiations revealed a way in which Anglo-American relations became 
‘Europeanised’. Nevertheless, the UK continued to pursue relations with the US and the 
Commonwealth territories in a traditional way, as shown in their inter-governmental 
negotiations, and there remained a degree of trade and economic inter-dependence between the 
UK and the US. Moreover, while the US defended its trade and monetary interests, it continued 
to back the enlargement of the EC. Therefore the US-UK relationship subtly adjusted, creating 
new multilateral ties with the EC, rather than fundamentally changing.  
A similar adjustment occurred in Anglo-American monetary relations, dealt with in 
chapter 5. From 1969-1970, the EC took major steps towards European economic and monetary 
union. But the monetary crisis of the early 1970s meant that the Werner Plan was widely seen as 
dead by 1974-1975. The EC resumed plans for monetary union in 1979 with the creation of the 
European Monetary System, which included the Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) to align EC 
currencies, the development of which continued throughout the 1980s. While there were periods 
of serious exchange-rate volatility, such as the monetary crisis of 1992-1993 when sterling and 
the Italian lira left the ERM, the EC managed to establish a single currency, the euro, on 1 
January 1999. By 2011, 26% of world monetary reserves were held in the euro currency, second 
only to the US dollar.
4
 Created thirty years after the original Werner Plan, the Heath 
government correctly informed the Nixon administration in 1971 that EMU would take “a very 
long time”.5 Nevertheless, EMU and sterling cannot be overlooked in the debate over the Heath 
government’s application to join the EC. Solving the monetary issues were a key to the 
successful outcome of the negotiations.       
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 The Heath Government’s early policy on sterling and the EC negotiations from June 
1970 to March 1971 sought to avoid monetary matters in the EC enlargement process. The 
Heath government focussed on improving political relations with France. The central topics 
covered in the official EC accession negotiations focused on Britain’s Commonwealth trade 
relations, community finance, and agricultural transitional arrangements, not on European 
monetary integration or the role of sterling. However, it eventually became clear to the British 
government from March to May 1971 that the “Trojan horse” issue was not the stumbling block 
to a successful EC application, but that the problem of sterling needed to be resolved in order to 
gain French support for UK membership. Heath committed Britain to a run-down of the sterling 
balances and the adoption of a single European currency at the Heath-Pompidou summit in May 
1971. Therefore, the Heath government fully backed the EC integration project. Following the 
flotation of sterling in June 1972, the Sterling Area progressively disintegrated, although the 
problem of the sterling balances continued into the late 1970s.
6
  
The issue of sterling and EMU never really took off in Anglo-American relations during 
this period. Internally, the US Treasury, the USDA, and the Department of Commerce 
expressed scepticism about the long term economic implications of EC enlargement and greater 
monetary integration. Some members of the administration saw the enlargement negotiations as 
an opportunity to substitute US support of the sterling balances with EC guarantees, thus 
relieving pressure on the dollar. However, both State and the White House strongly supported 
enlargement and EMU as a key part of the Western alliance.   
International economic relations were transformed from the 1950s US monetary and 
economic hegemony into a system of strong economic competition between the US, EC, and 
Japan and the rest of Asia from the 1970s onwards. This represented a growth of new 
commercial rivals with greater economic status in the system. It also marks the beginning of 
open market, flexible exchange rates. However, the collapse of Bretton Woods did not lead to a 
multi-polar currency system. The dollar remained the dominant international currency. By the 
first quarter of 2011, 60% of world currency reserves were held in US dollars, enabling the US 
to retain its monetary power.
7
     
Structurally, the Bretton Woods set-up failed to deal with the issues of liquidity and 
adjustment which caused instability in the international economy. Moreover, the unique position 
of the dollar in the Bretton Woods system created a conflict between national and international 
currency objectives. In terms of government policy, the US ran a persistent liquidity balance of 
payments deficit throughout the 1960s, which undermined international confidence in the 
reserve role of the dollar. This long-term problem contributed towards a shift in Nixon’s Cold 
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War strategy, through the policies of the Nixon Doctrine, Vietnamisation, détente, and the 
opening of China, in which the US sought to reduce its world-wide military commitments and 
create a more stable international system for economic cooperation. Furthermore, the US 
government introduced policies, through the NEP, that sought a fundamental re-organisation of 
the Bretton Woods set-up rather than just a ‘band-aid’. But the Smithsonian Agreement ended 
up being only a temporary solution because it did not fix the structural flaws in the Bretton 
Woods system. The Nixon administration also acted in the international monetary field for 
domestic political reasons.     
Between August and December 1971 Anglo-American relations suffered a breakdown 
in cooperation and communication, brought on by Nixon’s NEP. During the four months of 
negotiations at the G-10 and IMF Heath wanted to form a common position with the EC 
countries, although they could not agree amongst themselves, hindering the monetary 
integration movement. Bilateral discussions during the crisis displayed Anglo-American tension 
on both the way the NEP was introduced and the substance of reform. After the Bermuda fence-
mending, close Anglo-American cooperation continued throughout 1972 and up to the February 
1973 Washington meeting. Nixon had continued to back the UK’s membership negotiations 
during the monetary crisis, and after Britain’s accession both sides cooperated in trade and 
monetary affairs. In the aftermath of the Bretton Woods and Smithsonian monetary crises, the 
shared economic philosophies, common political systems, and the similar, well-connected 
financial centres of London and New York remained. This ensured that the UK was neither 
fundamentally tied to a future EC currency nor to the dollar, but operated in between these two 
currency blocs, influenced by both. Anglo-American economic and monetary relations remained 
significant.     
While an alteration took place in the economic field, Anglo-American defence 
collaboration strengthened under Heath and Nixon (chapter 6). The US and UK shared a vast 
array of military bases – many built and funded by the US on UK territories, and hence 
beneficial to both parties, as shown over Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. On East of Suez, the 
Heath government supported a limited political and military role which would support the 
Atlantic Alliance and help maintain cooperation with the US while negotiating entry into the 
EC. This showed that the Heath government wanted to retain a world defence role, not just a 
regional, European one as argued by some historians.  
During the SALT negotiations, the UK expressed concern about the level of ABMs 
permitted, and that an agreement might prohibit the transfer of nuclear knowledge and 
technology to third parties. As it turned out, SALT did not include a ‘no transfer’ clause. 
However, the number of ABMs permitted under the agreement meant that the UK needed to 
upgrade their nuclear system. The Heath government supported the continuation of an 
independent nuclear deterrent, while the US administration believed that further collaboration 
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would strengthen western deterrence. Thus, the US and UK embarked on a collaborative 
program to consider all viable options.  
At the same time, Heath revived interest in the idea of Anglo-French collaboration 
during the EC negotiations – but it only remained an idea. He thought that this would be 
important in displaying the UK’s commitment to future European defence. The issue caused a 
divide in Whitehall. The MOD strongly objected to making a serious move because it might 
harm the reality and substance of US-UK nuclear cooperation for the vague possibility of 
Anglo-French collaboration. But the FCO wanted to make a positive move towards the French, 
in order to bring them back into a collective NATO or European defence system. Heath sided 
with the FCO, and approached the US administration, who expressed support for the UK’s 
efforts to increase defence cooperation with France. However, the differences in the UK and 
French forces prevented any substantial developments.          
The US and UK thus pushed on in the nuclear field. A range of issue were considered, 
which centred around four main questions. Firstly, which option allowed for Anglo-French 
cooperation beyond the 1980s? Secondly, whether the UK’s nuclear knowledge and research 
skills in developing nuclear weapons should be preserved? Thirdly, which option was actually 
technically feasible? Fourthly, which option could the UK afford? The final decision, the Super 
Antelope, indicated that the UK government wanted to preserve their nuclear expertise, while 
retaining the option to work with the French in the 1990s. Moreover, a key factor proved to be 
the defence budget. In the final US-UK negotiations over the upgrade, the US managed to link it 
to a DOD request to expand the military facilities at Diego Garcia. This nuclear upgrade 
required extensive US-UK collaboration, therefore showing the continuation of special nuclear 
relations during the EC enlargement.     
Finally, Britain and the US started to re-develop strong bilateral relations in the Heath-
Nixon era, although by 1974 personal relations at the top had deteriorated. It primarily remained 
important because of mutual security and defence policies in the Cold War context, and 
economic cooperation. However, while the British still assigned key importance to the “natural” 
Anglo-American relationship, the US placed a greater priority on working with other powers, 
such as Russia and China, as well as dealing with the Vietnam War and building ties with other 
Western European countries. The emergence of Japan, Germany, and the EC as a whole reduced 
the importance of Britain in overall US foreign policy. The Anglo-American relationship had 
deteriorated in the late 1960s under Wilson and Johnson because of Vietnam, Britain’s relative 
economic decline and weakness, and the military and political withdrawal from East of Suez. 
But Nixon and Kissinger viewed Britain as an important ally, in which many policies and 
interests merged, and as a key gateway into Europe. Therefore, frequent and open policy 
discussions took place between Heath and Nixon and in the bureaucracies, which sustained the 
political and defence alliance in the field of Cold War diplomacy. This is illustrated by the high 
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level of US-UK nuclear cooperation during the Heath-Nixon years, as well as the sharing of 
military facilities.  
 However, Anglo-American relations during 1970-1974 deteriorated at specific stages 
and episodes. In late 1970 and early 1971 tension grew in trade policy, as components of the 
UK’s application to join the EC. In the second half of 1971 Heath complained about a lack of 
communication over the “Nixon Shocks”, as did other countries. This caused a four month crisis 
in Anglo-American relations on the reform of the Bretton Woods system, until the fence 
mending of the Heath-Nixon Bermuda summit in December 1971. Throughout 1972 and the 
first half of 1973, Anglo-American relations returned to a healthy state of frequent consultation 
and cooperation. But from mid-1973 tensions grew to a greater degree, especially in personal 
relations between Kissinger and Heath, which also rubbed off on Nixon, over the “Year of 
Europe” and the Yom Kippur War. But at a functional, official level, good bilateral relations 
continued between the UK and US throughout the Nixon-Heath period. Kissinger’s closest 
foreign government contacts were British officials – Sir Thomas Brimelow, John Freeman, and 
Sir Burk Trend - whom he regularly consulted on all foreign policy issues.  
Britain’s entry into the EC did not re-define the Anglo-American relationship within a 
purely EC context. Britain sought to strike a balance between Anglo-American relations and EC 
membership. Meanwhile, Nixon supported greater integration and the development of a strong, 
united Western Europe. This, it was hoped, would help maintain a strong Western alliance. 
Anglo-American bilateral relations adapted to the EC enlargement and retained its importance. 
The transformation of the international monetary system, an increase in China’s diplomatic 
status, developing trade disputes, and the steps taken to strengthen the economic and political 
integration of the EC during the Heath-Nixon period have all had an impact on contemporary 
international relations. Furthermore, the investigation into shared and diverging Anglo-
American security, political, and economic interests are still relevant to policy-makers today. 
This study has contributed to the scholarly inquiry into 1970s Anglo-American relations which 
will continue into the future. 
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